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“Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can
be counted”
– Albert Einstein
“It is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong”
– John Maynard Keynes
1.1 Background
Understanding the sources of economic growth and differences in income across countries
are at the heart of the economics profession. Ever since Solow (1956) and Swan (1956)
developed neo-classical growth model, economists have sought to distinguish between
two proximate causes of economic growth and income differences: factor accumulation
and total factor productivity (TFP). The conventional wisdom that TFP accounts for
the bulk of growth and cross-country income differences is challenged (e.g. Corrado,
Hulten & Sichel, 2009) as the modern economy, characterised by the pervasive use of
information and communications technology (ICT), is in the midst of rapid changes.
As a “General Purpose Technology” (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995), ICT facilitate
numerous complementary innovations which enhance firm productivity by reducing
costs and by enabling firms to develop new products or improve in the intangible aspects
of existing products like convenience and timeliness (Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2000). As a
consequence, business investment in traditional assets like machinery and buildings












knowledge-based intangible assets, such as product design, marketing, and management
practices, which are increasingly seen as the key creators of value for businesses.1 The
rising trend of these new types of investment suggests that the standard empirical
analyses of growth based on traditional factor inputs (i.e. labour and physical capital)
are missing out on an important part of investment in the 21st century and are no
longer well-suited for understanding the drivers of modern economic growth.
A new strand of literature emerged over the last decade aiming to correct for the
way that business activities are depicted in macroeconomic data and analysis. This is
done by broadening the investment concept beyond spending on physical assets. It is
argued that as long as current resources are committed to provide for future rather than
current consumption, any expenditures, either on tangible or intangible assets, should
be capitalised and included in a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) as business
investment (Corrado, Hulten & Sichel, 2005). The argument gained momentum among
scholars and policy makers alike and eventually led to the development of a broad
scheme for categorising and measuring business intangible investment that should be
included in a country’s national accounts. The upper panel of Figure 1.1 provides a list
of intangible assets that have been proposed by the pioneers in this research (Corrado
et al., 2005). Based on this expanded conceptual framework, a growing body of work
has shown that there is a clear shift in the investment composition towards knowledge-
based intangible assets at the aggregate economy level (Corrado, Haskel, Jona-Lasinio
& Iommi, 2012; OECD, 2013a). This is especially true for industrialised economies, such
as the U.S. where intangible investment had already exceeded traditional investment in
physical assets by the early 1990s and has kept on increasing over time (see the lower
panel of Figure 1.1).
Economic research on the importance of intangible assets is not new, starting with
research on the economic impact of investment in research and development (R&D).
These studies tried to determine how R&D investment enhances the productivity of
investing firms (Griliches, 1979, 1987; Mansfield, 1965) and how the newly developed
knowledge could ‘spill over’ to other firms or industries working on related technologies
(Bernstein & Nadiri, 1988; Griliches, 1992) as well as affect rivals in product markets
(Bloom, Schankerman & Van Reenen, 2013). With the rapid advances in ICT in
the 1980s, later research focused on the role of ICT in productivity and growth
(e.g. Colecchia & Schreyer, 2002; Van Ark, O’Mahony & Timmer, 2008) and how
1The value of some global leading companies, such as Facebook and Microsoft, is largely accounted for
by their intangible assets (Hulten, 2010). Moreover, international production fragmentation is another
salient feature of the modern economy. Much research (e.g. Dedrick, Kraemer & Linden, 2010) has
shown that the highest level of value creation in a global value chain is often found in activities like
research and development, marketing and branding, and customer services, signifying the important
role of knowledge-based capital in today’s economy.
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Figure 1.1: List of Intangibles Proposed and Investment Trend in the U.S.











• Entertainment and artistic originals
• Design and other new product development costs
• Branding (market research and long-lived advertising)
• Firm-specific human capital (training)
• Organisation capital (business process development)
Source: Corrado and Hulten (2014)
its productive potential could be better exploited with complementary investments in
firm-specific human capital and organisational structures (Bloom, Sadun & Van Reenen,
2012; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2000, 2003). According to an important macroeconomic study
by Basu, Fernald, Oulton and Srinivasan (2004), these complementary investments to
ICT play a substantial role in explaining why productivity growth accelerated in the
U.S. but slowed down in the U.K., driving a productivity gap across the Atlantic in the
second half of the 1990s.
Building on the pioneering measurement work of Corrado et al. (2005), more recent
literature begins to incorporate intangible assets into a standard ‘sources-of-growth’
framework and examine how the inclusion of intangibles affects the growth patterns of
a country (e.g. Corrado et al., 2012, 2009; Fukao, Miyagawa, Mukai, Shinoda & Tonogi,
2009). In general, these studies find that intangible capital is an important source of
growth: measured investment rates are higher than when only traditional physical assets
are considered. Most importantly, once intangible capital is accounted for the role of
(residual) total factor productivity becomes smaller.
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In spite of the progress made over the last decade, much remains to be done to better
understand the role of intangible capital in productivity and modern economic growth.
This thesis seeks to contribute to this rapidly evolving field of research by providing
four original studies that each take on a different aspect and focus of intangible capital.
(a) Knowledge spillovers from intangibles
Intangible assets are often non-rival and non-excludable, which open up the possibility
of knowledge spillovers (Nakamura, 2010). In the case of R&D, this has long been known
(Bloom, Schankerman & Van Reenen, 2013; Griliches, 1992). However, investment in
R&D may not be the only source of knowledge spillovers between firms. Recent research
has also shown knowledge spillovers from a broad set of non-R&D intangible assets
using industry-level data (Goodridge, Haskel & Wallis, 2012a) or economy-wide data
(Corrado, Haskel & Jona-Lasinio, 2014). Yet no study has focused on the potential
spillovers from investment in organisation capital, the knowledge of management know-
how and organisational structures at the firm level. This is despite the fact that the
firm is the most appropriate unit for analysing spillovers, as estimation at the industry
or economy-wide level cannot readily distinguish between productive benefits from
own-firm investments and spillovers from investment in organisation capital by other
firms. One example of such a spillover is Toyota’s just-in-time production process that
quickly spread to other car manufacturers (Liker & Morgan, 2006). Another example
of the diffusion of management knowledge is the build-to-order (BTO) distribution
system that originated with Dell Computers, but that has since been copied by firms in
other industries, such as BMW (Gunasekaran & Ngai, 2005). Despite these promising
cases, more comprehensive analysis on the potential spillover effects from investment in
organisation capital had been lacking and Chapter 2 is the first to provide this.
Following the broader microeconomic literature (e.g. Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013),
we use selling, general and administrative (SGA) expenses, an income statement item
widely reported by U.S. firms, to proxy for organisation capital investment. We expect
that firms are more likely to learn and benefit from the investments of firms that
have similar technological characteristics, while firm profitability is likely to suffer from
investments in organisation capital made by close competitors, i.e. firms that are selling
in similar markets. We follow the methodology of Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen
(2013) for the empirical analysis. Drawing on a large sample of company accounts data
for 1,266 U.S. manufacturing firms over the period 1982-2011, we do not find evidence of
i
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knowledge spillovers from organisation capital that increase the productivity or market
valuation of technologically similar firms. This lack of evidence stands in contrast to
recent studies by Goodridge et al. (2012a) and Corrado et al. (2014) that do find positive
productivity spillovers from broader measures of non-R&D intangible capital using more
aggregate data. Given these differences, we argue that knowledge spillovers seem more
likely to stem from intangible assets other than organisation capital and future research
should look into these assets as a source of spillovers.
(b) Complementarity between intangibles and ICT
The complementary nature of intangible assets to ICT investment is well-established in
microeconomic studies for U.S. firms (e.g. Bloom et al., 2012). However, little is known
whether this relationship can be generalised to the macroeconomic level as comparable
information on intangible investment at the level of industries for a set of countries had
long been lacking. This question is not only interesting in its own right, but it could also
be important to better understand why Europe has shown slower productivity growth
than the U.S. since the mid-1990s. Prior studies by Basu et al. (2004) and Corrado et
al. (2014) are two initial attempts at providing corroborating macroeconomic evidence.
We further contribute to the literature by exploiting a newly developed intangible
investment data at the industry-level, which provides a useful source of variation that
could help to pin down the complementary relationship between intangibles and ICT.
More specially, we explore the complementary nature of intangibles in Chapter 3 by
examining whether an increase in intangible capital deepening increases productivity
more strongly in ICT-intensive industries relative to those that use little ICT. Method-
ologically, this analysis is based on the difference-in-differences approach developed by
Rajan and Zingales (1998) and we use the industry-level intangible investment data
constructed by Niebel, O’Mahony and Saam (2013) for a set of ten European countries
and eleven industries over the period 1995-2007. The results show that the output
elasticity of intangible capital is significantly larger for more ICT-intensive industries.
By further distinguishing between different intangible asset types, we also show that
only R&D and organisation capital exhibit a higher output elasticity in ICT-intensive
industries, conforming to much of the evidence found in prior firm-level analyses.
(Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2003; Polder, van Leeuwen, Mohnen & Raymond, 2010).
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(c) Intangibles in accounting for income differences
Most of the literature has found that differences in traditional factor inputs – labour and
tangible capital – account for only a limited share of cross-country income differences
(e.g. Caselli, 2005; Easterly & Levine, 2001; Hsieh & Klenow, 2010; Hall & Jones, 1999).
However, the potential importance of differences in investment in intangible assets
remains unexplored. It seems plausible that richer countries invest more intensively
in intangible assets, thereby accounting for part of cross-country income variation. This
possibility has not yet been examined as information on investment in intangibles is
not available for a broad cross-section of countries and existing research has, instead,
primarily focused on the role of intangible assets in accounting for a country’s growth
over time (Corrado et al., 2009; Fukao et al., 2009). Chapter 4 remedies this shortcoming
by developing a large-scale macroeconomic data set on investment in intangible assets
and uses the resulting data to analyse investment patterns across countries and
incorporates intangible assets as an additional input in a development accounting
exercise.
Our newly developed intangible investment database is consistent and internationally
comparable for a set of 60 economies. With this new database we show that the share of
investment in intangibles in GDP has been rising between 1995 and 2011 and there is a
strong positive association between the level of economic development of a country and
its investment intensity in intangibles. As a result, including intangible capital as an
additional factor of production, we can account for substantially more of the variation
in cross-country income levels than before. Depending on the assumptions regarding
the output elasticities of factor inputs, the observed differences in intangible capital can
account for up to 16 percentage points more of the cross-country income variation. This
finding echoes with the preceding studies that find intangible capital to be important
for a country’s growth over time (Corrado et al., 2009; Fukao et al., 2009). In both
cases, the role of (residual) productivity is smaller once intangible capital is taken into
account.
(d) IPR protection and knowledge-intensive imports
Advanced technologies or knowledge in general can be embodied in goods and, through
trade, diffuse across national borders (Keller, 2004). Countries with a slow pace of
investment in intangible assets may find it desirable to import knowledge-intensive
goods from abroad in order to enhance growth. But how can countries attract goods
that have a large scope for knowledge diffusion? This is the topic of the last chapter
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of this thesis and we draw on the literature on the relationship between trade and
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection to address this question.
Specifically, in Chapter 5, we examine whether more stringent IPR protection stimulates
imports of goods with greater technology content. We proxy for the technology content
of an imported product by the extent to which the originating industry invests in
R&D. Then we follow the broader literature to measure the strength of a country’s
IPR protection using the index scores constructed by Ginarte and Park (1997). To
establish the differential effects of IPR protection across product categories with varying
degrees of technology intensity, we again apply the difference-in-differences approach as
in Chapter 3. Using imports data for a sample of 119 countries over the period 1976-2010,
we show that the impact of IPR protection on manufacturing imports is significantly
stronger for products with greater technology content. More specifically, an increase
in the level of IPR protection can lead to 22 percent faster increase in the value of
imports of products at the 90th percentile of R&D intensity than for products at the
10th percentile.
Taken together, the chapters in this thesis cover a wide set of research questions on the
relationship between intangible investments and economic growth. We summarise this
in Table 1.1, which serves as a guidance to the remainder of this thesis.





Chapter 2 Does organisation capital lead to
productivity spillovers?
Organisation capital U.S. firms
Chapter 3 Are intangibles more productive in
ICT-intensive industries?
All intangibles Industries in
the EU.
Chapter 4
How much more income variation
across countries can be accounted
for by intangible capital?
BE, OC, and R&D 60 economies
Chapter 5 Does stronger IPR protection lead to
more knowledge-intensive imports?
R&D 119 countries





















Productivity spillovers of organisation capital∗
2.1 Introduction
The role of knowledge-based assets for growth in advanced economies has drawn much
recent interest from researchers and policy makers alike – see e.g. Corrado and Hulten
(2010) and OECD (2013b). But while researchers are rapidly incorporating such assets
into a standard ‘sources-of-growth’ framework (e.g. Corrado et al., 2009, 2012), much is
yet unknown about the productive impact of such assets. Knowledge-based assets are
typically intangible and thus non-rival and non-excludable. This opens up the possibility
of knowledge spillovers (Nakamura, 2010). In the case of research and development
(R&D) spending, this has long been known (e.g. Griliches, 1979, 1992) and recent
firm-level evidence confirms the presence of R&D knowledge spillovers, see Bloom,
Schankerman and Van Reenen (2013, BSV henceforth). But recent research has also
shown knowledge spillovers from other knowledge-based assets, using industry-level data
(Goodridge et al., 2012a, GHW henceforth), and economy-wide data (Corrado et al.,
2014, CHJ henceforth).
In this chapter, we are the first to test for the effects of knowledge spillovers from
organisation capital using firm-level data, rather than the more aggregated data that
have been used so far.1 Organisation capital can be thought of as the information a
firm has about its assets and how these can be used in production (Prescott & Visscher,
1980). More specifically, it can be thought of as the value of brand names and knowledge
∗This chapter is based on Chen and Inklaar (2016).
1The literature on productivity spillovers from foreign direct investment (FDI) – e.g. Liu (2006)
and Keller and Yeaple (2009) – is partly related since domestic firms could learn from the foreign
multinational’s superior organisation. However, any learning taking place could also be on aspects of












embedded in firm-specific resources (Corrado et al., 2005).2 Several studies have shown
organisation capital to be important for firm productivity3 and it also seems important
for explaining stock market returns across firms (Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013). Since
knowledge of, for instance, organisational structures is non-rival and non-excludable,
knowledge spillovers between firms could, in principle, also be important.
Relying on firm-level analysis to identify the effects of knowledge spillovers has clear
advantages over analysis based on more aggregate data. Most importantly, we can
distinguish between the productivity effects of own-firm investments and knowledge
spillovers between firms, while analysis of aggregate data does not allow for such a clear
distinction. Another advantage is the greater number of observations, which allows for
more stringent testing. There are also downsides to firm-level analysis, including a less
precise delineation of what constitutes investment in organisation capital. As we will
argue later, though, the advantages outweigh the downsides.
In our analysis, we test whether firm productivity and market valuation are affected
by the organisation capital stocks of similar firms, defining ‘similar’ in the same way
as BSV. Since organisation capital relates to how production in a firm is organised, we
expect that firms are more likely to learn and benefit from the investments of firms
that are close in technology space. Firm profitability is likely to suffer, though, from
investments in organisation capital made by close competitors, i.e. firms that are close
in product market space. By locating firms in these two spaces, we can distinguish
between the two types of spillovers and provide estimates of the marginal private and
social returns to organisation capital investment.
We analyse a sample of 1,266 U.S. manufacturing firms over the period 1982-2011.
We measure investment in organisation capital as selling, general and administrative
(SGA) expenses, an approach followed by many in the firm-level analysis of organisation
capital.4 Past investments are cumulated into a stock of organisation capital and added
to a production function along with (tangible) capital and labour. The proximity of
firms in technology space is determined using patent data – an approach pioneered by
Jaffe (1986) in the context of R&D knowledge spillovers. We assume that firms with
patents in similar technology fields have greater potential to learn from each other’s
organisation capital. One example of such a spillover is Toyota’s just-in-time system
that quickly spread to other car manufacturers (Liker & Morgan, 2006). An example of
2See also Atkeson and Kehoe (2005). Conceptualising organisation capital as embedded in the
organisation distinguishes it from measures of human capital, see e.g. Jovanovic (1979), Becker (1993).
3See e.g. Tronconi and Vittucci Marzetti (2011), Hulten and Hao (2008), Lev and Radhakrishnan
(2005).











Productivity spillovers of organisation capital 11
cross-industry diffusion is the build-to-order (BTO) distribution system that originated
with Dell Computers, but that has since been copied by firms in other industries, such
as BMW (Gunasekaran & Ngai, 2005). Though patents may not perfectly reflect the
scope for such copying, they may be useful in identifying the technological position of
the firm in a broad sense.5
Proximity in product market space is determined using the set of industries each firm
is active in, assuming that greater overlap makes for fiercer competitors. Increased
investment in organisation capital by competitors is likely to hurt firm performance:
competitors may have to devote resources to copying successful business models such as
the BTO system. Investment in organisation capital also includes spending on marketing
and sales, and while some of this spending may expand the market, another part is aimed
at capturing market share from competitors.6
Our findings are, first, that organisation capital contributes substantially to the firm’s
own productivity and market value and second, that investment in organisation capital
by firms that are close in technology space has no effect on firm productivity or
market valuation. In contrast, we find results similar to BSV for R&D knowledge
and market-rival effects. Following the approach of BSV, we find that the marginal
private return to organisation capital investments is positive, regardless of the chosen
specification. The magnitude of the marginal social return is much more uncertain and
could even be negative. Our results for organisation capital are robust across industries
and to alternative distance measures and assumptions regarding the capitalisation of
organisation capital. We argue that these results make it unlikely that organisation
capital is the source of the knowledge spillovers found by CHJ and GHW. In the
remainder of this chapter we outline the methodology and data (Section 2.2), present
the results (Section 2.3) and conclude (Section 2.4).
2.2 Methodology and data
In this section we discuss the econometric approach to analysing organisation capital
spillovers, followed by a description of the data and the methods used to construct the
measures of organisation capital and the spillover pools.
5In addition, some business methods can be and have been patented since the 1990s, see Hall (2009).
6See Landes and Rosenfield (1994) on the long-lived nature of (some) advertising spending and, more
broadly, Bagwell (2007) on the economics of advertising.
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We analyse two firm-level outcome variables, namely productivity and stock market
valuation. In order to establish the effect of organisation capital and knowledge spillovers
and market-rivalry effects on productivity, we estimate a production function; to
establish the effects on market value, we estimate a market value equation.
Production function equation
To estimate the effect of organisation capital on firm productivity, we start from a
production function for firm i at time t, extended to include organisation and R&D
capital:







where Y is a measure of output, A is Hicks-neutral technology, K is physical capital, L
denotes labour input, G is the stock of organisation capital and R is the stock of R&D
capital. To determine the role of knowledge spillovers and any effects from product-
market rivals, we log-differentiate equation (2.1) and estimate the following equation:
lnYit = γ1lnGit + γ2lnRit + ϕ1lnKHGit + ϕ2lnMKTGit + ϕ3lnKHRit
+ ϕ4lnMKTRit + wX′it + ηi + τt + it
(2.2)
Here KHit capture knowledge spillovers from organisation capital or R&D capital
(distinguished by the superscripts G and R) and MKTit denotes any market-rival effect
of organisation and R&D capital. This means that the technology term from equation
(2.1), A, captures the effect from knowledge and market-rival spillovers; we further
decompose technology into a correlated firm fixed effect (ηi), a full set of time dummies
(τt), and an idiosyncratic component (it) that is allowed to be heteroskedastic and
serially correlated. Physical capital K and labour input L are combined into X′. Note
that we do not include a measure of material inputs, since fewer firms report on this
item, thus reducing the sample size notably. However, we show in Appendix Table 2.11
that the main production function results are robust to whether materials are included
or not.
Our main parameter of interest in this equation is ϕ1, which captures knowledge
spillovers from organisation capital. Based on the R&D spillover literature, we expect ϕ3
to be significantly positive. BSV argue, based on the industrial organisation literature,
that ϕ2 and ϕ4 should be zero: organisation or R&D capital of product-market rivals
i
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Productivity spillovers of organisation capital 13
may hurt profitability due to loss of market share, but standard theories do not predict
an effect on productivity.
The estimation of equation (2.2) can be affected by measurement error and simultaneity
bias. Measurement error arises because firm sales are not deflated by a firm-level price
index, but by an industry-level price index obtained from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). When prices vary across firms within an industry, part of the variation
in sales is due to variation in prices rather than quantities (Foster, Haltiwanger &
Syverson, 2008). To deal with this problem, we include the industry output index and
price index as part of the control variables X′, following the arguments of Klette and
Griliches (1996) and De Loecker (2011). Simultaneity bias causes concern because there
might be unobserved productivity shocks that are known to the firms when they choose
their input levels (Griliches & Mairesse, 1998). The error term is assumed to include
a firm fixed effect (ηi), because if the deviation between firm and industry prices is
largely time-invariant, this should go a long way towards dealing with the problem of
firm-specific prices. Moreover, to the extent that unobserved, firm-specific productivity
is also time-invariant, the simultaneity problem should also be controlled for. As these
assumptions might not hold in practice, we also consider a GMM specification, where
lagged values of the explanatory variables are included as instruments.7
Market value equation
In estimating the effect of organisation capital on firm market value, we also follow
the approach outlined in BSV, but extended to include organisation capital as another
factor influencing firm market value as well as a possible source of spillovers. BSV, in
turn, build on the work of Griliches (1981) in formulating their market value equation.
Tobin’s Q, the firm’s market value over the book value of assets is used as the dependent


























+ λ2lnMKTGit + λ3lnKHRit + λ4lnMKTRit + wX′ + ηi + τt + it
(2.3)
where V is the market capitalisation of the firm (the value of common and preferred
stock and total net debt) and A is the book value of its assets – including net plant,
property and equipment, inventories, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries and
7But note that given our long time period, with approximately 16 years of a data for the average
firm, the bias of the OLS fixed effects estimator on the variables that are not strictly exogenous but
only weakly exogenous is likely to be small.
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capitalised intangibles, but excluding the (estimated) value of organisation and R&D





















are typically not small. A first-order approximation would thus not be accurate, so we
use a higher-order expansion instead. As in the production function estimation, any
knowledge spillovers from organisation capital (λ1) and from R&D capital (λ3) should
have a positive impact on Tobin’s Q. Unlike productivity, Tobin’s Q would be affected if
successful innovations from R&D and organisation capital of competitors were to reduce
the firm’s market share. The market-rival effects, λ2 and λ4, would thus be negative.
Data sources
We obtained company accounts and stock market data from Datastream and matched
these to patent data from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database. We solely focus on
manufacturing firms as these are the most intensive investors in intangible assets
(Goodridge, Haskel & Wallis, 2012b).
For this reason, we also restrict our sample to manufacturing firms with at least one
patent. This leads to data on the patenting activity of 1,722 U.S. manufacturing firms,
obtained from Orbis. These patent data are matched to company accounts data from
Datastream using firm international securities identification number (ISIN) codes as
the unique firm identifier. From Datastream we collect information on the number
of employees (WC07011), total sales (WC01001), the stock of physical capital (net
property, plant, and equipment, WC02501), investment in organisation capital (selling,
general and administrative expenses, WC01101), R&D expenditure (WC01201), the
market value of the company (MVC), preferred stock (WC03451), current assets
(WC02201), total debt (WC03255), total inventories (WC02101) and total intangibles
(WC02649) all for the period 1982–2011. Of the 1,722 patenting firms from Orbis, 212
were not covered in Datastream and a further 244 firms had missing values for one or
more of the company accounts data items. Dropping these firms results in an unbalanced
panel of 1,266 U.S. manufacturing firms with over 18,000 usable observations. Table 2.1
provides some basic descriptive statistics on the key variables.
The table shows that the sample covers mostly larger firms and, since the means exceed
the medians, the size distribution is skewed. Furthermore, we can follow the firms in
our sample for a sizeable number of years, as indicated by the ‘Av. years’ column.
The (internal) stocks of organisation capital and R&D capital (see Section 2.3 for
measurement details) are large compared to the stock of physical capital, which suggests
that these knowledge-based assets could be important for productivity. The potential
to learn from organisation capital and R&D capital investments by firms that are close
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Productivity spillovers of organisation capital 15
in technology space (Section 2.4) is large, as indicated by the size of the external stocks.
The external stocks of market rivals (Section 2.5) are comparatively smaller.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Median Mean SD Btw. SD Wit. SD Av.years N
Sales 136 2,636 14,087 10,362 4,672 17.8 22,587
Market value 230 3,774 17,654 10,729 10,780 16.4 20,731
SGA expenses 32 404 1,431 1,016 628 15.7 18,695
R&D expenses 10 120 504 323 259 15.8 18,758
Physical capital 31 802 4,798 3,444 1,768 17.6 22,227
Employees 885 9,096 26,407 19,422 9,328 17.0 21,544
Internal OC 108 1,435 5,084 3,687 2,049 15.8 18,606
External OC (tech space) 28,605 32,710 21,669 14,589 16,028 30.0 37,980
External OC (market space) 1,852 3,156 3,762 2,963 2,320 30.0 37,980
Internal RD 49 609 2,606 1,676 1,318 15.8 18,678
External RD (tech space) 11,203 14,628 11,259 6,471 9,215 30.0 37,980
External RD (market space) 832 1,727 2,435 1,634 1,805 30.0 37,980
Technological fields 29 62.75 88.85 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,266
Product markets 3 3.01 1.86 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,266
Notes: ‘Btw. SD’ illustrates the variation between firms (averaged over time), while ‘Wit. SD’ illustrates the
variation over time, ignoring the between-firm variation. ‘N’ is the number of observations and ‘Av. years’
indicates the average number of years for which firms are in the dataset. Sales are deflated by the industry
price index and SGA expenses are deflated by the implicit GDP price deflator; all price indices are from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Employees, technology fields and product markets are in numbers; all
other variables are in millions of 2005 U.S. dollars. Computation of the external OC stocks, R&D stocks,
technological fields and number of markets is explained in Sections 2.3–2.5
By restricting our sample to firms holding at least one patent, our sample consists of
relatively large firms: the median number of employees in Table 2.1 is 885 versus 581
for a sample that also includes non-patenting firms (see Appendix Table 2.8). However,
as shown in Appendix Table 2.9, the production function estimates (without spillover
terms) are comparable to results based on our more restricted sample, suggesting limited
scope for sample selection bias.
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of firms across 19 broader (2-digit) manufacturing
industries. The sample of firms is fairly concentrated in the more high-tech sectors of
the economy, such as computers & electronics and chemicals & pharmaceuticals, with
the top-five industries accounting for around 80% of the firms. As shown in Appendix
Table 2.10, our results are not influenced by any of these well-represented industries.
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2.2.2 Measuring organisation capital
Investment in organisation capital has been measured in a number of ways in the
literature. These include business surveys (Black & Lynch, 2005), part of the wage
bill of managers (Squicciarini & Le Mouel, 2012), the residual from a production
function (Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2005) and selling, general and administrative (SGA)
expenses (Tronconi & Vittucci Marzetti, 2011; Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013). Given
data availability, we opt to use SGA expenses for measuring investment in organisation
capital. Note that SGA expenses covers many different types of expenditures, and
these are typically not broken down in great detail. One of the major items would
be advertising expenditure, which represents 9% of SGA expenses for firms which
separately distinguish this item.
Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) present detailed arguments and examples of how
resources allocated to this expense item can yield improvements in employee incentives,
distribution systems, marketing technologies, and a wide range of other organisational
structures. Further evidence is from Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) who find that
their measure of organisation capital based on SGA expenses correlates highly with the
managerial quality scores constructed by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). This evidence
suggests that using SGA expenses to measure organisation capital is informative of the
quality of management practices across firms.
i
i







Productivity spillovers of organisation capital 17
SGA expenses includes R&D expenditure,8 so to focus on organisation capital we
subtract R&D expenditure to get our measure of investment in organisation capital.9 To
convert this investment flow into an organisation capital stock, we apply the perpetual
inventory method:
Gi,t = (1− δ) ·Gi,t−1 + SGAi,t
pt
(2.4)
where pt is the implicit GDP deflator from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. To
implement the law of motion in equation (2.4), an initial stock and a rate of depreciation
must be chosen. Assuming a steady-state relationship from the Solow growth model,
the initial stock can be calculated according to:
G0 =
SGA0
g + δ (2.5)
where g denotes the steady-state growth rate of organisation capital and δ is the rate
at which organisation capital become obsolete. According to the aggregate estimates
of the INTAN-Invest database compiled by Corrado et al. (2012), organisation capital
grows at an average rate of 6% per year, so we use this value for g in equation (2.5).
Organisation capital can depreciate over time for a variety of reasons. The existing
management practices become obsolete if improvements come along. Organisation
capital can also erode through work attrition and the adoption of new products or
production processes (Hulten & Hao, 2008). In the existing empirical works, the assumed
rate of depreciation various between 10% (Tronconi & Vittucci Marzetti, 2011) and 40%
(Corrado et al., 2009). Given that organisation capital has two contrasting components:
a long-lasting learning-by-doing element which depreciates like R&D; and a short-lived
organisational ‘forgetting’ dynamic which depreciates like advertising, a rate in the
middle of the range is chosen as our baseline rate; that is, δ = 0.25. The alternative rates
of 10% and 40% will be considered in the robustness analysis. R&D capital is estimated
in a similar fashion as organisation capital; following BSV, we use a depreciation rate
of 15%.
2.2.3 Technological proximity
We assume that firms are more likely to learn from the organisation capital of firms that
are technologically similar. Moreover, we assume that a firm’s patent portfolio defines
8At least, according to the definitions employed by Datastream and Compustat.
9Tronconi and Vittucci Marzetti (2011) measure investment as 20% of this amount to reflect that not
all SGA expenses add to organisation capital. This is irrelevant from an econometric point of view.
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its technological position and that firms developing or utilising similar technologies have
organised their organisations similarly. As discussed earlier, the diffusion of just-in-time
production system and build-to-order supply chain management are two cases in point.
We use the patent data provided in Orbis, which is based on the European Patent
Office’s PATSTAT database. This database covers over 80% of the world’s patents to
date and these patents are classified by four-digit international patent classification
(IPC) code. This means that even if the firm had been awarded patents from patenting
offices in different countries, their patents can be compared. Our sample of 1,266
manufacturing firms obtained around half a million patents spanning 612 technology
fields, as defined by the first three digits of the IPC code.10 All patents of a firm are
included because it is not possible to select patents for a specific time frame, but this is
also a helpful feature, as it defines the ‘average’ technological position of a firm, rather
than focusing only on activity for a specific period.
Define the vector Ti = (Ti1, Ti2, Ti3..., Ti612), where Tiτ indicates the number of patents
of firm i in technology class τ . The technological proximity between any firm i and j is
then defined as the uncentred correlation of patent portfolios, as in Jaffe (1986):













The larger the proximity the more effective knowledge of organisation capital can diffuse
between firms i and j (or vice versa). As indicated in Table 2.1, the median firm is active
in 29 technological fields, providing ample opportunity for learning from other firms in
any of these fields. Analogous to BSV, the spillover pool of management know-how





2.2.4 Product market proximity
We also locate firms in product market space, using information on the industries in
which firms are active. Datastream provides up to eight industry codes for each firm
at the four-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) level, which means that a firm
can be active in up to eight different markets. As shown in Table 2.1, firms on average
report sales activities in 3 different markets out of a total of 569 different four-digit SIC
10The level of disaggregation of a 3-digit IPC code generates a workable and comparable amount of
technology classes to that of BSV. A further breakdown of the classification codes to the fourth digit
is not pursued as Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) argue that a finer disaggregation would be
subject to a greater degree of measurement error.
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industries.11 Define the vector Si = (Si1, Si2, Si3..., Si569), where Sik indicates whether
or not firm i is active in market k. In contrast to BSV, we have no information on the
share of sales in each market, but that information was not crucial to their results.12
Analogous to the technology proximity measure, the market proximity measure for any



















For the separate identification of knowledge and market rival spillovers we rely on
differences in the two proximity measures. The correlation between the proximity
metrics in technology and product-market space is 0.196, indicating substantial
variation between the two proximity measures.
To illustrate how firms can be located differently in technology and market space,
consider the case of Apple, Intel and Dell. These three firms are all close in technology
space, with PKHApple,Intel = 0.93, PKHApple,Dell = 0.87 and PKHDell,Intel = 0.84. These proximity
measures are high relative to the average PKHi,j of 0.28. However, Apple and Dell are both
active in the product market for computers (with Apple also active in other markets)
leading to PMKTApple,Dell = 0.37. In contrast, Apple and Dell do not share any product
market with Intel, so that PMKTApple,Intel = PMKTDell,Intel = 0.
2.3 Results
In this section we discuss the main empirical findings, with first results of production
function estimates without spillovers, followed by the evidence on the presence of
spillovers for productivity and market valuation, including the robustness of that
evidence. Finally, we discuss what the spillover results imply in terms of the private and
social returns to investment in organisation capital and discuss our results in relation
to GHW and CHJ.
11Only few firms (5%) are active in eight different markets, while many more firms (29%) are active
in just two markets.
12For a further comparison, we constructed a market spillover variable for R&D stock like the one used
by BSV but based on our information on the number of active markets. For 237 firms, this market
spillover variable can be compared to the corresponding BSV variable. The correlation coefficient is
high at 0.68, giving confidence that our market spillover measure is comparable to theirs.
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2.3.1 Production function estimates without spillovers
Table 2.2 shows production function estimates with firm and year fixed effects and OLS
estimation (FE) or generalised method of moments estimation (GMM). In the GMM
estimates, we follow Tronconi and Vittucci Marzetti (2011) and use lagged values of
the inputs as instruments; specifically, we use Xit−2 and Xit−3 as instruments for Xit.
The first two columns of Table 2.2 show production function results with only capital
and labour as inputs. Both are highly significant but the sum of the coefficients is
significantly smaller than one, indicating decreasing returns to scale. In the next two
columns, the stock of organisation capital is added to the production function and
it enters with a highly significant coefficient. This finding is in line with the earlier
firm-level analyses of organisation capital and provides further support for considering
intangible assets as factors in production alongside tangible capital (Corrado et al.,
2005, 2009; Van Ark, Hao, Corrado & Hulten, 2009).
The output elasticity of organisation capital is substantial in size, between 0.222 and
0.469, a similar range as found by Tronconi and Vittucci Marzetti (2011) for their
sample of European firms. In columns (5) and (6), we include R&D capital, but exclude
organisation capital, while in columns (7) and (8), both sets of capital are included.
By itself, the R&D capital output elasticity is positive and, in the case of the FE
specification, significantly so. The elasticity turns negative when R&D and organisation
capital are included jointly, but as shown in Appendix Table 2.9, this negative coefficient
is not robust to the set of firms that is included. With these results, a necessary
condition for there to be any scope for knowledge spillovers from organisation capital has
been satisfied: organisation capital contributes systematically to own-firm productivity.
What is further notable is that the GMM specifications with organisation capital show
constant returns to scale. This is in contrast with the results of CHJ, whose findings
suggest increasing returns to scale. We discuss our findings in relation to theirs in more
detail below.
2.3.2 Spillovers to productivity and market values
Table 2.3 presents the main productivity spillover results. The first two columns show
the results with only spillover terms related to organisation capital; columns (3) and
(4) mimic the BSV specification about R&D spillovers; and columns (5) and (6) include
both sets of spillover variables. The main result is that there is no robust evidence of OC
knowledge spillovers on productivity. When also allowing for R&D knowledge spillovers,
the point estimates for OC knowledge spillover even turn negative in column (6), but
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remain insignificant. In contrast, the R&D knowledge spillover term is significantly
positive by itself, in columns (3) and (4). The R&D knowledge spillover term turns
insignificant in columns (5) and (6) mostly because the OC and R&D knowledge
spillover terms are highly correlated. Another factor is that our use of robust standard
errors, clustered by firm, turns out be a more conservative approach than the Newey-
West HAC standard errors used by BSV.13
Table 2.3: Organisation Capital Spillovers to Firm Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM
OC knowledge spillovers 0.497* 0.323 0.149 –0.157
(0.254) (0.264) (0.381) (0.433)
OC market rivals –0.157*** –0.273*** –.188*** –0.326***
(0.051) (0.087) (0.060) (0.092)
RD knowledge spillovers 0.468** 0.342* 0.353 0.380
(0.200) (0.183) (0.298) (0.323)
RD market rivals –0.044 –0.061 0.040 0.064
(0.040) (0.047) (0.051) (0.058)
Physical capital (K) 0.148*** 0.194*** 0.148*** 0.191*** 0.148*** 0.197***
(0.020) (0.042) (0.020) (0.042) (0.020) (0.042)
Employees (L) 0.492*** 0.572*** 0.494*** 0.586*** 0.493*** 0.576***
(0.035) (0.067) (0.035) (0.067) (0.035) (0.067)
Organisation capital (G) 0.563*** 0.308*** 0.555*** 0.284*** 0.565*** 0.311***
(0.043) (0.058) (0.043) (0.057) (0.043) (0.059)
R&D capital (R) –0.125*** –0.077** –0.124*** –0.072* –0.132*** –0.089**
(0.032) (0.038) (0.033) (0.040) (0.033) (0.041)
Number of observations 17,103 13,593 17,103 13,593 17,103 13,593
Number of firms 1,149 1,077 1,149 1,077 1,149 1,077
R2 0.750 0.751 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.751
Returns to scale (H0: RTS=1) 1.077*** 0.997 1.073*** 0.989 1.074** 0.994
Hansen J p value 0.204 0.420 0.409
Weak instrument 32.23 26.76 24.23
Notes: The table shows the results from estimating equation (2.2). See notes to Table 2.2 for details of the
production function estimation. The OC knowledge spillovers variable is based on equation (2.7) and the R&D
knowledge spillovers variable is defined analogously. The OC market rivals variable is based on equation (2.9)
and the R&D market rivals variable is defined analogously. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
13We confirm this using the BSV data, with results shown in Appendix Table 2.12.
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A striking result is the negative OC market rival effect. Taken at face value, this implies
that productivity is hurt by rival firm investments in organisation capital. As mentioned
before, such a ‘face value’ result is hard to reconcile with the industrial organisation
literature, which considers only a negative market rival effect on firm profitability, not on
productivity.14 One explanation for the negative market rival effects could be that the
inclusion of indexes of industry output and industry prices does not adequately correct
for the lack of information on firm-level prices. The market structure in the model of
De Loecker (2011) is one of monopolistic competition in a differentiated-product market,
but between-firm competition could be fiercer. In that case, the negative coefficients on
OC market rivals could reflect a profitability effect, rather than a productivity effect.
Another possibility is that adjustment costs lead to a short-term loss of efficiency as
firms need to adjust their inputs to their reduced market share. Given these alternative
explanations for the negative coefficients and the lack of a theory-consistent explanation
that could help understand why firm productivity would be negatively affected, we do
not take these results as serious evidence of negative productivity spillovers.
We now turn to estimating the market value equation (2.3). Table 2.4 shows the esti-
mation results using either an OLS firm fixed-effect estimation (FE), or a specification
where the spillover variables enter the equation with one lag (FE-Lag). We chose
the FE-Lag approach rather than the GMM approach from the production function
estimation because the test for overidentifying restrictions showed that lagged values
of the explanatory variables were not valid instruments. We thus follow the estimation
approach of BSV in using the spillover variables at t− 1 rather than at t.
The table shows clear negative market rival effects from R&D, with the coefficients
consistently significant and negative in columns (3)–(6). Columns (1) and (2) suggest
similar market rival effects from organisation capital, but they are not robust to the
inclusion of the R&D market rival effect. Similarly, the significantly negative knowledge
spillover terms for organisation capital and R&D are not robust, as shown in column
(5) and (6). It is notable that BSV find significantly positive R&D knowledge spillovers,
while we do not. Further checks using the data and programme files provided by BSV
suggest their R&D knowledge spillovers evidence is not fully robust. For one, their use
of Newey-West HAC standard errors is less conservative than our use of robust standard
errors, clustered by firm. Second, their data cover 1981–2001, but their estimation
sample only uses data for the period 1985–2000. Appendix Table 2.12 shows that
the evidence for R&D knowledge spillovers is less convincing when using the more
conservative standard errors and the full sample period.
14See also Denicolo` and Zanchettin (2014).
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Table 2.4: Organisation Capital Spillovers to Firm Market Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE-Lag FE FE-Lag FE FE-Lag
OC knowledge spillovers -1.529*** -1.764*** -0.934 -1.315
(0.586) (0.572) (1.016) (0.945)
OC market rivals -0.207* -0.254** 0.061 0.063
(0.111) (0.103) (0.139) (0.130)
RD knowledge spillovers -1.048* -1.152** -0.459 -0.344
(0.543) (0.516) (0.899) (0.831)
RD market rivals -0.308*** -0.336*** -0.336*** -0.367***
(0.085) (0.081) (0.104) (0.100)
OC capital/capital stock 0.328*** 0.327*** 0.296*** 0.291*** 0.295*** 0.291***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
RD capital/capital stock 0.193*** 0.196*** 0.228*** 0.234*** 0.228*** 0.234***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Number of observations 14,931 14,931 14,931 14,931 14,931 14,931
Number of firms 1,043 1,043 1,043 1,043 1,043 1,043
R2 0.302 0.303 0.304 0.306 0.305 0.306
Notes: FE: fixed effects; FE-Lag: fixed effects with the spillover variables lagged by one period. Dependent
variable in all estimations is Tobin’s Q, defined as the market value of equity plus debt, divided by the stock of
fixed capital. A seventh-order polynomial in (OC stock/capital stock) and a fifth-order polynomial in (R&D
stock/capital stock) are included, but only the first term is shown for brevity. All specifications include firm
and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by firm, are shown in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗
p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
2.3.3 Sensitivity analysis
In Tables 2.5 and 2.6, we present regression results that vary the measurement of
proximity in technology and market space and of organisation capital. We first aim
to test whether our results depend on the definition of proximity in the technology
and product market space. In the baseline model, a firm’s position in technology space
is determined based on the 3-digit IPC classification of its patent portfolio and its
position in market space is determined based on the 4-digit SIC industry codes the
firm is active in. We consider two alternatives: (a) IPC code at 2-digit with SIC code
at 3-digit denoted ‘Proximity (2-3)’ and (b) IPC code at 1-digit with SIC code at 2-
digit denoted ‘Proximity(1-2)’. For brevity, we only report the GMM specifications in
Table 2.5, comparable to column (6) of Table 2.3; in Table 2.6 we only report the fixed
effect lagged (FE-Lag) specifications, comparable to column (6) of Table 2.4. Results
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for the fixed effect specifications are available upon request. We also vary the assumed
depreciation rate for organisation capital. The 25% depreciation of the baseline model is
an average of commonly-used depreciation rates in the literature, but we also consider
a much lower rate of 10% and a much higher rate of 40%.
Table 2.5: OC Spillovers to Firm Productivity – Sensitivity Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Proximity (2–3) Proximity (1–2) δ = 10% δ = 40%
OC knowledge spillovers 0.323 –1.761 –0.162 –0.232
(0.807) (1.550) (0.467) (0.436)
OC market rivals –0.165** –0.580*** –0.196** -0.258***
(0.078) (0.177) (0.080) (0.067)
RD knowledge spillovers 0.020 1.387* 0.239 0.446
(0.491) (0.733) (0.322) (0.325)
RD market rivals 0.027 0.109 0.018 0.040
(0.066) (0.097) (0.060) (0.052)
Physical capital (K) 0.195*** 0.183*** 0.212*** 0.167***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042)
Employees (L) 0.590*** 0.598*** 0.644*** 0.536***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
Organisation capital (G) 0.284*** 0.298*** 0.205*** 0.356***
(0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059)
R&D capital (R) –0.076** –0.091** –0.048 –0.071*
(0.038) (0.039) (0.043) (0.037)
Number of observations 13,593 13,593 13,593 13,593
Number of firms 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077
R2 0.750 0.751 0.744 0.756
Returns to scale (H0: RTS=1) 0.993 0.987 1.013 0.989
Hansen J p value 0.594 0.309 0.098 0.769
Weak instrument 20.66 26.14 21.40 21.59
Notes: See notes to Table 2.2 on the estimation of the production function and to Table 2.3 on the
spillover terms. For brevity, only GMM specifications are shown, comparable to column (6) of Table 2.3
for the baseline model. In the baseline model, patents are categorised into 3-digit patent categories and
4-digit industry categories for determining proximity in technology space [equation (2.6)] and in market
space [equation (2.8)]. Column ‘Proximity (2–3)’ uses 2-digit patent categories and 3-digit industry
categories; column ‘Proximity (1–2)’ uses 1-digit patent categories and 2-digit industry categories. In
the baseline model, organisation capital is assumed to depreciate at a geometric rate δ of 25%. The












Table 2.6: OC Spillovers to Firm Market Value – Sensitivity Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Proximity (2–3) Proximity (1–2) δ = 10% δ = 40%
OC knowledge spillovers –1.168 2.077 –1.965* –0.761
(1.429) (2.058) (1.107) (0.853)
OC market rivals 0.148 –0.257 0.047 0.109
(0.150) (0.241) (0.146) (0.122)
RD knowledge spillovers –0.657 –1.954* –0.241 –0.746
(1.059) (1.084) (0.845) (0.817)
RD market rivals –0.335*** –0.222 0.400*** –0.421***
(0.112) (0.208) (0.099) (0.095)
OC capital/capital stock 0.307*** 0.314*** 0.263*** 0.284***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.042) (0.041)
RD capital/capital stock 0.216*** 0.206*** 0.412*** 0.424***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.032) (0.031)
Number of observations 14,931 14,931 14,931 14,931
Number of firms 1,043 1,043 1,043 1,043
R2 0.304 0.301 0.307 0.306
Notes: See notes to Table 2.4 on the estimation of the market value equation and notes to Table
2.5 for an explanation of the column headings. For brevity, only the FE-Lag specifications are shown,
comparable to column (6) of Table 2.4 for the baseline model. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
The most important result from Table 2.5 and 2.6 is that there are no significant
knowledge spillovers from organisation capital to productivity (Table 2.5) or market
values (Table 2.6), regardless of the proximity definitions or the assumed depreciation
rate. When assuming a lower depreciation rate, the output elasticity of organisation
capital is smaller, because the stocks of organisation capital are larger. Despite this
variation, the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale also cannot be rejected under
the two alternative depreciation rates. Further sensitivity analysis is in Appendix Table
2.10, which shows that excluding a single industry at a time does not affect the results.
2.3.4 Private and social returns to organisation capital
With our results, we can gauge the marginal social and private returns to investment
in organisation capital, again following BSV. Consider, first, the output elasticity γ1 =
ρ×(G/Y ), where ρ is the marginal productivity of organisation capital G. If one assumes
a constant marginal product γ1 and a constant discount rate r along with an infinite
planning horizon, then ρ can be given the economic interpretation of a marginal gross
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internal rate of return.15 In BSV, the marginal social return (MSR) to organisation
capital of firm i is defined as the increase in aggregate output generated by a marginal
increase in firm i’s organisation capital stock:
MSR = (Y/G) · (γ1 + ϕ1) (2.10)
where γ1 and ϕ1 are the coefficients from estimating equation (2.2) as given in Table
2.3. The MSR can be interpreted as the marginal product of a firm’s organisation
capital contributed: (1) directly from firm’s own organisation capital stock γ1 and (2)
indirectly from the external stock of management knowledge, ϕ1. The marginal private
return (MPR) is defined as the increase in firm i’s output generated by a marginal
increase in its own stock of organisation capital:
MPR = (Y/G) · (γ1 − σλ2) (2.11)
Own organisation capital increases a firm’s own sales, thus γ1 is part of the MPR. Also
included is λ2 since the firm’s own organisation capital has a business-stealing effect on
its product market rivals, as given in the market value equation. This business-stealing
effect increases the private incentive to invest in organisation capital by redistributing
output between firms. The business-stealing effect on market values will generally consist
of a (negative) impact on rival firms’ prices and output levels. The share of the overall
effect that falls on output is represented by parameter σ and, in line with BSV, is set
at 12 . More in general, the size of σ will depend on the precise model of product market
competition.
As our estimates of the different parameters (γ1, ϕ1 and λ2) vary notably between
specifications and because the spillover parameters ϕ1 and λ2 are often not statistically
significant, it is most helpful to report 95-percent confidence intervals (estimated using
the delta method) alongside the point estimates. In Table 2.7, we report the MSR
and MPR estimates based on parameters from two specifications, namely from column
2 of Tables 2.3 and 2.4 – which give relatively optimistic estimates of organisation
capital knowledge spillovers – and column 6 of Tables 2.3 and 2.4 – which give relatively
pessimistic estimates. As the table shows, the MPR of investment in organisation capital
is significantly positive. Column 2 of Table 2.4 showed a significantly negative business-
stealing effect, which results in a higher MPR; column 6 of Table 2.4 showed a positive
but insignificant business-stealing effect, which results in a lower MPR and a wider
confidence interval. The MSR estimates show much more uncertainty. Based on the
estimates in column 2 of Table 2.3, the point estimate of the MSR is higher than
the MPR, but the confidence interval is very wide. In column 6 of Table 2.3, the point
15For a detailed derivation and discussion, see Hall, Mairesse and Mohnen (2010).
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estimate of knowledge spillovers from organisation capital is negative, leading to a lower
MSR and an even wider confidence interval that includes zero. So despite the clearly
positive private benefits to investment in organisation capital, the social benefits are
much more uncertain and could well be less than the private return.
Table 2.7: The Marginal Social and Private Returns to OC Investment
Column 2 Column 6
MSR 0.636 [0.073 – 1.200] 0.155 [-0.710 – 1.026]
MPR 0.438 [0.337 – 0.540] 0.282 [0.153 – 0.411]
Notes: The marginal social return (MSR) and marginal private return (MPR) from investment in
organisation capital are estimated using equations (2.10) and (2.11) and the parameter estimates as
given in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 from the indicated columns. Reported in square brackets are the 95-percent
confidence intervals, which are estimated using the delta method
2.3.5 Discussion
As mentioned in the introduction, we are not the first to analyse potential spillover
effects from organisation capital or knowledge-based/intangible assets more in general.
GHW find knowledge spillovers from U.K. industry stocks of ‘economic competencies’,
which overlaps substantially with our measure of organisation capital.16 CHJ find
knowledge spillovers from non-R&D intangible assets using market sector capital stocks
for the U.S. and European economies. Investment in non-R&D intangible consists in
equal parts of investment in organisation capital (as we define it) and other intangible
investments.17
The difference in asset coverage could account for the difference in findings, especially
in comparison with the CHJ results: their knowledge spillovers could stem from many
other assets than from organisation capital. But a first question would be whether their
findings on knowledge spillovers could refer to knowledge spillovers from organisation
capital given the lack of evidence for such spillovers in this study. GHW find some
evidence of positive external effects, with industries learning about the organisational
practices of their suppliers, but no support for the movements of workers between
industries as a channel for external effects. GHW also find negative internal stock
16‘Economic competencies’ accounts for 80% of our measure of organisation capital and for 20% of
investment of worker training.
17Specifically, investment in software, new architectural and engineering designs, development of
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effects, which could be the same negative market-rival effect we find: investments in
organisation capital by other firms in the industry adversely affect the investing firm.
There is a larger gap in findings with CHJ, who find evidence of positive productivity
spillovers based on economy-wide data. If firm-level returns to scale are constant – as
they are in our data – the findings of CHJ would point to between-firm spillovers. If
such between-firm spillovers exist at the economy-wide level, this would imply that our
analysis is not looking at the right channels through which knowledge about intangible
capital ‘spills over’ between firms. Indeed, it could be that knowledge diffuses through
the supply chain, through worker flows or in other ways that we cannot readily measure.
At its most limited, the contribution of this chapter is thus to show that there is no
evidence to support the notion that firms with more similar technologies (as reflected
in their patent portfolio) learn from each other’s organisation capital. However, a
corollary of this contribution is that any ‘true’ between-firm spillover channel cannot
be positively correlated with the similarity of firm patent portfolios. Furthermore, such
a true between-firm spillover channel also cannot be positively correlated with within-
firm organisation capital, because if it were, we would have found (robust) evidence of
increasing returns to scale in our basic production function estimates. Such a lack of
correlation would be at odds with the literature on learning (e.g. Cohen & Levinthal,
1989), which argues that firms invest in R&D (in part) with the aim of learning about
R&D done by other firms. Given that the hypothesised spillovers from organisation
capital are also thought of as knowledge spillovers, a greater spillover potential should
lead to greater within-firm investments in organisation capital. So, given our findings, it
is not straightforward to hypothesise how knowledge spillovers from organisation capital
would operate.
An alternative explanation would be that we measure organisation capital with greater
error than CHJ or GHW. Such measurement error would make it harder for us to find
significant evidence of knowledge spillovers. GHW and CHJ can certainly analyse more
precisely-delineated measures of intangible capital than we are able to. Our investment
measure, SGA, includes spending on advertising and managerial compensation – both
of which GHW and CHJ also consider as investment in intangible assets – but also
spending that is not related to intangible capital formation, such as rents. That said, the
CHJ and GHW numbers are also imperfect measurements of ‘true’ organisation capital.
It could be that having more and better-paid managers leads to the accumulation
of more efficient organisational structures, but this is more of a presumption than
a result. It is, for example, not known if firms that invest more in organisation
capital (according to the CHJ/GHW measures) adopt more performance-enhancing
management practices, as measured by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). There is a
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positive correlation, though, between the quality of management practices and SGA-
based measures of organisation capital, as shown by Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013).
This suggests that the measurement error in our SGA-based measure is not so large as
to drown out a useful signal.
Furthermore it is not a given that measurement error would play a more substantial role
in our firm-level setting given that we have many more observations (18,000 versus 100)
and can more extensively control for confounding factors and employ econometrically
appealing methods. Additionally, we can focus on firms in manufacturing, to which the
production function framework can be more easily applied than to some of the services
industries in the data of GHW, for which output prices are much harder to measure.
Finally, GHW and CHJ both adjust their measure of output to include the estimated
investment in intangibles. While this is logical within the framework of the System of
National Accounts – investment goods have to be produced first – our focus on real sales
as the output indicator has a much clearer interpretation: it is the sales to customers
that brings in revenues – and thus can lead to profits – while the imputed output value
of intangible capital investment is nothing more than an accounting element to balance
the (national accountant’s) books.
Given these considerations, it is hard to see how organisation capital could be a source
of substantial knowledge spillovers. Especially the evidence from CHJ can most easily
be interpreted as evidence of knowledge spillovers from ‘non-R&D, non-organisation
capital’ intangible assets. The evidence of GHW was more mixed to begin with, with
both negative and positive effects. We would thus argue that, first, our results place
limits on where we can hope to find any knowledge spillovers from organisation capital;
and second, that caution is in order when interpreting evidence of knowledge spillovers
from intangible capital based on aggregate evidence.
2.4 Conclusions
This chapter presents the first firm-level analysis of knowledge spillovers from invest-
ment in organisation capital. With traditional tangible capital, aggregate productivity
benefits are simply a summation of firm benefits, but when the asset is intangible – as
is the case with organisation capital – there may be spillovers across firms that drive a
wedge between the private and social returns of investment.
Our analysis is based on a sample of 1,266 U.S. manufacturing firms. We locate each firm
in technology space, to capture potential knowledge spillovers of organisation capital
between technologically similar firms; and in product market space to capture negative
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‘market-stealing’ spillovers from competitors. We find no significant knowledge spillovers
and only limited evidence for market-stealing effects on the market value of firms.
This lack of evidence stands in contrast to recent studies by GHW and CHJ that do find
evidence for spillovers from intangible assets based on more aggregate data. We have
argued that, at the very least, our findings limit the scope of where positive knowledge
spillovers from organisation capital can be found. More broadly this chapter suggests
that knowledge about organisation capital does not readily spill over between firms. This
can be best understood if information about organisation capital is tacit, firm-specific
and idiosyncratic. Seen in that light, it seems more sensible to interpret the evidence
of GHW and CHJ as evidence in favour of knowledge spillovers from intangible assets
other than organisation capital. Either way, the lack of supportive firm-level evidence on
knowledge spillovers from organisation capital suggests caution is in order when looking
for intangible assets as a potential accelerator of productivity growth.
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Table 2.8: Descriptive Statistics for a Sample Including Non-patenting firms
Median Mean SD Between SD Within SD Av.years N
Sales 87 2,150 12,484 8,548 4,119 14.6 29,228
Market value 174 3,170 15,912 8,976 9,661 13.9 25,756
SGA expenses 22 331 1,279 810 558 12.4 23,839
R&D expenses 6 95 449 257 230 12.4 23,950
Physical capital 20 653 4,241 2,768 1,561 14.3 28,688
Employees 581 7,538 23,806 15,739 8,344 13.6 27,173
Internal OC stock 74 1,172 4,533 2,927 1,815 12.4 23,839
Internal RD stock 28 481 2,315 1,326 1,164 12.4 23,950
Notes: ‘Between SD’ illustrates the variation between firms (averaged over time), while ‘Within SD’
illustrates the variation over time, ignoring the between-firm variation. Sales are deflated by the industry
price index and SGA expenses are deflated by the implicit GDP price deflator; all price indices are
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Employees are in numbers; all other variables are in millions
of 2005 U.S. dollars.













Table 2.9: Production Function Estimates Including Non-patenting Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Physical capital (K) 0.206*** 0.239*** 0.231*** 0.251***
(0.042) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050)
Employees (L) 0.702*** 0.492*** 0.651*** 0.476***
(0.056) (0.070) (0.062) (0.073)
Organisation capital (G) 0.246*** 0.226***
(0.046) (0.055)
R&D capital (R) 0.072** 0.025
(0.032) (0.032)
Number of observations 18,171 13,994 14,058 13,994
Number of firms 1,432 1,232 1,233 1,232
R2 0.664 0.731 0.720 0.729
Returns to scale (H0: RTS=1) 0.908*** 0.977 0.954* 0.979
Hansen J p value 0.48 0.103 0.588 0.178
Weak instrument 82.46 44.92 43.45 34.31
Notes: All results are estimated using on the two-step efficient generalised method of moments (GMM)
estimator, using Xit−2 and Xit−3 as instruments for Xit. Dependent variable in all estimations is real
sales and all specifications include firm and year fixed effects, the industry output index and the lag of
the industry output index and the industry price index. Robust standard errors, clustered by firm, are
shown in parentheses. Returns to scale tests whether the sum of all inputs (K, L and G and R where
included) is significantly different from one. The Hansen J p value is based on a test of overidentifying
restrictions, where the null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid. The Weak instrument line
gives the Wald F-statistic of the first-stage regression. If this statistic exceeds 11–12 (depending on the
specification), the IV bias is less than 5% of the bias of using OLS, see Stock and Yogo (2005).
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
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Table 2.11: Production Function Estimates Including Material Inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Physical capital (K) 0.140*** 0.160*** 0.152*** 0.154***
(0.013) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Employees (L) 0.667*** 0.557*** 0.660*** 0.549***
(0.020) (0.060) (0.058) (0.059)
Materials (M) 0.090*** 0.066* 0.061* 0.056
(0.012) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Organisation capital (G) 0.173*** 0.238***
(0.046) (0.052)
R&D capital (R) 0.047 –0.058*
(0.031) (0.035)
Number of observations 11,831 9,755 9,790 9,755
Number of firms 924 831 832 831
R2 0.814 0.832 0.822 0.834
Returns to scale (H0: RTS=1) 0.897*** 0.957* 0.859*** 0.884***
Hansen J p value 0.001 0.154 0.338 0.224
Weak instrument 412.9 19.18 21.25 15.78
Notes: All results are estimated using on the two-step efficient generalised method of moments (GMM)
estimator, using Xit−2 and Xit−3 as instruments for Xit. See notes to Appendix Table 2.9 for further
details. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗p<0.1
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Complementarity between intangibles and ICT:
Evidence from EU countries∗
3.1 Introduction
Investment in information and communications technology (ICT) and investment in
intangible assets are key sources of growth in advanced economies. Much anecdotal and
firm-level evidence confirm that ICT and intangible assets do not only contribute to
labour productivity growth individually, but do even more so in combination (Bloom et
al., 2012; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2002; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2000; Brynjolfsson,
Hitt & Yang, 2002; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2003; Hall, Lotti & Mairesse, 2013). While
evidence on this complementary relationship between investment in ICT and intangibles
is well-established in microeconomic studies, little is known about this relationship at
the macroeconomic level as there were no explicit data on intangible investment at the
level of the economy or industries.1 Since the pioneering measurement work of Corrado
et al. (2005, 2009), which standardised and popularised the approach of measuring
business investments in intangible assets, quantifying the impact of intangibles on
productivity and economic growth has been made possible in recent years. Many
researchers incorporate such assets into a standard ‘sources-of-growth’ framework and
find that intangible capital contributes significantly to labour productivity growth
(Borgo, Goodridge, Haskel & Pesole, 2013; Corrado et al., 2009; Fukao et al., 2009;
Roth & Thum, 2013). However, the effect of labour productivity from the combined
∗This chapter is based on Chen, Niebel and Saam (2016).
1To note, there have been other attempts to provide macroeconomic evidence on the complementarity
between investment in ICT and intangibles (Basu et al., 2004; Corrado et al., 2014). This chapter
however differs from the previous works, as this is the first study to explicitly account for intangible
investment at the industry level. This is potentially a very useful source of variation that could help to












investment in ICT and intangibles is still not taken into account in those macroeconomic
studies.
By using the industry-level intangible investment data for ten European countries, this
chapter tests a much-discussed hypothesis in firm-level studies, namely that intangible
capital investment is needed to gain the largest benefits from investment in ICT,
and provides corroborating macroeconomic evidence. It is important to establish such
evidence at the macroeconomic level as the existing microeconomic evidence may not
hold in general and even if the findings can be generalised, the quantitative results
could still differ if data with comprehensive coverage are used. We also contribute to
the literature by shedding light on the magnitude of the output elasticity of intangible
capital. Thus, in addition to its qualitative importance we also discuss the quantitative
importance of intangible capital for labour productivity growth. More importantly,
the quantitative implication enables us to quantify the growth differentials between
industries with varying degrees of ICT intensity, which might be of great interest to
policy makers in designing industry-specific policies.
This chapter is also related to the strand of literature that studies the productivity
gap between the U.S. and continental Europe, as the poorer productivity performance
observed in Europe since the mid-1990s may not only be the result of its lower level of
investment in ICT relative to the U.S. (Van Ark et al., 2008), but also to a less effective
exploitation of ICT due to lower investment in intangible capital.2
To empirically examine to what extent the growth impact of intangible capital is
dependent on an industry’s ICT intensity, we first define an industry characteristic that
ranks the industries by the extent to which they rely on the use of ICT and calculate this
ranking as the ratio of ICT capital services to labour services. The resulting intensity
indicator is then interacted with the growth of intangible capital and the interaction
term is estimated in an intangibles-augmented Cobb-Douglas production function.
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, we test whether a one percent
increase in intangible capital deepening increases output per worker more strongly in
more ICT-intensive industries.
Three key findings emerge from this study. First, intangible capital contributes
systematically to labour productivity growth and its productive impact is found to be
significantly higher in ICT-intensive industries than in those that use little ICT. This
result supports the complementarity between intangible capital and ICT in production
2According to Corrado, Haskel, Jona-Lasinio and Iommi (2013) the U.S. has a much higher propensity
to invest in intangibles than the EU. Between 1995 and 2009 (the period during which the productivity
gap widens), intangible investment as a share of GDP is averaged around 10.6% for the U.S., while the
share is only about 6.6% for the EU.
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found in prior microeconomic studies. Second, using industry-level instead of country-
level data on intangibles, we find a much smaller mean output elasticity of intangible
capital (0.17 as opposed to 0.4–0.7 found in Corrado et al., 2014), as well as a
larger differential effect of labour productivity growth across industries. The output
elasticity of intangible capital amounts to 0.099 for industries at the lowest quartile
of ICT intensity, while it exceeds 0.19 for industries at the highest quartile. Third,
by distinguishing various different intangible asset types, we find that not every single
intangible asset exhibits a higher output elasticity in ICT-intensive industries. In the
sample of assets investigated, this is only true for organisational structures and research
and development (R&D).
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the concept
and measurement of intangible capital and how capitalisation of intangibles changes
the traditional output measure and growth accounting framework. The econometric
approach to investigate the impact of intangible capital accumulation on labour
productivity growth is outlined in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 elaborates on the proxy of
industry ICT intensity measures. Empirical analysis and robustness checks are presented
in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Measuring intangible inputs and output
This section considers issues related to the concept and measurement of intangible
capital. It begins with a discussion on the definition of intangible capital: what is it and
how can it be measured? Then, it outlines how capitalising investment in intangible
assets changes the conventional output measure, followed by a descriptive overview of
the data used for analysis. It is important to emphasise that this section only highlights
the main issues, readers should refer to Niebel et al. (2013) for more extensive details
regarding the construction of the intangible investment data by industry.
3.2.1 Defining intangible capital
Intangible capital, also known as knowledge-based capital, comprises a variety of
distinctive assets, which create long-lasting benefits for the firm and the economy.
Unlike machinery, equipment, and buildings, intangible assets do not have a physical
embodiment. Well-known examples of intangible assets include computer software and
scientific research and development (R&D), both of which are currently recognised as
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part of the official national accounts of a country.3 Since the ground-breaking work
of Corrado et al. (2005), a more comprehensive measure of intangible capital that is
compatible with national accounts has been developed and it consists of three categories:
(1) computerised information, (2) innovative property, and (3) economic competencies.4
The first category mainly includes investment in software and computerised databases.
The second is composed of scientific R&D and a number of non-scientific R&D, such as
new financial products, designs, and artistic originals. The last category, arguably the
largest in size, contains brand equity, firm-specific human capital and organisational
structures.
Table 3.1: Industry Coverage
Industries covered (NACE Rev. 1.1 classification) Acronym
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing (AtB)
Mining and quarrying (C)
Total manufacturing (D)
Electricity, gas and water supply (E)
Construction (F)
Wholesale and retail trade (G)
Hotels and restaurants (H)
Transport and storage and communication (I)
Financial intermediation (J)
Renting of machinery and equipment and other business activities (K)
Other community, social and personal services (O)
This measurement breakthrough by Corrado et al. (2005) sparked great interests among
economists and unleashed increasing efforts to measure overall business investment in
intangibles, which in the end led to the development of the INTAN-Invest database
(Corrado et al., 2012). It provides market sector data on the above-mentioned intangible
assets for 27 EU countries plus Norway and the U.S. The data set used in this chapter is
a breakdown of the INTAN-Invest database by industry and it was developed by Niebel
et al. (2013) in the INDICSER project.5 This data cover eleven industries according
to the NACE 1.1 classification (see Table 3.1) and seven different intangible assets
that are not included in the EU KLEMS database,6 where the industry-level data on
output, non-ICT assets, ICT assets, and labour input are derived from (see Table 3.2
3Software has been recognised as investment in national accounts since the 1993 revision of the System
of National Accounts (SNA); R&D has been newly added since the SNA 2008 revision.
4The need to measure and incorporate these intangible assets into national accounts is also extensively
discussed in Nakamura (2010).
5INDICSER refers to Indicators for Evaluating International Performance in Service Sectors.
6The EU KLEMS database provides detailed statistics on growth and productivity accounts at
industry level for individual EU member states, various EU aggregates, Japan, and the United States.
See O’Mahony and Timmer (2009) for more details.
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Table 3.2: Asset Groups
Non-ICT Assets ICT Assets Intangible Assets
Transport equipment Computing equipment Scientific research and development
Other machinery and equipment Communications equipment Firm-specific human capital
Total non-residential investment Software New financial product development
Residential structures New architectural & engineering designs
Other assets Market research
Advertising expenditure
Organisational structures (Own Account)
Organisational structures (Purchased)
Notes: The composition of ICT and non-ICT assets is consistent with the distinction made in EU KLEMS
database see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009).
and further discussions on these variables in Section 3.3). The term ‘new intangibles’ is
used to designate those investments that are not capitalised in national accounts prior
to the SNA 2008 revision. As a result, computer software is counted as part of ICT
assets instead of ‘new intangibles’ in this chapter.
3.2.2 Measurement approach
Measuring business investment in intangibles is extremely difficult as they are often
created for internal use and suffer from a lack of observable market transaction data for
valuation. To circumvent this problem, the cost approach has been widely used as an
alternative. The underlying assumption of the cost approach is that firms are willing
to invest in intangible assets until the discounted present value of the expected future
income stream equals to the cost of producing the marginal asset (Jorgenson, 1963). A
key challenge and caveat of the cost approach, however, is that it is not known how much
(i.e. what portion) of intangible spending can be counted as investment. The current
consensus is to apply a capitalisation factor equal to one. That is, all expenditures on
intangibles are believed to have long-lasting impacts (i.e. longer than a year) and are
counted as investment.7
To convert nominal values into real terms, a price deflator for intangible investment is
needed. Following the broader literature on intangibles, we use an output deflator that
7Known exceptions to this rule are spending on advertising and own-account organisational structures.
Existing research on advertising suggest that only about 60% of advertising expenditures have a
long-lasting impact (i.e. longer than one year). As for own-account organisational structures, 20%
of managers’ wage are counted as investment (Corrado et al., 2005).
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is based on the value added price index for the total business sector as the proxy.8 The
industry-specific intangible capital stock is then constructed using the usual perpetual
inventory method (PIM):
Rk,i,t = (1− δk) ·Rk,i,t−1 + Nk,i,t
pt
(3.1)
where Rk,i,t is the capital stock for intangible asset k in industry i at time t. Nominal
investment in intangibles N is deflated by the value added price deflator pt obtained
from the EU KLEMS database (except for training, see footnote 8). This deflator is
assumed to be the same across all industries and asset types. δk is the time– and
industry–invariant depreciation rate for asset k, following Corrado et al. (2012). By
assuming that the economy is in a steady-state, the initial capital stock in year 1995 is






(δk + g) (3.2)
where g is the average rate of growth of real value added in the total business
sector between 1991 and 1999. Under the assumption of marginal productivity pricing,
(industry) output measured by nominal value added is accordingly expanded as follows:




where the conventional output measure VAadj,i,t, taken from EU KLEMS, is augmented
to include the flow of new intangibles Nk,i,t. Thus, after capitalisation intangible capital
is both a productive input (Rk,i,t) that provides capital services and a part of adjusted
output (Nk,i,t). To convert the nominal adjusted value added to volumes, an adjusted
value added deflator is required and it is calculated as:
∆lnVA Padj,i,t = vVA,i,t∆lnVA Pi,t + vINT,i,t∆lnPi,t (3.4)
where vVA,i,t is the two-period average share of nominal value added in adjusted value
added, and vINT,i,t is the two-period average share of nominal intangible investment N
in adjusted value added.
The internal rate of return irr for each industry i also needs to be recalculated and it
is redefined as follows:
8The exception is investment in firm-specific human capital, which is deflated using an earnings
deflator following O’Mahony (2012). The rationale for using an earnings deflator for investment in
training is that training costs are related more to wage payments than to prices in general.
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irri,t =













where the adjusted value added VAadj minus the labour compensation (LAB) denotes
the industry-specific adjusted total capital compensation; p, δ, and R are the investment
price index, the rate of depreciation and the real stock of both tangible and intangible
assets k. The asset-specific user cost of capital uck,i,t is calculated using the following
relation:
uck,i,t = pIk,i,t−1 · irri,t + pIk,i,t · δk,i − [pIk,i,t − pIk,i,t−1] (3.6)
As equation (3.6) shows, the user cost of capital is determined by the nominal rate of
return, the rate of depreciation, and the asset-specific capital gains. The user cost, in
turn, is used to calculate the capital compensation for each asset type and industry:
COMPadj,i,t = uck,i,t ·Rk,i,t (3.7)
The industry-specific growth of each intangible capital services Rs is calculated as
follows:




where wINTk,i,t is the two-period average share of intangible asset k in total intangible
capital compensation.
The aggregation of input and output volumes to the total business sector is calculated





where uINTi,t is the two-period average share of industry i in total business sector
intangible capital compensation.
3.2.3 Price and depreciation issues
The growth of intangible capital stocks and services calculated above may be sensitive
to the assumptions on price deflation and depreciation rates. As widely acknowledged,
the overall business output price is only a place-holder when used as the price index
for intangible investment. It could be argued that rather than the business-sector
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price deflator, more appropriate asset deflators would be the price indices of the
industries that produce (in part) intangible assets, such as the management consulting
(organisation capital), advertising (brand equity) and architectural and engineering
services (architectural designs) industries. Although this might not be a perfect match,
especially for own-account investment, a similar procedure is used to deflate investment
in own-account software in the national accounts of countries like the United States.
Appropriate output deflators for intangible-producing industries, however, are not
widely available for the set of EU countries that we cover.
In order to assess the plausibility of the assumption that the growth of intangible
capital stocks is robust to changing the deflator from the overall business output
deflator to output deflators of intangible-producing industries, we use data for the
U.S., where more detailed industry prices are available. Intangible capital stocks
are reconstructed for investments in R&D, advertising, market research, organisation
capital, and architectural design and engineering services. One of the findings is that
the growth of intangible capital stock calculated using the business-sector price deflator
correlate very highly with the growth of the stock calculated using detailed industry-
specific prices (i.e. correlations are all above 0.92). Although the degree to which
this analysis holds true for other countries is unknown, it does provide comforting
evidence that the scope of bias resulting from the choice of the price deflator is likely
to be limited. As for the depreciation rates, these are the ‘standard’ rates used in all
research on intangibles. The sensitivity of capital stock growth to changing the standard
depreciation assumptions seems minor, as shown in studies like O’Mahony (2012).
3.2.4 Descriptive statistics
The industry intangible investment data cover ten European countries and for the period
of 1995-2007: Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. One of the key insights of the industry
data is that investment in intangibles is found to be concentrated most intensively in
Manufacturing industry (D), which has an average share of total intangible investment
of 38 percent across ten EU countries (see Table 3.3). This result is in line with the
work of Goodridge et al. (2012b) who find that the Manufacturing industry has the
highest ratio of intangible investment to value added. The Business service industry
(K) and the Wholesale and retail trade industry (G) also show relatively large shares
of intangible investment in comparison to other industries. With an average share of
less than 0.3 percent, the Mining and quarrying (C) industry has the lowest level of
investment in intangible capital.
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Table 3.3: Average Share of Intangible Investment in Total Business Sector
Industry AT CZ DK FI FR DE IT NL ES UK Mean
AtB .00 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .009
C .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .01 .003
D .38 .29 .34 .60 .33 .57 .35 .32 .39 .22 .379
E .01 .02 .01 .02 .02 .02 .01 .02 .03 .01 .017
F .05 .08 .09 .03 .04 .03 .05 .04 .07 .05 .053
G .16 .15 .17 .08 .12 .08 .21 .14 .12 .14 .137
H .02 .02 .01 .01 .01 .01 .02 .02 .03 .03 .018
I .05 .05 .06 .06 .06 .03 .07 .09 .08 .08 .063
J .09 .09 .07 .06 .10 .10 .07 .09 .11 .15 .093
K .20 .24 .19 .10 .27 .14 .18 .22 .12 .25 .191
O .04 .04 .04 .03 .03 .02 .04 .04 .04 .06 .038
Source: Niebel et al. (2013). The last column Mean is calculated as the cross-country average.
Table 3.4 provides some basic descriptive statistics on the key variables of interest. As
can be seen in this table, the most rapid growth of inputs over the period of observation
is found for ICT capital (with an average growth rate of 12 percent). Although the
growth is much slower than for ICT, growth in intangible capital input is the second
largest. It grew by over 4 percent between 1995 and 2007. The amount of labour services
provided, on the other hand, experienced the slowest growth. It grew by an average of
merely 1 percent over the same period.
Table 3.4: Growth Rates of the Key Variables
Median Mean S.D. Min Max N
Value added 0.03 0.02 0.06 –0.55 0.34 1,320
Non-ICT 0.02 0.02 0.04 –0.40 0.19 1,320
ICT 0.10 0.12 0.10 –0.23 0.85 1,320
Total intangibles 0.04 0.04 0.06 –0.23 0.63 1,320
Labour 0.01 0.01 0.04 –0.24 0.15 1,320
Notes: Value added is adjusted to include intangible capital as in equation (3.3). Growth rates are
calculated as ln differences and are averaged over the period 1995-2007. The letter N in the last
column denotes the total number of observations. Note, the actual number of observations is 1430 (10
countries times 11 industries times 13 years), but one year is lost for computing the growth rate.
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The main model of interest builds upon the following general production function:
Vc,i,t = Ac,i,t · F (Lc,i,t,K c,i,t) (3.10)
where V denotes value added adjusted to include intangible capital.9 A is the Hicks-
neutral technology parameter that allows for changes in productivity with which labour
(L) and capital (K) are transformed into output. The subscripts c, i, t indicate country,
industry, and year. Suppose total capital input K is composed of three types: non-ICT
(NICT), ICT, and intangible capital (INT) and assume a Cobb-Douglas functional form
for the production function. Equation (3.10) can be written out as follows:








where L denotes labour input measured by labour services, which accounts for
differences in labour qualities (i.e. human capital);10 K is the capital services provided
by non-ICT, ICT, and intangible capital. The output elasticities are labelled by the
superscripts α and βx, x = (1, 2, 3). After taking logs and first differences and assuming
constant returns to scale, equation (3.11) can be rewritten as:
∆(v − l) = β1∆(kNICT − l) + β2∆(kICT − l) + β3∆(kINT − l) + µ (3.12)
where lower-case denotes variables in natural logarithms and the subscripts are
suppressed for simplicity of exposition. The efficiency term A is modelled as part of the
error term µ. For reasons explained below, the error term is decomposed into a country-
industry specific fixed effect ωc,i, a full set of time dummies τt, and an idiosyncratic
component c,i,t. To examine whether the output elasticity of intangible capital differs
across industries with varying degrees of ICT intensity, intangible capital is interacted
with an ICT intensity indicator (DICTc,i ) that is measured as the ratio of ICT capital
services to labour services:11
9Value added is used as the output measure because: (1) there is no readily available intangibles data
on gross output; and (2) labour productivity based on value added is measured more accurately in the
presence of outsourcing, a feature that is commonly observed at the industry level (Schreyer & Pilat,
2001)
10Labour input is taken from the EU KLEMS database which adjusts for the productivity of various
types of labour input such as low- versus high-skilled. EU KLEMS cross-classifies labour input by
educational attainment, gender, and age, resulting in a total of 18 different labour categories. Interested
readers should refer to O’Mahony and Timmer (2009) for more details.
11This is one of the most commonly used measures for (ICT) capital intensity (e.g. Corrado et al.,
2014). Other proposed measures, such as ICT capital compensation as a share of total value added
(e.g. Jorgenson & Timmer, 2011; Michaels, Natraj & Van Reenen, 2014) and ICT capital share of total
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∆(v − l) = β1∆(kNICT − l) + β2∆(kICT − l) + β3∆(kINT − l)
+ γ∆(kINT − l) ·DICTc,i + ωc,i + τt + c,i,t
(3.13)
This specification is akin to the difference-in-differences approach which has its
antecedents in literature that analyses the impact of financial development on industry
growth (Rajan & Zingales, 1998)12 and has been used in the previous work on
productivity in ICT-intensive industries (Corrado et al., 2014). If the complementarity
hypothesis holds true, γ is expected to be positive and statistically significant. Given
that ICT investment is highly correlated with intangible investment (the correlation
coefficient is larger than 0.8), one may argue that it is perhaps not intangible capital
that has a higher output elasticity in ICT-intensive industries but ICT investment itself
or even non-ICT assets. To account for these potential omitted variable biases, the full
model is specified as follows:
∆(v − l) = γ1∆(kNICT − l) ·DICTc,i + γ2∆(kICT − l) ·DICTc,i
+ γ3∆(kINT − l) ·DICTc,i + βX′ + ωc,i + τt + c,i,t
(3.14)
where X′ indicates the vector of the main variables including the growth of capital
inputs. γ1 and γ2 are not expected to be different from zero, as there is no theoretical
underpinning for assets other than intangibles to complement ICT investment. To
ensure a meaningful interpretation of the coefficients of the variables of interest, the
interaction terms are demeaned for estimation following the suggestion of Balli and
Sørensen (2013).13
It is important to note that the econometric specification presented above has several
limitations. First, assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function is equivalent to
assuming a constant output elasticity. This differs from the typical growth accounting
framework where output elasticities, approximated by the cost shares, can change
over time. Allowing for changing output elasticities, though, would require the use
of a translog production function. Despite its greater flexibility, estimating a translog
production function comes at the cost of a larger number of parameters that need to
be estimated. Having distinguished four different production factors (i.e. three capital
inputs plus labour input), the amount of parameters that need to be estimated in
capital services (e.g Stiroh, 2002), are considered in sensitivity analysis.
12For a more extensive review on using the difference-in-differences estimation approach and its pros
and cons, see Ciccone and Papaioannou (2010)
13From an econometric point of view, demeaning the interaction term does not change the result. It is a
reparameterisation of the same statistical model, but the added benefit is that the coefficient estimates
of the main variables will remain similar to the simple model without the interaction term. As for the
coefficient estimate of the interaction term as well as its standard errors, it will be exactly identical
whether the interaction variables are demeaned or not.
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a translog framework increases to 14, imposing hard constraints on the feasibility of
the analysis.14 The probability of the occurrence of a harmful collinearity between the
explanatory variables significantly increases as the number of considered production
factors increases. Given this practical constraint, estimating a Cobb-Douglas production
function remains preferred in spite of the assumption of a constant output elasticity.
Another issue in the estimation of equation (3.14) is the potential correlation between
unobservable productivity shocks and the input levels, as was first noted by Marschak
and Andrews (1944) and further discussed in Griliches and Mairesse (1998). This
problem is commonly referred to as simultaneity bias in production function estimation.
It arises from the fact that unobservable productivity shocks are known to the firms, but
not to the econometrician when firms choose their input levels. Firms facing a positive
productivity shock may respond by using more inputs. Negative shocks, on the other
hand, may lead firms to cut back their output by decreasing input use. To control for
this simultaneity bias, it is advised to include time dummies and (the country-industry
specific) fixed effects in the error term (Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry & Pakes, 2007). The
rationale for this is that to the extent that the observable productivity shocks are time-
invariant and country-industry specific, this specification should go a long way towards
dealing with the problem of simultaneity bias. This within estimator is also preferred to
the between estimator, as by collapsing the time series as an average it would lead to a
too small number of observations (i.e. 110), resulting in a larger scope for simultaneity
bias than the within estimator.
Following Michaels et al. (2014), we further account for the potential endogeneity of
the ICT intensity indicator DICTc,i by instrumenting the measure with the industry-
level U.S. values at the beginning of the period of observation. The idea behind this
strategy is that the sharp decline in quality-adjusted ICT prices disproportionately
affects industries that have a greater potential for using ICT inputs. An indicator of
this potential, as argued by Michaels et al. (2014), is the initial ICT intensity in the U.S.,
a country that is widely seen as the technological leader. Last but not least, standard
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and correlation between the country-industry
pairs, an approach also applied by Stiroh (2002) in investigating the revival of the U.S.
productivity growth using industry-level data.
14In translog production function estimation, the number of estimated parameters is equal to n · (n+
3)/2, where n denotes the number of production factors.
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3.4 Proxy ICT intensity indicator
Following the literature, there are various ways to proxy for country-industry variant
ICT intensities: (1) the ratio of ICT capital services to labour services, (2) the ICT
capital share – of total value added, (3) – of total capital services, and (4) – of total
capital compensation (Table 3.5).
Table 3.5: Definition of ICT Intensity Indicators



















∗W is the two-period ICT capital compensation share in total nominal capital compensation; KICT and
KNICT denote capital stocks. LS indicates labour services measured by total number of hours worked.
§P is the rental price of capital stock. The superscripts denote capital types: namely ICT and non-ICT. WL
indicates the labour share of income.
On theoretical grounds, there is no proxy that is superior to the others. We follow
Corrado et al. (2014) in using ICT capital services divided by labour services as the
baseline measure of ICT intensity and apply the other three alternative measures
for sensitivity analysis. Figure 3.1 displays the average values of all four intensity
measures. If ICT intensity is split at the median intensity value, Transport (I), Financial
intermediation (J), and Business services (K) would be classified as ICT-intensive
industries across all four measures; while Agriculture (AtB), Manufacturing (D), and
Construction (F) are always ICT non-intensive. Mining and quarrying (C) remain below
the median value for three measures.15
Since the ICT intensity might be endogenous, we follow Michaels et al. (2014) in using
the industry-specific U.S. ICT intensity at the beginning of the period of observation
(i.e. 1995) as an instrument. For comparison purposes, analysis using the endogenous
indicator – the average of ICT intensity across ten EU countries and time – is also
carried out, but instrumentation with the U.S. values remains to be the benchmark
specification. The U.S. ICT capital intensity in 1995 is shown in Figure 3.2. Comparing
this industry ranking to the ranking of average EU ICT intensities in the upper left
panel of Figure 3.1, the main differences are the higher position for industry D and the
15Results for individual countries are available upon request. For the preferred measure, the values for
industries J and K exceed the median in nine out of ten countries and the values for industry I in eight
countries. The values for industries AtB, F, and H fall below the median in all countries. The values
for Manufacturing (D) tend to lie close to the median.
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lower position for industry C in the U.S. in 1995, while other industries remain largely
unchanged.
Figure 3.1: Four Measures of EU Industry ICT Intensity
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These ICT intensity measures vary continuously, both across industries and over time.
This could lead to volatility in an industry’s ranking. As an alternative to these
continuous ICT intensity indicators, we also use a discrete indicator by grouping
industries into ICT-intensive and ICT non-intensive in the spirit of Stiroh (2002) and
Bloom et al. (2012). This helps to keep the volatility of an industry’s ranking to a
minimum. At the same time it remains an accurate description of the actual ranking
of ICT intensities, as the changes are likely to occur within rather than between the
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intensity groups. Using the ratio of ICT capital to labour services as the preferred
proxy (i.e. DICT1 ), three alternative criteria can be applied to distinguish ICT-intensive
industries from those that are ICT non-intensive. The first one is the standard practice
of dividing the groups at the median value of ICT intensity (observed in industry
G). Industries with ICT-intensity values larger than 0.14 are labelled as ICT-intensive
industries (i.e. K, I, E, C, J); while others with intensity values smaller than the median
are labelled as ICT non-intensive (i.e. AtB, F, H, D, O). For robustness checks, we also
looked for ‘structural breaks’ of the intensity values and used that criterion to split the
industries. The two largest structural breaks are observed in industries D and K. For
the former, the ICT intensity value became more than twice as large as the preceding
industry H; while for industry K, it is about 80 percent more ICT-intensive than the
preceding industry G.
Table 3.6: Discrete Measures of ICT Intensity
Split at median (G) Split at break point (D) Split at break point (K)
ICT-intensive K, I, E, C, J D, O, G, K, I, E, C, J K, I, E, C, J
ICT non-intensive AtB, F, H, D, O AtB, F, H AtB, F, H, D, O, G
3.5 Empirical results
This section discusses the main empirical findings. It begins with the analysis on the
importance of intangible capital for labour productivity growth, followed by the test
whether the output elasticity of intangible capital is higher in industries that invest
more in ICT. It provides a brief discussion on the quantitative implication of the results
and on how it differs from Corrado et al. (2014). By distinguishing various different
intangible asset types, this section ends with the analysis on which specific intangible
asset is most conducive to the exploitation of ICT investment.
3.5.1 Analysis for total intangible capital
Table 3.7 presents the first set of results. Under the assumption of constant returns to
scale, columns (1) and (2) estimate the Cobb-Douglas production function, first without
intangibles and then adding them. Both non-ICT and ICT capital are found to be
significantly associated with labour productivity growth. In the augmented estimation
in column (2), intangible capital is also identified as an important driver of labour
productivity growth, a result conforming to the rapidly growing literature calling for an
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equal treatment of intangible investment vis-a`-vis the tangible counterparts (Corrado
et al., 2005; Van Ark et al., 2008; Niebel et al., 2013).
Table 3.7: Cobb-Douglas Production Function Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Two–capital INT augmented Full Full
OLS OLS OLS IV
NICTc,i,t 0.372*** 0.313*** 0.312*** 0.306***
(0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.055)
ICTc,i,t 0.087*** 0.080*** 0.066*** 0.075***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028)
INTc,i,t 0.130*** 0.161*** 0.174***
(0.031) (0.034) (0.038)
NICTc,i,t ×DICTc,i –0.060 0.057
(0.284) (0.389)
ICTc,i,t ×DICTc,i –0.207** 0.001
(0.088) (0.224)
INTc,i,t ×DICTc,i 0.340* 0.540*
(0.193) (0.317)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,320 1,320 1,320 1,320
Adjusted R2 0.187 0.209 0.214 0.206
F statistic for excluded instruments 7.96
Notes: The output V (i.e. value-added) in column (1) is not adjusted for the inclusion of intangible
capital; whereas for column (2)–(4), intangibles are added both as an input and as an output. Hence,
output V is adjusted for intangibles in these columns. All specifications in column (1)-(4) include the
country-industry specific fixed effect and the interaction terms are in demeaned forms. Standard errors
shown in parentheses are heteroskedastic-robust to country-industry clustering. Column (3) and (4)
calculate the industry ICT intensity as the ratio of ICT capital services to labour services. Column
(3) uses the ‘endogenous’ ICT intensity indicator measured as the time average across all EU country-
industry pairs. Column (4) instruments for the industry ICT intensity using the industry-level measures
of ICT from the U.S. in 1995. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
The differential impact of intangible capital across industries with varying degrees of
ICT intensity is revealed in columns (3) and (4). The former uses the ‘endogenous’
industry ICT intensity indicator, calculated as a time average across all EU country-
industry pairs. Column (4), as the baseline specification, employs the ‘exogenous’ ICT
intensity values from the U.S. as instrument. The interaction between intangible capital
growth and ICT-intensity (i.e. γ3) is found to be positive and significant in both
‘endogenous’ and ‘exogenous’ specifications. Meanwhile, no (robust) evidence is found
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for ICT and non-ICT capital. This suggests that the output elasticity of intangible
capital is, as expected, significantly larger in industries characterised by higher levels
of investment in ICT. In other words, among all capital inputs only intangible capital
exhibits a higher output elasticity in ICT-intensive industries. With a larger coefficient,
this complementarity effect seems to be stronger in the baseline specification when
the ICT intensity is instrumented with the exogenous U.S. values (see column 4 in
Table 3.7). Since the interaction terms are demeaned for estimation, the main effect
of intangible capital represents the output elasticity of an industry with average ICT
intensity, which amounts to 0.174.
The positive correlation between the ICT intensity and the output elasticity of
intangible capital is visualised in Figure 3.3 where the partial effect of intangibles is
plotted against the (demeaned) ICT-intensity defined by country-industry pairs. The
upward sloping line suggests that the output elasticity of intangible capital goes hand
in hand with the level of investment in ICT. The demeaned ICT intensity at the lowest
quartile is (minus) 0.138, which corresponds to an output elasticity of 0.099. At the
highest quartile, the demeaned ICT intensity takes the value 0.35 and the output
elasticity amounts to 0.193. Since ICT intensities assume very high values in some
country-industry pairs, the output elasticity at the 90th percentile (a demeaned intensity
value of 0.22) rises to nearly 0.3.16












-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3
Demeaned ICT Intensity (Dc,i)
Marginal Effect 95% lower band C.I.
95% upper band C.I.
16This is derived by taking derivatives with respect to intangible capital in equation (3.14). Doing so,
one arrives at βˆ3+ γˆ3 ·Dc,t, where Dc,t refers to the demeaned ICT intensity. Plugging in the estimates
obtained under column (4) in Table 3.7, an output elasticity of 0.099 at the lowest quartile and 0.193
at the highest quartile are obtained for intangible capital.
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As argued in the previous section, various ICT intensity indicators have been suggested
in the past. If the output elasticity of intangible capital is truly different across industries
with varying degrees of ICT-intensity, this finding should be robust to these alternative
ICT intensity measures. Table 3.8 provides comforting results. No matter which ICT
intensity measure is used, the output elasticity of intangibles is consistently higher
in more ICT-intensive industries. This is true whether the endogenous ICT intensity
measure is used or the instruments of the U.S. values are used.17 The results are also
robust to discretely splitting industries into ICT-intensive and ICT non-intensive groups
using various alternative grouping criteria (see Table 3.9).
The qualitative evidence is clear that labour productivity growth is higher in ICT-
intensive industries complemented by intangible capital, but what is the quantitative
implication in terms of productivity growth? The mean rate of accumulation of
intangible capital is four percent (see Table 3.4). Consider the difference between an
industry accumulating at an annual rate of three percent and an industry accumulating
at a rate of five percent, which is a difference far below the standard deviation of 0.06,
this translates into a difference in labour productivity growth of 0.35 percent (0.174% ×
2). If one further assumes that the industry with slow accumulation of intangibles has an
ICT intensity at the lowest quartile and the other industry has an ICT intensity at the
highest quartile, the difference in labour productivity growth rises to 0.677 percentage
points. Comparing these results to similar considerations in Corrado et al. (2014), the
following differences are noteworthy. First, after taking into account industry-specific
measures of intangible investment, the average output elasticity of intangible capital
at 0.174 is much lower than the 0.4–0.7 found in Corrado et al. (2014). Second, the
growth differentials of labour productivity are larger than the magnitude suggested by
Corrado et al. (2014).18 These differences seem to indicate that the aggregate growth
of intangibles is an imperfect proxy for industry-level growth. It tends to overstate the
mean output elasticity of intangibles and understate the complementarity effect between
ICT and intangible capital.
17For the ICT intensity measured by ICT share of total capital services, only the OLS estimation is
reported. This is because the validity test of the instruments is not met. The first stage F statistic for
excluded instruments has a value close to zero (F=0.02).
18An exact comparison of the values in this chapter with those from Corrado et al. (2014) is difficult
because of different levels of aggregation. But considering both country-level accumulation of intangibles
and industry-level ICT intensity at the lowest and the highest quartile, they find a differential growth
effect between 0.4 and 0.5. One notable difference with the specification used in Corrado et al. (2014)
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3.5.2 Analysis by asset types
Intangible capital is highly heterogeneous containing a wide range of distinctive
asset types. To gain a deeper insight into which intangible asset is most likely to
complement ICT investment, we further analyse the complementarity hypothesis for
each of the six intangible assets individually.19 According to the existing microeconomic
literature, organisational structures seem most likely to complement ICT investment.
The underlying theory, as argued by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) and Brynjolfsson
et al. (2002), is that as a ‘General Purpose Technology’, ICT offers the opportunity to
restructure the organisation of a firm so that the firm can be more efficient by minimising
Table 3.10: Analysis by Asset Types
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OC RD OC & RD All assets
NICTc,i,t 0.338*** 0.361*** 0.317*** 0.248***
(0.051) (0.054) (0.058) (0.071)
ICTc,i,t 0.073*** 0.067** 0.062** 0.074***
(0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024)
OCc,i,t 0.094*** 0.093*** 0.086***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
OCc,i,t ×DICTc,i 0.198** 0.205** 0.282**
(0.087) (0.102) (0.132)
RDc,i,t 0.074*** 0.069*** 0.059***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
RDc,i,t × DICTc,i 0.341*** 0.324*** 0.304***
(0.088) (0.078) (0.085)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,320 1,200 1,320 1,200
Adjusted R2 0.206 0.206 0.223 0.239
Notes: All specifications include the country-industry fixed effect and all interaction terms are
demeaned for estimation. The ICT intensity indicator used is the baseline measure calculated as
the ratio of ICT capital services to labour services. Standard errors shown in parentheses are
heteroskedastic-robust to country-industry clustering. The last column ‘All assets’ means that all seven
different intangible asset types are included for estimation. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
OC: organisation capital, RD: research and development
19As shown in Table 3.2, seven different intangible assets are identified but the analysis of the
complementarity hypothesis was only possible for six assets because data for new financial product
(NFP) are only available for one industry (i.e. Financial Intermediation) while missing for others.
After controlling for the country-industry specific effect, NFP drops out in estimation.
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the costs of information acquisition and processing. In other words, ICT capital becomes
most productive when firms have an organisational structure that really benefits from
ICT adoption. Although there is a lack of theoretical underpinning, the other asset
that has been tested in the literature for complementarity with ICT is investment in
R&D. Few studies using firm-level company accounts data have produced mixed results.
Polder et al. (2010) find a complementarity effect between investment in ICT and R&D
for a sample of Dutch services firms, while Hall et al. (2013) fail to identify such an
effect for Italian firms.
Using the intangible investment data by industry, this chapter is able to show that both
organisation capital and R&D capital exhibit a higher output elasticity in more ICT-
intensive industries (see Table 3.10). These results are robust whether only one single
asset is estimated (i.e. Table 3.10, columns 1 and 2), both are considered (Table 3.10,
column 3), or even all intangible assets are included for estimation (Table 3.10, column
4).
3.6 Conclusions
The discussion of intangible investment has undoubtedly gained momentum in both
academia and policy-making circles. Using an industry breakdown of the INTAN-
Invest data to the level of 1-digit NACE industries, we are the first to rigorously
and systematically examine the potential complementarities between investment in
intangible capital and ICT capital at the industry level.
This chapter offers three key findings. First, intangible capital contributes systematically
to labour productivity growth and its output elasticity is found to be significantly higher
in ICT-intensive industries than in those that use little ICT. This means that intangible
capital deepening makes a greater contribution to growth when complemented by ICT
investment. This finding supports the complementarity hypothesis proposed in prior
microeconomic studies. Second, using industry-level rather than country-level data on
intangibles, we find a much smaller mean output elasticity of intangible capital, but
a larger differential effect of labour productivity growth across industries with varying
degrees of ICT intensity. Third, not all individual intangible assets are complementary
to ICT investment. In the sample of assets investigated, only organisational structures
and research and development (R&D) are found to be conducive to the exploitation of
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These results offer important implications. The poor productivity performance observed
in Europe since the mid-1990s does not seem to be solely caused by a lower level of
investment in ICT (Van Ark et al., 2008), but also by a lower level of investment in
intangible capital, which led to a much less effective exploitation of ICT capital in that
period.
To gauge quantitative implications, we compare an industry with an ICT intensity at
the lowest quartile to an industry at the highest quartile, assuming at the same time a
difference in intangible capital growth of two percentage points. Taking the estimates
at the face value, these differences in inputs lead to a growth differential of labour
productivity of over 0.677 percentage points. This effect is economically important,
but it remains suggestive and speculative, since we fail to uncover a definite causal
relationship between intangible capital accumulation and labour productivity growth.
Decomposing the error term into a correlated country-industry specific fixed effect and
a full set of time dummies does not satisfactorily solve the issue of simultaneity bias,
since it hinges on a highly restrictive assumption that the unobservable productivity
shocks are time-invariant and country-industry specific. The more structural control
function approaches of Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2000) are not
readily applicable to data of an industry-level setting with multiple inputs. Moreover,
much remains to be done to improve industry-level measurement of intangibles (e.g.
with regard to appropriate price deflators and depreciation rates), where the industry
intangible investment data constructed by Niebel et al. (2013) based on INTAN-Invest
are still to be seen as experimental.
Despite these caveats, this study offers an important insight into the productive





















Cross-country income differences: Accounting for the
role of intangible capital
4.1 Introduction
Living standards, as captured by average income per person, vary dramatically across
countries. According to the estimates of the World Development Indicators (World
Bank, 2015a), the ratio of 90th to 10th percentile in the world income distribution is
at an alarming factor of 28 in 2012.1 What can explain such enormous differences in
income per capita across countries?
Based on the Solow growth model economists have been seeking to provide answers
around two proximate determinants: differences in factors of production and in
efficiency. This analytical framework is formally known as development accounting.
The main idea of this analysis is that by using cross-country data on output and
inputs at one single point in time, development accounting quantifies how much of
the cross-country variation in income can be accounted for by the observed differences
in production factors and how much is left to be explained by the differences in efficiency
as measured by total factor productivity (TFP). The latter is a residual, i.e. everything
that cannot be accounted for by the observable inputs.2 The current consensus is that
efficiency plays the largest role in accounting for cross-country income variation, while
the observed differences in factor inputs merely account for a small share (Caselli, 2005;
Easterly & Levine, 2001; Hall & Jones, 1999; Mutreje, 2014).
1Real GDP per capita is calculated using constant internationally comparable dollars (i.e. adjusted
for differences in relative prices–PPPs).












The goal of this chapter is to extend the existing works on international income
differences by accounting for an important factor of production that has been ignored
so far – intangible capital. This is likely to be a promising extension, as the emerging
research agenda on intangible investment has shown that intangible assets, such as
brand equity, scientific research and development (R&D), and organisation capital, have
become increasingly the more important forms of investment in the modern economy
and they have escaped the statistical net (Corrado & Hulten, 2010). In the System
of National Accounts (SNA), investments are broadly defined as: the acquisition of
fixed assets that is undertaken specifically to enhance future production possibilities.
According to the guidelines of SNA 1993 revision, this includes physical assets such
as machinery, equipment and buildings as well as a limited set of intangibles, namely
software, mineral exploration, and artistic originals, which we will indicate by national
accounts (NA) intangibles in the remainder. In SNA 2008, the investment boundary was
extended to also cover expenditures on R&D.3 However, this still omits other important
intangible assets, such as brand equity and organisation capital.
Thanks to the pioneering measurement work of intangible investment by Corrado et al.
(2005, 2009), evidence is growing stronger that there is a gradual shift in investment
composition towards intangible assets. In the U.S., for example, business intangible
investment as a share of GDP had already exceeded the share of traditional investment
in tangible assets (e.g. machinery and equipment) by the mid-1990s and has kept on
rising over time (see Figure 4.1). Rather than being an exception, other country-specific
studies and the research project commissioned by the OECD (2013b) also show that
investment in intangibles has been rising in both high-income economies and emerging
economies.4 In light of this evidence, it is clear that the traditional emphasis on physical
capital as the only capital input is missing out on an important part of investments in
the modern knowledge-intensive economy. This implies that inputs might account for
more of cross-country income differences than generally known so far.
This study is the first to explicitly account for a country’s (business) investment in
intangible capital as an additional production factor in accounting for income variation
across countries. We first develop a novel database on intangible investment that is
consistent and internationally comparable for a set of 60 economies over the period
1995-2011. The dataset, by itself, is a contribution to the rapidly growing literature on
3Since 2013 a small number of countries have started to capitalise R&D spending as investment (e.g.
USA, Australia) following the guidelines of SNA 2008. Most countries around the world, however, have
not yet switched to SNA 2008. For this reason, R&D is still counted as new intangibles instead of NA
intangibles in this chapter.
4Other country-specific studies include Australia (Barnes, 2009), Brazil (Dutz, Kannebley, Scarpelli
& Sharma, 2012), China (Hulten & Hao, 2008), South Korea (Chun, Fukao, Hisa & Miyagawa, 2012),
and Japan (Fukao et al., 2009).
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intangible investment as this is the first database providing internationally comparable
data on intangibles for such a wide range of countries, including not only the advanced
economies, but also major emerging economies like China and Brazil as well as much less
developed countries, such as Honduras and Vietnam. This dataset offers two important
insights. First, there is a strong positive association between the level of economic
development of a country and its investment intensity in intangibles, reaffirming the
important role of intangible capital in modern economic growth. Second, the share of
investment in intangible assets as a percentage of (intangibles-adjusted) GDP has been
increasing steadily over time, while the share of traditional investment in physical assets
is highly volatile and had declined somewhat during the period of observation.
Starting with the basic development accounting framework that features physical and
human capital akin to Caselli (2005), we find that the observed differences in the
traditional factors of production account for approximately 23 percent of the cross-
country income variation in 2011. This result holds true whether the analysis is based
on the total economy or the market economy which excludes public sectors such as
Public Administration and Defence. Therefore, for the set of 60 economies that we
cover efficiency is still the main factor accounting for international income differences,
conforming to the findings of the existing literature (e.g. Caselli, 2005; Easterly &
Levine, 2001; Mutreje, 2014). In the augmented development accounting analysis where
intangible capital is included as an additional factor of production, we show that the
variance accounted for by the observed differences in inputs increases significantly and
systematically across a wide range of specifications. Depending on the assumptions
regarding the output elasticity of intangible capital, the observed differences in factor
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inputs can account for up to 40 percent of the income variation, an improvement of 16
percentage points compared to the conventional analysis that ignores intangible capital.
Even under a more conservative specification, we still find that including intangible
capital leads to an increase of nearly 5 percentage points of income variation.
Before proceeding, it is helpful to place these results in a broader context. The emphasis
on the comparability of the intangible investment series across a set of 60 economies
has required rather restrictive assumptions that apply to all countries and measuring
intangible investment in a less comprehensive fashion. For instance, we have only
focused on three major intangible assets that can be well covered using standardised
international databases, which leaves out intangible investment in, for example, firm-
specific human capital. This means that the estimates constructed in this study do not
reflect the full extent of intangible investment. Superior in this regard are the outcomes
of the INTAN-Invest project (Corrado et al., 2012) and other country-specific studies
that mainly rely on national accounts and national survey data to measure intangible
investment.5 However, since such studies have not achieved the level of country coverage
necessary for an informative development accounting exercise, we have developed our
estimates specifically for this purpose.
A key finding of this chapter is that intangible capital is important in accounting for
cross-country income variation at a single point in time. This echoes with the macro-
level studies that find intangible capital to be important for a country’s growth over
time (e.g. Corrado et al., 2009; Dutz et al., 2012; Fukao et al., 2009). In both cases, the
role of efficiency, measured by TFP, is diminished once intangible capital is accounted
for.
Since our analysis is an accounting exercise, it can shed no light on whether investing
more in intangible assets would lead to higher income or if causality runs the other
way. However, there are prior firm-level studies that analyse the role of intangible
capital in determining firm productivity and performance. For instance, using a large
panel of company accounts data, organisation capital is found to lead to higher firm
productivity (Chen & Inklaar, 2016; Tronconi & Vittucci Marzetti, 2011) and larger
stock market returns (Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013), and it is also complementary
to the exploitation of the productivity potentials of information technologies (Bloom
et al., 2012; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2000, 2003). At the firm level, there thus seems
to be a causal relationship between investment in intangibles and productivity. One
of the main insights from our analysis is that high-income countries tend to invest
more in intangibles than lower-income countries, which raises the question why firms
5See footnote 4 for the list of country-specific studies.
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in lower-income countries are not investing more. So far, the evidence on this is scarce,
though Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie and Roberts (2013) find that the adoption
in Indian manufacturing firms of modern management practices – a form of investment
in organisation capital – is hampered by informational barriers. While it is a useful
piece of evidence, this is a question that awaits further research.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes the general
measurement procedure of intangible investment and how capitalising expenditures
on intangible assets changes the conventional gross domestic product (GDP) concept.
A brief discussion on the key features of the intangible investment data is presented
in the second part of Section 4.2. Section 4.3 outlines the basic and the augmented
development accounting framework and elaborates on the data that we use for analysis.
Results, obtained across various specifications, and robustness checks are discussed in
Section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes and discusses the main limitations of this study.
4.2 Measuring intangible inputs and output
In this section we describe the general approach used to measure intangible investment
and show how capitalising such investment requires a change in the measurement of
GDP. Then, we discuss the list of intangible assets measured in this study as well as
the key features of the data that we construct and use for the subsequent development
accounting analysis. It is important to note that this section only provides a general
overview of the measurement procedure. For a more extensive and detailed discussion
on the data construction of intangibles, please refer to Appendix 4.A.
4.2.1 General measurement approach
Before discussing how to measure intangible investment, a natural question to ask a
priori is: why do we need to reclassify expenditures on intangibles and capitalise them
as investment? The argument is presented more formally in Corrado et al. (2005) based
on inter-temporal capital theory, but the simple answer is: “any use of resources that
reduce current consumption and production in order to increase it in the future” should
be capitalised as investment. Expenditures on tangible assets, such as office buildings,
machinery, vehicles, and equipment certainly satisfy this criterion, but so does much
spending on brand equity, R&D, and organisational structures.6 Expenditures on these












assets, collectively termed new intangibles in this chapter, contribute to (rather than
detract from) the value of individual companies and growth of the economy.
While few would disagree with the potentially long-lasting benefits of intangible capital
and their role as productive inputs, little is known about the size of intangible investment
at the level of the economy.7 The measurement of intangibles is particularly difficult
as they are often created for internal use within the firm and suffer from a lack of
observable market transaction data for valuation. To circumvent this measurement
issue, researchers turned to use the cost approach as an alternative. The underlying
assumption of the cost approach is that firms are willing to invest in intangible assets
until the discounted present value of the expected income stream equals the cost of
producing the marginal asset (Jorgenson, 1963).
A key problem of this cost approach, however, is that it is not known with precision how
much or what portion of intangible spending has long-lasting impact (i.e. longer than
one year) and can be and should be treated as investment. In this chapter, we follow
the work of Corrado et al. (2005) which suggests a wide range depending on the specific
asset. For own-account organisation capital, 20 percent of managers’ wage are counted
as conducive to organisational development; for advertising, the literature suggests that
about 60 percent of advertising expenditures have long-lasting benefit. While for R&D
all expenses are treated as investment following SNA 2008.
To cumulate intangible investment flows (N) into capital stocks, one can use the
usual perpetual inventory method (PIM) which accumulates past capital formation and
subtracts the value of assets due to obsolescence. Physical capital is generally subject
to value loss because they tend to be used up in production mainly due to wear and
tear. Intangible capital, on the other hand, does not physically deteriorate due to its
intangibility. It is more subject to the rise of superior knowledge that supplants the
existing ones and thereby making the current intangible or knowledge stock obsolete.
By including some expenditures as investment, one also needs to adjust the GDP
concept. More specifically, a country’s nominal GDP as measured traditionally (Y)
will be expanded accordingly as follows:
GDP ′ ≡ Y +N =
Expenditure side (GDP)︷ ︸︸ ︷
C + I + N︸︷︷︸
added
=




7Various proxy measures, such as business surveys, are used in firm-level studies (e.g. Black &
Lynch, 2005; Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2005).But none of these proposed approaches yield the kind of
comprehensive measure needed for national accounting or source-of-growth analysis.
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where N is the flow of new intangible investment added on to the expenditure side
and R is the income from the flow of services provided by the intangible capital stock.
In other words, intangible capital is now both a productive input (R) and a part of
intangibles-augmented output (N). This new concept of GDP, denoted by GDP ′, is
larger in magnitude than conventionally defined.
4.2.2 List of intangibles measured and overview of the data
We assemble internationally comparable data to estimate intangible investment for a
set of 60 economies over the period 1995-2011 (see Appendix Table 4.A1 for the full list
of economies covered). We capture the following three intangible assets in this study:
brand equity, R&D, and organisation capital. Brand equity can be seen as the value
premium that a firm can capitalise on from a product or service with a recognisable
name as compared to its generic equivalent. Following Corrado and Hao (2014), we
measure brand equity as the sum of expenditures on advertising and market research.
R&D refers to the innovative activities leading mainly to the development of a new or
improved product and it is measured by business expenditures on R&D. Organisation
capital can be thought of management know-how and the information a firm about its
assets and how these can be used in production (Prescott & Visscher, 1980). Following
the broad literature, organisation capital is measured as a fraction of manager’s wage
compensation. Table 4.1 provides a general overview of the list of intangibles covered,
how they are measured, and the sources of the data used. Readers should refer to
Appendix for more detailed discussions on the measurement issues.
Table 4.1: List of Intangible Assets Measured and Data Sources
Asset Type Measured by δ Data source*
Brand equity Spending on advertising and market research 60% WARC & ESOMAR
Scientific R&D Business expenditures on R&D 20% UNESCO & Eurostat
Organisation capital Wage compensation of managers 40% ILO, PWT8.1, BLS
δ: Asset-specific depreciation taken from Corrado et al. (2009).
* ILO: International Labour Organisation; PWT: The Penn World Table version 8.1; BLS: Bureau
of Labour Statistics; WARC: World Advertising Research Centre; ESOMAR: European Society for
Opinion and Marketing Research; UNESCO-UIS: UNESCO Institute for Statistics; Eurostat: Statistical
Office of the European Communities.
It is important to emphasise that these do not include all intangible investments in
the economy. As noted earlier, investment in national accounts intangibles are already
capitalised and included in investment and GDP statistics following the SNA 1993.
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There is hence no need for additional estimation.8 Corrado et al. (2005) include three
other intangibles, namely architectural and engineering designs, firm-specific human
capital, and new financial products, but these are relatively minor. According to the
estimates of the INTAN-Invest project, a pioneering database providing country-level
intangible investment data for a sample of 29 countries, the sum of these three assets
account for nearly 75 percent of the total intangible investment not covered in SNA
1993 statistics. Thus, in terms of their shares in total intangible investment these three
assets can be considered as the most important ones to capture.
Like many other studies on intangibles, we focus on market sector investment in
intangible assets and omit public intangible investment due to measurement difficulties.9
Hence, a country’s market GDP (MGDP) after adjusting for business investment in
intangible assets is calculated as follows:
MGDP ′c,t ≡ mYc,t +NBEc,t +NRDc,t +NOCc,t (4.2)
where m denotes the share of market economy; Y denotes GDP calculations based on
SNA 1993 revision, and intangible investments are represented by the letter N indexed
by the asset-specific superscripts – BE, RD, and OC.
The intangibles data constructed in this study offers several important insights. The first
is that, there has been a steady increase in the share of investment in intangibles between
1995 and 2011 for most of the countries covered in our sample (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3).
Whereas, the same is not true about the share of traditional investment in physical
assets, which had declined somewhat over time. These two contrasting investment trends
or patterns seem to suggest that the modern economy is currently undergoing structural
changes with investment composition shifting gradually towards intangible assets.
In addition, it is also interesting to note the difference in volatility of investment in
tangible and intangible assets. Figure 4.3 shows that investment in intangible assets as
a share of MGDP′ seems to be much more stable and resilient to economic downturns,
while traditional investment in tangible assets appears to be highly volatile and sensitive
to external shocks. This is reflected by the sharp decline in tangible investment
share observed in 1997, 2001, and 2008. In chronological order, these three years are,
8To have a full-fledged analysis on how the addition of total intangible capital affects the development
accounting analysis, it would be ideal to isolate those national accounts intangible investments from
total tangible investment (I) and reclassify them as intangibles. This is however not possible due to
data constraints.
9The distinction between market and nonmarket (public) sector is the same as defined in EU KLEM
(O’Mahony & Timmer, 2009). According to NACE classification, sectors A-K plus sectors O and P
consist of market sector. See Appendix 4.B for more detailed discussions.
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 Notes: Author's calculation. The line shown in the figure is a 45 degree line. Both axises
denote intangible investment as a share of MGDP', one for 2011 and the other for 1995.
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 Notes: Author's calculation. The line shown in the figure is OLS regression line. The shares of 
intangible investment are averaged over time.
respectively, associated with the Asian financial crisis, the dot-come bubble burst, and
the global financial crisis.
Third, the world’s leading investor in intangible capital is the U.S., which has an average
intangible investment share of over 7 percent of MGDP′. Vietnam, on the other hand,
has the smallest share (i.e. slightly over 0.5% of MGDP′). The positive slop of the fitted
line shown in Figure 4.4 suggests that there is a strong positive correlation between the
level of economic development of a country and its investment intensity in intangible
assets, which is above 0.67. This, of course, could mean that rich countries tend to
invest more in intangible assets or that, intangible assets tend to make these investing
countries richer.
4.3 Development accounting and data analysis
In this section, we revisit the basic development accounting technique and set the stage
for the extension of the basic model, which already features physical capital and human
capital as factor inputs, to further include intangible capital. Then, we elaborate on the
data that we use for the development accounting analysis and briefly discuss how the
key variables of interest are constructed.
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4.3.1 Development accounting framework
The point of departure for our empirical analysis is the benchmark Hall and Jones
(1999)’s production function:
Y = A ·Kα (Lh)γ (4.3)
where Y is a country’s GDP, K is the aggregate physical capital stock and Lh is
employment adjusted for labour quality (i.e. number of workers L multiplied by their
average human capital h). The superscripts α and γ are the output elasticities of capital
and labour,10 and A denotes the state of technology with which production factors
are combined to produce output. Assuming that the production function features the
property of constant returns to scale (i.e. γ = 1− α) and normalise the function by the
number of employees, equation (4.3) can be rewritten as follows:
y = A · kαh1−α (4.4)
where y is the output per worker, k is the capital-labour ratio for physical assets (i.e.
K/L). Equation (4.4) basically asks how much of the variation in output per worker
y can be attributed to variation observed in physical capital k and human capital h,
each weighted by their output elasticities, and how much is left to be accounted for by
differences in technology A or total factor productivity (TFP).
Akin to Caselli (2005), we define yKH ≡ kαh1−α as the so-called factor-only model and
for ease of exposition rewrite equation (4.4) accordingly as:
y = A · yKH (4.5)
where both y and yKH are observable. In the tradition of variance decomposition, this
equation can be further transformed as follows:
var[log(y)] = var[log(A)] + var[log(yKH)] + 2cov[log(A), log(yKH)] (4.6)
The explanatory power of observed input differences is then defined as:
VAF = var[log(yKH)]
var[log(y)] (4.7)
where VAF denotes the fraction of income variances accounted for by the observed
differences in factor inputs. The higher the value of VAF, the higher the explanatory
10In growth or development accounting the output elasticity of factor inputs is equal to its income share
if inputs earn their marginal product and firms maximise profits. We will speak of output elasticities,
instead of income shares, throughout this chapter.
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power of the observable inputs. In the work of Caselli (2005), this ratio or fraction is
alternatively labelled as the success rate: how successful are observable factor inputs in
accounting for cross-country income differences?
We extend the basic framework to further include intangible capital (R) as an additional
production factor and denote its output elasticity by a constant parameter β. Then, the
augmented production function in per worker terms becomes:
y′ = A · yKRH = A · kαrβ (h)1−α−β (4.8)
where yKRH ≡ kαrβh1−α−β denotes the augmented factor-only model; the superscripts
α and β represent the output elasticities for tangibles and intangibles; and y′ is the
market GDP adjusted to include intangible capital constructed per equation (4.2).
Again, following Caselli (2005) the decomposition of the variation in GDP per worker
is now given by:
VAF′ = var[log(yKRH)]
var[log(y′)] (4.9)
The prime interest is essentially the difference between VAF and VAF′. If intangible
capital is important in accounting for international income differences, one would expect
the value of the latter to exceed the former. In fact, the larger the difference between the
two ratios, the larger the role of intangible capital in accounting for income variation.
4.3.2 Basic data
The basic data we use are obtained from various sources. Countries’ (nominal) GDP
and total investment in tangible assets,11 and number of workers are primarily extracted
from the United Nations National Accounts (UN NA) database, human capital (h)
comes from the standard database of Barro and Lee (2013), and total investment
in intangibles (N) is constructed in this study. Since both GDP and investment are
denominated in local currency unit (LCU) and are expressed in nominal terms, we first
estimate real GDP per worker (RGDPWOKc,t) and real value of tangible investment
(Ic,t) in international comparable dollars as follows:
yc,t ≡ RGDPWOKc,t = GDPc,t/Pc,t/pppc,2011/empc,t (4.10)
Ic,t = GFCFc,t/P Ic,t/pppc,2011 (4.11)
11Investment is measured by gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). Since Taiwan is not covered in the
UN NA database, we alternatively extract its (nominal) GDP and total gross fixed capital formation
(I) from the PWT 8.1 database.
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where the subscripts c and t denote country and year, respectively; P is the GDP price
deflator with 2011 as base and ppp is the GDP PPP divided by the exchange rate
in 2011 and is taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2015a).
Physical capital stock K is calculated using the perpetual inventory method:12
Kc,t = Ic,t + (1− δK) ·Kc,t−1 (4.12)
where I is the real investment in traditional tangible assets deflated by the investment
price deflator (P I) and δK is the rate of depreciation for physical capital K, which is
set equal to 0.06 following the broader literature (e.g. Caselli, 2005).13 For the initial
capital stock calculation (K0), we follow the standard approach proposed by Harberger
(1978) by assuming the steady-state relationship from the Solow growth model:
K0 = I0/(g + δK) (4.13)
The initial capital stock K0 for an asset is related to investment in the initial year I0,
the (steady-state) growth rate of investment g and the rate of depreciation δ. Unlike
intangible investment data that is only available for 17 years (i.e. 1995-2011), tangible
investment I is, for many countries, available since 1960.14 Therefore, to make the best
use of the existing data, tangible capital stock K is constructed for a much longer time
series than intangible capital stock, which we turn to discuss in the next subsection.15
The (physical) capital-labour ratio is calculated as:
kc,t = Kc,t/empPWTc,t (4.14)
12It would be ideal to measure capital services rather than capital stocks as a capital input measure,
as a capital services measure would capture the larger return of shorter-lived assets. However, the
data requirements are much more demanding for estimating capital services than for capital stock and
there is no readily available data to measure capital services. For instance, one would need additional
information on the user cost of capital to calculate capital services. The user cost of capital requires
the rate of return on capital and the rate of asset-specific inflation. The former is generally hard to
measure with precision (e.g. Inklaar, 2010) and data on the asset-specific capital gains are not available
for many countries. Due to these practical constraints, total capital stock (both tangible and intangible)
based on perpetual inventory method is used as a measure of capital input, rather than the preferred
services measure. Note, the existing studies on international income differences generally relied on a
stock measure as well for capital input (e.g. Caselli, 2005; Mutreje, 2014), so the results obtained in
this chapter by adding intangibles as an additional capital input can be directly compared to previous
studies.
13The investment price deflator for tangible assets P I is calculated as GFCF at current national prices
divided by GFCF at constant national prices. Both data series are retrieved from the UN NA database.
14To be precise, 1960 (29 countries), 1965 (2 countries), 1966 (1 country), 1968 (1 country), 1970 (18
countries), 1980 (1 country), 1989 (2 countries), 1990 (6 countries).
15With a rate of depreciation of 6%, a much longer time series is also needed to calculate tangible
capital stock, especially for the initial capital stock. To note, there are nine East European countries
that do not have a reasonably long time series of tangible investment (i.e. dating back to 1970), we
will drop them in the subsequent development accounting analysis for robustness check. For countries
that have a negative average growth rate, we reset it to 4%, which is the mean geometric growth rate
observed for the other countries.
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As for human capital h, we rely on the recently updated data on educational attainment
for population aged 25 and over from Barro and Lee (2013)16. Following the broader
literature, we measure human capital h of country c at time t as a function of average
years of schooling (s) as follows:
h = eφ(s) (4.15)
The function φ(s) from equation (4.15) takes the following form as in earlier studies
(e.g. Caselli, 2005; Inklaar & Timmer, 2013). The rationale for this form is that
early years of schooling is believed to have a higher rate of return than later years.
This assumption is also empirically supported by the cross-country Mincerian wage
regressions (Mincer, 1974). To be precise, φ(s) is piece-wise linear with rates of return
based on Psacharopoulos (1994):
φ(s) =

0.134 · s if s≤ 4
0.134 · 4 + 0.101 · (s− 4) if 4< s ≤ 8
0.134 · 4 + 0.101 · 4 + 0.068 · (s− 8) if s> 8
(4.16)
Unlike the basic data discussed in the previous section where y and k are calculated
both for the total economy and for the market economy,17 data on intangibles is solely
constructed for the market economy. The real value of market investment in intangibles
n, expressed in international comparable dollars, is computed as follows:
nj,c,t = Nj,c,t/PNj,c,t/pppc,2011 (4.17)
where N denotes nominal intangible investment flows; PN is the asset-specific price
deflator for intangibles and is imputed based on the U.S. data (see Section 4.3.3 for
more detailed discussions on intangible price deflator); ppp is the GDP PPP divided
by the exchange rate in 2011 taken from WDI. Intangible capital R is then calculated
using PIM:
Rj,c,t = (1− δRj ) ·Rj,c,t−1 + nj,c,t (4.18)
where δR is the country-time-invariant depreciation rate for asset j from Table 4.1. The
initial capital stock is computed based on the steady-state assumption:
16The educational attainment data provided by Barro and Lee (2013) is available every five years,
going back to 1950 and most recently up to 2010. For 2011, we assume that 2010 average years of
schooling prevail.
17Due to the lack of data, human capital h is only calculated for the total economy and is assumed to
be the same for the market economy.
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Rj,0 = nj,0/(gj + δRj ) (4.19)
where nj,0 is the real value of intangible investment in 1995, and g is the average growth
rate of the intangible investment series between 1995 and 2011. Given the relatively
high rates of depreciation assumed for intangible capital, a time span of 17 years is
long enough for the initial capital stock to have only little impact on the development
accounting analysis as the true value of the initial stock will be depreciated by 2011,











where sMc,t denotes the share of employment in the market sector (see Appendix 4.B2
for a more detailed discussion).
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Basic Data for 2011 (Market Economy)
Description Min. Mean Max. S.D. N
y′ real market output per worker 7, 666 65, 747 139,955 33, 430 60
(VNM) (SGP)
k physical capital per worker 15, 485 126, 681 233,007 63, 191 60
(VNM) (NOR)
r intangible capital per worker 77 7, 429 26,839 6, 731 60
(VNM) (USA)
h human capital per worker 1.97 3.00 3.70 0.435 60
(IND) (USA)
Notes: All the numbers presented in the table are based on the market-sector of the economy and only
for year 2011.
To have a general overview of the data, a brief summary of some descriptive statistics
is provided in Table 4.2. As can be seen, Vietnam is the poorest country in the sample
with the least amount of physical and intangible capital, while Singapore has the highest
income per worker. The U.S. has the highest level of both intangible capital and human
capital. Figure 4.5 correlates tangible capital per worker with intangible capital per
worker, both of which are normalised relative to the U.S. values. As can be seen, these
18Even for asset with the lowest rate of depreciation (e.g. RRD = 20%), the initial capital stock would
wear out almost completely after 17 years: (1− 0.2)17 = 0.02. This still holds true if the depreciation
rate is just 15%: (1− 0.15)17 = 0.06. Thus, a time span of 17 years is already long enough to measure
intangible capital stock with precision.
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two capital-labour ratios are highly correlated (correlation coefficient is approximately
0.77). This suggests that countries with higher tangible capital per worker tend to have
more intangible capital per worker as well.
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Tangible capital per worker (USA=1)
 Notes: Author's calculation. The line shown in the figure is OLS regression line.
4.3.3 Intangible investment price deflator
Currently, there is very limited knowledge on the appropriate price measures of
intangible investment as these assets tend to be internally generated and lack observable
market data for valuation. The existing studies have primarily relied on the non-farm
business output price deflator as a proxy for the price of intangibles and applied this
deflator uniformly to all intangible assets (Corrado et al., 2012, 2009). It could be
argued however that rather than using the uniform business output price deflator,
more appropriate asset-specific deflators would be the price indices of the industries
that produce (in part) intangible assets, such as management consulting industry for
organisation capital, advertising and marketing research industry for brand equity, and
R&D services industry for R&D.
Since price deflators for intangible-producing industries are not widely available for
the other economies, we use the U.S., where the data are available, as the benchmark
country and impute the asset- and country-specific intangible price deflators as follows:
RNj,t,US = PNj,t,US/P It,US (4.21)
i
i







Cross-country income differences 79
where RN denotes the relative intangible price deflator of the U.S., PNj,t,US is the price
deflator of the asset-specific intangible-producing industry obtained from U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis, and P It,US is the tangible investment price deflator provided by
the UN NA data. Assuming that the relative price between intangible and tangible
investments are constant across countries, we derive intangible investment price for the
other economies as follows:
PNj,c,t = P Ic,t ×RNj,t,US (4.22)
It is important to emphasise that the price of intangibles calculated per equation (4.22)
is only a crude proxy and a practical choice needs to be made. Robustness to the choice
of intangible price deflator, rate of depreciation of intangible capital stock, and other
assumptions made during the data construction process will be examined in the next
section.
4.4 Empirical results
In this section, we discuss the main empirical findings, first with results of the basic
development accounting analysis which only features physical and human capital,
followed by the analysis augmented to include intangible capital as an additional factor
of production. By varying the output elasticities of factor inputs, we compare and
contrast the findings across various specifications and discuss the robustness of the
main result.
4.4.1 Basic development accounting analysis
With data on y, k and h, and setting the output elasticity of physical capital α equal to
1/3 as suggested by the broader literature, the variance of the basic factor-only model
for year 2011, var[log(yKH)], is 0.088 and the observed actual output variance, var[log(y)]
is 0.387 (see the first row of Table 4.3). This result suggests that, for a sample of 60
economies, only about 23 percent of the income variances can be accounted for by the
observed differences in factor inputs. This fraction remains largely unchanged if we drop
those nine former Soviet Union countries that do not have a sufficiently long tangible
investment series going back to 1970.19
19The rationale for this sensitivity check is that for those countries that have a short investment series,
the initial capital stock (calculated based on the steady-state assumption) has a non-trivial impact on
the development accounting analysis because about 14 percent (i.e. 1980-2011, (1− 0.06)32) to over 25
percent (i.e. 1990-2011,(1−0.06)22) of the initial capital stock is still in use in 2011. Only for countries
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Table 4.3: Variance Accounted For: Basic Model for 2011
Coverage var[log(y)] var[log(yKH)] VAF
Own data Total Economy (60) 0.387 0.088 22.7%
Own data (excl. former USSR) Total Economy (51) 0.432 0.101 23.4%
Data from PWT 8.1 Total Economy (60) 0.452 0.109 24.1%
Own data Market Economy (60) 0.432 0.101 23.3%
Notes: Market economy indicates that the analysis is based on market– GDP, –investment, and –
unemployment. The share of variance accounted for in the last column is calculated based on values
to the seventh decimal point. For brevity, variance values to the third decimal point are shown in the
table.
To check whether this result is plausible, we compute the VAF of the basic factor-only
model by solely using the PWT8.1 data constructed by Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer
(2015) for 2011 (see Table 4.4 for the variables used). The counterfactual variance
using PWT8.1 data, var[log(yKH)] takes the value 0.109 and the observed variance
of var[log(y)] is 0.452, resulting in a fraction of 24 percent of the income variances
accounted for by factor inputs. This rate is very similar to the prior finding. If we
narrow the focus down to the market sector of the economy (i.e. y is the market output
per worker, k is the capital stock accumulated by the market sector, and L is the market
share of employment), the variance accounted for remains nearly identical (about 23%).
So regardless of the coverage of the economy (i.e. market or total), in the basic factor-
only model the differences of the observed factor inputs can account for no more than 25
percent of cross-country income differences and the rest is attributable to the differences
in efficiency measured by TFP.
Table 4.4: Alternative Data from PWT 8.1
Variables names Data Description
y real output per worker rgdpe Expenditure-side real GDP at chained PPPs (in 2005 US$)
k capital-labour ratio ck Capital stock at current PPPs (in 2005 US$)
L number of workers emp Number of persons engaged (in millions)
h human capital hc Human capital index, based on years of schooling
A caveat to bear in mind is that these results rest on the restrictive assumption that the
output elasticity of physical capital is time-invariant and constant at 1/3. According to
various recent studies (e.g. Inklaar & Timmer, 2013; Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2014;
with a reasonably long investment series (i.e. time span of 42 years or more), would the true value of
the initial capital stock be (nearly) depreciated away by 2011.
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Rodriguez & Jayadev, 2010), there is robust evidence that the labour share of income has
been declining over time around the world. Under the assumption of constant returns
to scale, this means that the income share of capital is increasing and income shares are
typically used to approximate output elasticities. As a consequence, using 1/3 as the
output elasticity for capital is a simplification which may not reflect the reality. Figure
4.6 plots the change of VAF as a function of the output elasticity of capital α. This
analysis illustrates that as long as the output elasticity of capital is less than 50 percent
(i.e. α ≤ 0.5), most of the variation in income is still accounted for by TFP. It is also
reassuring that the variance accounted for remains fairly similar across different data
sources and coverage of the economy.
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4.4.2 Augmented development accounting analysis
To examine how much of the income variation can be accounted for by intangible
capital, we now turn to examine the augmented factor-only model. The first challenge
is to pin down the output elasticity of intangible capital β and the resulting changes of
output elasticities brought to labour γ and physical capital α.20 In a growth accounting
framework, Corrado et al. (2009) find that after capitalising intangible investment in
the U.S., the total capital share of income (i.e. sK + sR) rises to 40 percent, of which
about 62.5 percent accrues to physical capital and 37.5 percent accrues to intangible
20After capitalising intangible investment, labour’s share of income changes from sL = (PLL)/(PLL+
PKK) to sL = (PLL)/(PLL+ PKK + PRR)
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capital (i.e. α′=0.25 and β=0.15), and the labour share of income drops to 60 percent.21
We take these shares as the baseline but also as the upper-bound specification for
the development accounting analysis. Given that the U.S. invests most intensively in
intangibles assets, it is unlikely for the other economies to have an income share of
intangible capital to be higher than the share of the U.S.
As shown in Table 4.5, the counterfactual variance, var[log(yKRH)] under the upper-
bound specification, takes the value 0.177 and the market output variance var[log(y′)]
becomes 0.445. This leads to a significant improvement in the variance accounted for
from 23 percent under the basic development accounting analysis to nearly 40 percent.
Even if we calibrate the model to a more conservative specification with the output
elasticity of physical capital unchanged (i.e. α=1/3 as previously used) and the output
elasticity of intangibles accounting for merely 5 percent (i.e. β=0.05), the VAF′ ratio
still has a sizable increase of about 5 percentage points as compared to the basic model
that ignores intangible capital.
Table 4.5: VAF′: Augmented Model for 2011 (Market Economy)
Output elasticities var[log(y′)] var[log(yKRH)] VAF′ ∆
Lower-bound α = .33 & β = .05 0.445 0.124 27.9% +5%-points
Mid-range α = .33 & β = .10 0.445 0.166 37.2% +14%-points
Upper-bound α = .25 & β = .15 0.445 0.177 39.8% +16%-points
(Baseline)
∆: denotes the difference in the explanatory power of the augmented model as compared to the basic
model (i.e. VAF′-VAF) in percentage points.
It is clear that the exact value of VAF′ is sensitive to the choice of the output elasticities.
This sensitivity prevents us from drawing firm conclusions about the exact improvement
of the additional variance accounted for by intangibles. The qualitative evidence,
however, is clear: intangible capital systematically improves the explanatory power of
observed input differences in accounting for income variation. As shown in Figure 4.7
where we keep the output elasticity of labour fixed at 60 percent (i.e. γ=0.6) and only
vary the output elasticities between two capital inputs,22 the variance accounted for is
21Similar pattern-changes, but in much larger magnitude, also emerged in studies that rely on
econometric estimation. For a sample of EU countries, Roth and Thum (2013) find the following
output elasticities for these factor inputs: α′=0.30, β=0.25, and γ′=0.45.
22This can be seen as the most conservative specification, as labour share has been declining over
time as argued previously in the text. Thus, using 60 percent for the labour share (after adjusting for
intangible capital which would also decrease labour share, see footnote 18) should be the maximum
possible. Since the variation of human capital is less than the other capital inputs, changing the labour
share to any value less than 60 percent would only increase VAF by factor inputs. In other words, the
improvement shown in Figure 4.7 is on the conservative side.
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increasing steadily as we increase the share of intangible capital (and thus decrease the
share of tangible capital).
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4.4.3 Robustness of the main result
Despite the fact that the quantitative implication is sensitive to the choice of the
output elasticities of factor inputs, the main result is that including intangible
capital systematically improves the explanatory power of observed input differences
in accounting for income variation across countries. In this subsection, we test the
robustness of this main result using various alternatives. The baseline is the upper-
bound result from Table 4.5 (i.e. output elasticity of intangibles at 0.15). We discuss
how this baseline result changes when we make alternative choices in various stages of
the data construction process.
First, investment in organisation capital is measured by the wage compensation of
the managers, but data on wage compensation by occupation is not widely available
outside the U.S. Our main results are based on the assumption that the relative wage of
managers to an average worker is the same for all the other countries as in the U.S. Based
on the scant earnings data provided by the International Labour Organisation, a fairly
strong negative relationship can be observed between a country’s level of investment and
its wage differentials (see Figure 4.8). Thus, using the U.S. relative wage would mean
that we are likely to underestimate the actual level of investment in organisation capital
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for most of the other economies covered in our sample, as countries at a lower level of
development tend to have a larger wage differential than the benchmark economy –
the U.S. In light of this evidence, we provide an alternative measure of investment in
organisation capital that allows for the relative wage of managers to an average worker
to differ by country (i.e. Rc).23 As shown in the first row of Table 4.6, applying this
alternative measure of organisation capital has little impact on the main result.
Second, due to data constraints, the intangible investment data of some countries have
mainly relied on imputations. For instance, business investment in R&D for Brazil is
approximated based on the data from Mexico (see the Appendix for greater detail).
In the second and third rows of Table 4.6, we show that the main result remains
unchanged to alternative country samples. It is not sensitive to dropping Spain and
Greece, two countries with anomalously large amount of investment in organisation
capital, or dropping Brazil, Egypt, Honduras, and Venezuela, countries with investment
in R&D imputed.
23The alternative wage differential Rc is based on the limited earnings data by sex and occupation
from the ILOSTAT database. We use the ISCO 2008 classification and retrieve the wage data for two
occupational categories: Managers and Total for 2009, 2010 and 2011, the only three years that have
the wage data available. In total, 35 countries are covered by ILO. Since there is little variation over
time, we take an average of the ratio (Managers/Total) and held it constant for all years. Hence,
the alternative measure of organisation capital assumes a country-variant but year-invariant wage rate
for managers. For the rest of the 24 countries that have no earnings data by occupation, we simply
use the wage differential from a similar country that has a comparable level of GDP per capita and
are geographically located close to one another. The wage data for the U.S. is extracted from the
Occupational Employment Statistics database provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics.
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In row (4) of Table 4.6, we show that the main result is also robust to using lower rates
of depreciation as the rates assumed by Corrado et al. (2009) might have been too high.
Take R&D and organisation capital for example, other studies have suggested to use
a rate of 15 percent to depreciate both capital stocks (Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013;
Hall, 2007). For brand equity, we lower the depreciation rate to 50 percent following
the empirical evidence surveyed in Bagwell (2007). In addition, the main result is not
affected if the average growth rate of intangible investment, g, per equation (4.17)
is calculated based on early years of observation (i.e. 1995-1999), since investment in
intangibles were much lower in the 1990s than later on.
Last but not least, if other price proxies were used to deflate intangible investments,
for instance the tangible investment price deflator, the GDP price deflator, or the non-
farm business output price deflator, the resulting intangible capital stock correlate very
highly (correlation above 0.98) and the main result of the analysis also remains largely
unchanged (see the last three rows of Table 4.6).
Table 4.6: Robustness Analysis of the Main Result
var[log(y′)] var[log(yKRH)] VAF′ ∆
Baseline result from Table 4.5 0.445 0.177 39.8% +16%-points
(1) Alternative OC 0.443 0.171 38.6% +15%-points
(2) Dropping GRC&ESP 0.456 0.181 39.7% +16%-points
(3) Dropping sample 0.403 0.160 39.7% +16%-points
(4) Alternative δj 0.445 0.183 41.1% +18%-points
(5) Alternative K0 & R0 0.445 0.177 39.8% +16%-points
(6) Alternative price PBS 0.445 0.173 38.9% +15%-points
(7) Alternative price PGDP 0.445 0.172 38.6% +15%-points
(8) Alternative price P I 0.456 0.173 38.9% +15%-points
Notes: ‘Alternative OC’ denotes alternative measures of investment in organisation capital. ‘Dropping
sample’ means Brazil, Egypt, Honduras, and Venezuela are dropped from analysis. Alternative prices
in (6)–(8), denote intangible price deflator proxied by non-farm business output price deflator (PBS),
the GDP price deflator (PGDP), and the tangible investment price deflator (PI).
∆: denotes the difference in the explanatory power of the augmented model as compared to the basic
model (i.e. VAF′-VAF) in percentage points.
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Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others? We revisit
this question by accounting for the role of intangible capital, a form of investment that
has become increasingly more important in the fast-changing modern economy. Based
on various data sources, we first develop a new intangible investment database that
is consistent and internationally comparable for a sample of 60 countries and over a
time span of 1995-2011. We find a high positive correlation between a country’s level
of GDP per capita and its investments in intangibles. In a development accounting
framework, we show that the fraction of cross-country income variation accounted for
by the observed differences in factor inputs increases substantially after taking intangible
capital into account. In our baseline result, observed input differences can account for
approximately 40 percent of income differences, which is notably higher than the 23
percent if only differences in physical and human capital are accounted for.
Furthermore, the potential of intangible capital to account for international income
differences is likely to be greater than what the results in this chapter suggest, as the
set of intangible assets we cover is only a subset of the full list of intangibles identified
by Corrado et al. (2005).
Although the evidence we find are encouraging, it is important to note the limitations
as well. First, there are still many unresolved yet highly important issues surrounding
the measurement of intangible capital. For instance, we have not adequately addressed
the issue of appropriate price deflators for the asset-specific intangible investments.
Assumptions made in this regard may have non-trivially affected the quantitative
results. Second, the standard ‘one-size-fits-all’ output elasticities of inputs (e.g. 1/3 or
1/4 for physical capital) are simplifications which may not reflect the reality. As noted by
Inklaar and Timmer (2013), the explanatory power of variation in observed inputs could
be larger if output elasticities of inputs are country- and year-specific. This limitation,
however, does not discredit the contribution of this study to the literature as the results
are comparable to earlier studies that have also assumed a common output elasticity of
factor inputs (e.g. Caselli, 2005; Mutreje, 2014). Third, the analysis is based on capital
stocks rather than capital services, which would have been a more appropriate measure
for capital input since shorter-lived assets should have a larger return in production as
it would be indicated by its user cost. But while these are limitations, our analysis
is still a useful step forward. By focusing attention on low levels of investment in
intangible assets in lower-income countries, we suggest a research agenda for trying
to uncover the determinants of this low investment and thus a promising new direction
for understanding international income differences.
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In this note, we describe in detail the data sources and estimation methods used to
produce the global series of intangible investment for 60 economies and for the period
1995-2011 (see Table 4.A1 for the full list of economies covered). Given data constraint,
the focus is placed on the construction of three major types of intangible assets that
are not yet fully incorporated in the System of National Accounts (SNA): (1) scientific
research and development (R&D), (2) own-account organisation capital, and (3) brand
equity. According to the estimates of INTAN-Invest, a pioneering database that provides
country-level intangible investment data for 27 EU countries plus Norway and the U.S.,
these three assets taken together account for nearly 60 percent of all the intangibles
identified by Corrado et al. (2005, 2009).24 Therefore, the estimates presented in this
study should provide a fair representation of the cross-country investment patterns in
intangible assets. Moreover, the set of economies we cover account for over 91 percent
of the world gross domestic product (GDP),25 which means that, if not all, the vast
majority of the world’s total investment in intangible capital is captured in this study.
To avoid the difficulty of measuring intangible investment in public sectors (i.e.
Education, Health, and Public Administration), the research scope is restricted to
merely cover the market sector of the economy.26 Hence, about 80%-85% of aggregate
economic activity is captured (see Appendix 4.B for more detailed discussions on the
distinction between market and nonmarket sectors).
24The other six intangible assets are: computerised database, mineral exploration, artistic originals,
new financial products, architectural and engineering designs, and firm-specific human capital.
25This is according to the GDP estimates in 2005 from the Penn World Table version 8.1.
26Since the pioneering work of Corrado et al. (2005, 2009), there is a general consensus on the
measurement for private business spending on intangibles. While public intangibles are rife with
both conceptual and operationalisation problems. A new research project named SPINTAN has been
launched recently and it deals with public investment in intangibles specifically. This project, however,
is still in its early phase and we are still far from reaching any consensus regarding the asset types to
























Table 4.A1: List of Economies Covered
Country ISO Country ISO Country ISO Country ISO
Argentina ARG Estonia EST Latvia LVA Slovak Rep. SVK
Australia AUS Finland FIN Lithuania LTU Slovenia SVN
Austria AUT France FRA Malaysia MYS South Africa ZAF
Belgium BEL Germany DEU Malta MLT Spain ESP
Brazil* BRA Greece GRC Mexico MEX Sweden SWE
Bulgaria BGR Honduras* HND Netherlands NLD Switzerland CHE
Canada CAN Hong Kong HKG N. Zealand NZL Taiwan* TWN
Chile CHL Hungary HUN Norway NOR Thailand THA
China CHN India IND Peru PER Turkey TUR
Costa Rica CRI Indonesia IDN Philippines PHL Ukraine UKR
Croatia HRV Ireland IRL Poland POL U.K. GBR
Cyprus CYP Israel ISR Portugal PRT U.S.A. USA
Czech Rep. CZE Italy ITA Romania ROU Uruguay URY
Denmark DNK Japan JPN Russia RUS Venezuela* VEN
Egypt* EGY Korea KOR Singapore SGP Vietnam* VNM
Notes: Economies marked with an asterisk indicate that for one of the three intangible assets estimated,
one or more external data sources are used (e.g. business investment in R&D for Taiwan is derived
from OECD). Estimates for other countries, on the other hand, are consistently based on the same
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4.A1 Research and development
For the estimation of cross-country investment in (scientific) R&D, we primarily rely
on the data provided by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. To be specific, we obtain
annual gross expenditures on R&D performed by Business Enterprises (BERD) for 56
countries and for the period 1996-2011.27 For values that are missing from UNESCO, we
first extrapolate them using the growth of the actual BERD values from the other data
sources, such as OECD, Eurostat, and/or a country’s own Statistical Office. Then, we
linearly interpolate the data that are missing between two observed data points based
on the logged variables (i.e. assuming a constant annual growth rate). The interpolation
takes the following general form:










where y0 and y1 denote two data points observed at year t0 and t1; y is the missing
value needs to be interpolated at year t where t0 < t < t1, and X denotes the specific
type of an asset, which in this case is R&D.
Countries with missing BERD
There are four countries (i.e. Brazil, Egypt, Honduras, and Venezuela) that warrant
extra attention as none of them, to the best of our knowledge, provide any information
on business investment in R&D.28 As a result, we apply a rough proxy by using the
share of BERD in GERD (i.e. BERDGERD ) from a ‘similar’ country to back out their business
expenditures on R&D. Two countries are defined to be similar if they have identical or
very similar intellectual property rights (IPR) protection scores and are geographically
located close to one another. The assumption we make here is that the higher the level
of IPR protection in a country, the larger the share of business investment in R&D.
Despite being simplistic, this assumption is not without any plausibility. As shown in
Figure 4.A2 where the strength of a country’s IPR protection is significantly associated
with the private share of R&D (Pearson’s correlation coefficient is also highly significant
at .01 percent).29 The exact matching procedure for these four countries is shown in
Table 4.A2.
27For Taiwan, the BERD data is alternatively extracted from the OECD database. As shown later in
this appendix, there is a perfect match of the BERD data between UNESCO and OECD. Thus, even
though BERD data for Taiwan is extracted from OECD, it is counted as taken from UNESCO.
28For Venezuela, there is even no data on GERD from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. We
alternatively extract the GERD data for Venezuela from the ECLAC database.
29The IPR index is only available quinquennially from 1960 to 2010. Thus, the years of observation used
to plot Figure 4.A2 are discrete. We also considered dropping these four countries in the development
accounting analysis and results remain largely unchanged.
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Table 4.A2: Matching the Share of BERD
Countries Matched with IPR Scores
Brazil Mexico 5.5 - 5.2
Egypt Kenya 4.6 - 4.6
Honduras Argentina 4.5 - 5.5
Venezuela Paraguay 3.2 - 4.1
Notes: IPR scores are obtained from Intellectual Property Rights Index 2014.
Reliability check by comparing with OECD and INTAN-Invest
To examine how well the R&D numbers derived from the UNESCO Institute for
Statistics line up with the other existing estimates, we compare them with two other
prominent sources of data: (1) R&D investment by sector of performance provided by
the OECD for a set of 34 countries and a time span of 1995-2011; and (2) estimates on
business R&D investment reported by the INTAN-Invest database for 29 countries and
over the period 1995-2010. With a (near) perfect correlation, comparisons with both
data series assured the validity and reliability of our estimates of business investment
in R&D. In fact, the investment figures of BERD are identical between UNESCO and
OECD. As can be seen in Figure 4.A3, however, there is a somewhat wider range
of dispersion when we compare our estimates with INTAN- Invest’s. The estimates are
generally larger than that of INTAN-Invest by about 10 percent. The largest discrepancy
is observed in Cyprus for year 2004 where our estimates are close to twice as large.
One of the reasons to explain the discrepancy is the difference in the methodology.
i
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In INTAN-Invest project, R&D expenditures of the computer sector (K72) and the
financial intermediation sector (J) are excluded from calculation in order to avoid
double-counting with the other intangible investments in software and new financial
products. Due to the lack of data, however, we are not able to exclude R&D investment
of these two sectors and correct for the potential double-counting bias noted by the
INTAN-Invest project.30
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4.A2 Organisation capital
Organisation capital or organisational structure is arguably the largest component of
intangible assets and the hardest to measure. According to the estimates compiled
by INTAN-Invest (see Figure 4.A1), this asset alone accounts for 25 percent of all
intangibles. Rather than inventing or improving technologies like investment in scientific
R&D, organisation capital is associated with innovation in methods, management prac-
tices, and business models. In the literature, organisation capital has two components:
own-account and purchased. Due to the lack of data, we restrict the focus on the
own-account component and further assume, a la` Corrado et al. (2005, 2009), that
own-account organisation capital can be represented by the value of managers’ time
30As a robustness check, we tried to subtract the share of R&D investment of these two sectors from
final estimation. According to the national accounts data provided by Eurostat, the sum of these two
sectors is about seven percent (based on a cross-country average of 27 EU countries). As a crude
measure, we downsized business investment in R&D by seven percent for all countries and years. This
has little impact on the development accounting analysis.
i
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spent on improving the effectiveness of business organisations and/or devising more
efficient business models. Though it is a rather arbitrary number, we follow the broader
literature by assuming that 20 percent of managers’ time/wage is spent on enhancing
organisational structures and this fraction holds true for all the 60 economies covered
in this chapter. Therefore, in order to measure a country’s investment in own-account
organisation capital, we would need data on the total amount of managers employed
in the economy and their corresponding annual wage. Investment in (own-account)







To retrieve data on employment by occupation, we rely on the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) which, to the best of our knowledge, provides the most compre-
hensive information on labour statistics both in terms of time and country coverage.
We obtain three datasets from ILO and as will be explained later, they are used
complementarily during the employment data construction process. The first and the
most important data, which we name it the benchmark data, is the number of employees
by occupation using the International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO-88)
from the ILOSTAT database. As described by ILO, this is a new database extending the
previous data collection effort (i.e. LABORSTA) to more recent years (i.e. from 2008
onwards). From ILOSTAT we obtain employment data for all 60 economies covered in
the sample and for the entire time period from 1995 to 2011.31
A detailed look into this data, however, shows that about 33 percent of the employment
data on managers are missing. To fill the gaps that are observed between two data
points, we again apply the linear interpolation technique per equation (4.A1). The
other possibility to recover some of the missing data is to check whether the old labour
statistics database (i.e. LABORSTA) may cover any information that is missing in the
benchmark data (i.e. ILOSTAT). Consistent with the earlier ISCO-88 classification,
we retrieve managers’ employment data from LABORSTA for 59 countries and over
the period of 1999-2008. After matching the two databases, we find that there are 77
observations having managers’ employment statistics in the former but not in the latter
database. Even though employment numbers from ILOSTAT and LABORSTA are very
similar or even identical most of the time, there are cases where these two data series
31Other employment classifications are provided by ILO as well, but the 1988 version is used because
it provides the most complete employment data by occupation.
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differ by more than double.32 To ensure consistency and comparability of the numbers
by merging two databases, we extrapolate the benchmark data using the growth of
LABORSTA numbers.33 In other words:






where the superscripts New and Old refer to the benchmark (i.e. ILOSTAT) and
LABORSTA databases. Since some of the employment data in early years (i.e. before
2000) are only available with an older version of the occupational classification (i.e.
ISCO-68), we further extrapolate the missing values of early years using the growth
of ISCO-68 numbers per equation (4.A3). A brief summary of the employment data
construction process is shown in Table 4.A3. As can be seen in this table, extrapolation
only takes place after linear interpolation is performed first.
Table 4.A3: Construction of the Employment Data
Order of integration Source Methods Missing(%)
1.1 ILOSTAT ISCO-88 (BM)* Non 32.84%
1.2 ILOSTAT ISCO-88 (BM) Interpolation 29.90%
2.1 LABORSTA ISCO-88 Interpolation
2.2 LABORSTA ISCO-88 Extrapolate using its growth 21.08%
3.1 ILOSTAT ISCO-68 Interpolation
3.2 ILOSTAT ISCO-68 Extrapolate using its growth 16.27%
Notes: Linear interpolation, based on logged variables, is applied to all three databases to fill the gaps
observed between two data points.
*BM: Benchmark data
One important issue to note about the employment data is that ILO only provides
employment classification at the most aggregate level. Thus, it is not possible to separate
managerial workers from legislators and senior officials under ISCO-88 classification or
from administrative workers under ISCO-68 classification (see Table 4.A4 for a detailed
outline of occupational classification). As a consequence, the estimates of own-account
investment in organisation capital may well be larger than the conventional measure
that focuses on workers with managerial titles only. This departure from the convention,
however, is in line with the recent work of OECD (i.e. Squicciarini & Le Mouel, 2012)
32For Indonesia in year 2007, manager’s employment level is reported in both LABORSTA and
ILOSTAT but the former reports a total of 4,720,675 managers are employed in that year while
ILOSTAT reports less than half of that (i.e. 2,160,000).
33For countries that have no data in ILOSTAT but do in LABORSTA, we simply copy the employment
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which calls for the inclusion of other non-managerial workers in measuring organisation
capital. This is because those non-managerial titled workers may well be engaged in
tasks that contribute to organisational development.
Wage data
It would be ideal to have the wage data on employment by occupation from the same
data provider – ILO. This, however, was not possible due to the extremely scant data
ILO provides on income by occupation. The income data is reported for a limited
sample of 35 countries and for no more than three years of observation (i.e. 2009, 2010
and 2011). As a result, the wage data has to be externally imputed and we do so in two
steps using two data sources: the Penn World Table version 8.1 (PWT) database and
the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labour
Statistics. First, we extract the data on annual income for management occupations
from OES and denote it by WManagersBLS .34 Then, we calculate the wage rate of an
average worker for all 60 economies using data from PWT 8.1 as follows:
WMeanc,t =
(





where labshare indicates the share of labour compensation in GDP at current national
prices; cgdpo is the output-side GDP calculated at current PPPs (denominated in 2005
USD); pl gdpo denotes the price level of GDP; emp is the total number of persons
engaged in production; and xr is the market exchange rate needed to convert currency
units back to national currencies. Combing these two wages, we can derive a year-variant
wage differential (or relative wage) between the managers and an average worker for









The evolvement of this relative wage R is plotted in Figure 4.A4. Because of the
change of the use of Standard Occupational Classification from five-digit to six-digit
in 1999, it was only possible to retrieve consistent U.S. wage data for years between
1999 and 2011.35 To complete the estimation for the whole period, the relative wage is
held constant to the last value available. Assuming that the wage differential between
managers and average workers is the same in other countries as in the U.S. (i.e. R
34This is the annual wage of managers averaged across all different types. It is coded as 11-0000
according to the Standard Occupational Classification 2010
35No clear guideline on the matching between the five-digit SOC and the six-digit SOC are provided.
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constant across countries), it is then possible to back out the wage rate of managers for




which in turn enables us to estimate the annual investment flows in own-account
organisation capital per equation (4.A2).
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Reliability check by comparing with INTAN-Invest
To check how well our estimates, using equation (4.A2), align with the existing measure,
we compare the estimates with INTAN-Invest (see Figure 4.A5). It is worth noting that
it is not our goal to have a perfect match between these two investment series as there are
both methodological and data differences. Investment in organisation capital provided
by INTAN-Invest has two components: in-house produced and externally purchased. As
previously noted, we merely focus on the estimation of the former and omit the latter.
Since most of organisation capital are in-house produced (Squicciarini & Le Mouel,
2012), the estimates constructed should be in the same ballpark as INTAN-Invest’s,
despite of the differences in coverage.
With a correlation of 0.96, the plausibility of the our measure of investment in
organisation capital is warranted. In addition to this high correlation, the estimates
i
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also fairly closely resemble those of INTAN-Invest. The mean and the median of the
ratio of our estimates to INATN-Invest’s are at 0.99 and 1.29. If Greece and Spain
are excluded, two countries that we elaborate on later, the similarity between the two
investment series improves significantly. The mean and the median of the ratios become
0.962 and 0.998. This suggests that the difference between our estimates and INTAN-
Invest’s for a sample of 27 countries (i.e. after excluding GRC and ESP) is, on average,
less than 0.1 percent.
Greece and Spain are two notable outliers whose investment in own-account organisation
capital are significantly larger than the estimates suggested by INTAN-Invest. A careful
look into the data shows that the cause of this large discrepancy is primarily due
to the difference in the coverage of the number of managers, which is a potential
source of discrepancy we anticipated ex ante. The fact that Greece and Spain are
affected most is because the difference between strictly defined and broadly defined
managers is anomalously large for these two countries. As shown in Figure 4.A6, the
sum of managers, legislators and senior government officials is generally less than twice
the amount of corporate managers. For Greece and Spain, however, this difference
is more than 8 and 4 times, respectively. This seems to suggest that unlike other
EU countries, there is a disproportionately large amount of governmental managers
employed in Greece and Spain than corporate managers. The failure to exclude them
caused significant (upward) bias for the estimates of these two countries. As discussed











































As the most valuable assets many companies possess (e.g. think of Facebook or Uber,
their names probably worth much than their documented property and machinery),
brand equity is another major type of intangible we measure in this study. The idea
of brand equity was born in the U.S. in the 1980s when companies began to realise
that patiently building up brands is more enduring to boost sales than other means,
as it allows them to hold on to customers, win new ones and provide launching pads
for new products. Most brands are closely associated with advertising and marketing
activities, which are the most common ways of building up a brand. Thus, we follow
the convention by decomposing brand equity into these two components. Closely in line
with the recent work of Corrado and Hao (2014), we reproduce the global perspective on
brand investments using two international database: World Advertising Research Centre
(WARC) and European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research (ESOMAR). The
former is a privately owned company that publishes the official advertising expenditure
figures for 84 countries and for years dating back to the 1980s; the latter issues market
research spending data for about 80 countries and for some of them the data is available
since 1988.
As noted by Corrado and Hao (2014), these two data sources are likely to underestimate
the actual amount of expenditures. For advertising, WARC does not include direct
mailing and production costs. This, according to their calculation based on the Coen
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media-structured advertising database, is a significant omission. If one adds direct mail
advertising to WARC’s estimates for the U.S., the overall advertising spending figure of
the U.S. would increase by 32 percent. In the case of the U.K., the magnitude of such
a downward bias is about 7 percent, according to WARC’s own calculation.
As for the market research spending figures provided by ESOMAR, it is likely to be
overly conservative as well, since it only focuses on traditional market research activities
while newer activities associated with the internet are not yet included in their (official)
estimation. An external independent research, commissioned by ESOMAR, extends the
conventional market research activities to include seven more newer ones and found
that the expanded set of marketing activities led to spending figures that were 60 to
70 percent larger in the U.S. and the U.K., and 20 percent larger in Argentina.36 This
finding points to the fact that the marketing industry is undergoing structural changes
and the current focus on traditional marketing activities is simply insufficient to capture
the actual level of spending in market research activities. Despite of the known risk
of having a downward bias, we still choose to rely on these two data sources for its
comprehensive data availability.
Estimation method for investment in brand equity
It is well-documented in the existing literature on advertising longevity that only major
campaign type of advertising spending is likely to generate long-lasting benefits to the
development of a brand. Therefore, not all advertising spending can be counted as
investment. We follow Corrado et al. (2005, 2009) and Corrado and Hao (2014) by
applying a capitalisation factor (d) of 60 percent.37 This capitalisation factor is also
found to be in line with the U.K. intangible asset survey (Awano, Franklin, Haskel &
Kastrinaki, 2010).
In two country-specific studies on the U.K. and Sweden, Marrano, Haskel and Wallis
(2009) and Edquist (2011) used figures from the supply-use tables on business purchases
of advertising and market research to measure investment in brand equity. These studies
36According to the Market Research Handbook (2007), the traditional market research activities
include: (1) market measurement, (2) media audience research, (3) stakeholder measurement, (4) market
modelling, (5) new product/service development, (6) usage and attitude studies, (7) advertising/brand
tracking, (8) advertising pre-testing, (9) opinion research/polling, (10) qualitative/focus groups, (11)
business-to-business studies, (12) other omnibus/shared costs survey, and (13) others. The additional
activities added by the external research commissioned by ESOMAR include: (1) marketing reports and
research, (3) media monitoring, (3) sample and panel provides, (4) web traffic measurement, (5) social
media communities, (6) survey software, and (7) information technology and telecom measurement
research.
37Effects that last more than one year, a distinction used widely by national accountants in separating
current production costs from expenditures that expand future productive capacity.
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find that advertising media expenditures understates the actual total consumption of
advertising services and they reckon that the underestimation is about 39 percent.
In light of their suggestion and to remain consistent with Corrado and Hao (2014),
we also scale up the advertising media spending figure by multiplying the so-called
MHW-Edquist adjustment factor (i.e. γadv = 1.39) to measure long-lived investment in
advertising. In addition, market research spending provided by ESOMAR only captures
the purchased component, while the in-house production of market research is omitted.
In the case of the U.S., the own-account component based on compensation of marketing
managers is about equal in size to the purchased market research activities (Corrado
& Hao, 2014). This aligns with the prior assumption used in Corrado et al. (2009)
of doubling market research spending to account for own-account component. In sum,
investment in brand equity is estimated as follows:
IBEc,t =
(







Investment in market research
(4.A7)
where γ denotes the adjustment factor (i.e. 1.39 for advertising and 2 for market
research), E is the expenditure data obtained from WARC and ESOMAR, and d is
the capitalisation factor of 60 percent to capture long-lived advertising. To note, we
implicitly assume that in-house marketing spending equals out-house spending in all
countries.
Comparison with the existing estimates
Since both estimation method and data sources are identical to what is used in Corrado
and Hao (2014), our estimates in principal should coincide with theirs. Due to the fact
that their global series on brand investment estimates are not yet publicly available, a
direct one-to-one estimate comparison cannot be made. As an alternative, we performed
a somewhat crude comparison by replicating their plot on the relationship between
brand investment and level of economic development across a set of 17 countries and
they resemble quite well.38 As an additional check, we further compare our investment
in brand equity with the estimates from INTAN-Invest. On average, the estimates are
somewhat (i.e. 20%) smaller than the numbers suggested by INTAN-Invest, but it is
reassuring that these two series have a very high correlation of 0.92.
38For conciseness, these plots are intentionally omitted but are available upon request.
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4.A4 Dealing with missing values
Like any other data construction works, one of the major difficulties encountered in
this project is that not all countries have the data available for all the years that we
aim to cover. The data missing patterns also differ significantly across countries and
asset types. For intangible asset R&D, some countries only have one year of observation
available (e.g. Vietnam), while a smaller set of data-rich countries (e.g. the U.K. and
the U.S.) only has one year of observation missing. In order to complete the investment
series for each intangible asset, we apply: (1) linear interpolation technique based on
the logged variables, per equation (4.A1), to fill in the values that are missing between
two data points; and (2) backward and forward extrapolations using the average growth






×NGDPc,t−1 IXc,t+1 = Sxc,t · (1 + r)×NGDPc,t−1 (4.A8)
where the superscript X denotes the intangible asset under concern (i.e. R&D,
organisation capital, and brand equity); S denotes the first/last observable share of
intangible asset X in GDP, and r represents the average growth rate of this share
observed for the first/last five years (i.e.
∑5
t=1 S/5). Table 4.A5 provides an overview of
the data missing patterns. As can be seen, about 22%–32% of the investment series are
not estimated based on the real data, but are imputed. It could be argued that given high
rates of depreciation assumed for organisation capital (40%) and brand equity (60%), it
is not needed to have series for them going back to 1995 if the development accounting
analysis is based on 2011. Focusing on more recent years (e.g. 2003–2011 for organisation
capital), however, does not help much to reduce the amount of imputations.39 As a
result, we choose to have equally long series for those three intangible assets.
Table 4.A5: Share of Missing Observations by Asset-type
Missing (%) R&D O.C. Brand Equity
Originally 21.96% 32.84% 24.71%
After interpolation 16.08% 29.90% 20.88%
After extrapolation 0% 0% 0%
N (60 × 17) 1020 1020 1020












4.B Market versus nonmarket sectors
In this section we discuss the distinction between the market sector and the nonmarket
sector for output, employment, and investment. Similar to the definition used in the EU
KLEMS project, we regard NACE industries Revision 1: Public Administration and
Defense (L), Education (M), and Health and Social Work (N) as nonmarket sectors and
the remaining ones (A through K, plus O) make up the share of the market economy.40
4.B1 Market output versus nonmarket output







where L, M , and N denote value added of the nonmarket industries; and GVA denotes
total value added of the entire economy. Since there is no one single database providing
a consistent sectoral breakdown of output for all 60 economies, we complementarily
calculate the nonmarket share using various data sources (see Table 4.B1).
There are, however, two economies (i.e. Hong Kong and Singapore) require some further
explanation as neither of them provide detailed data on public output. As an alternative,
we back out their output of the nonmarket sectors using two other data sources: the 10
sector database compiled by the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC)
and the United Nations National Accounts (UN NA) data. The former provides output
data for industry J and K (Finance, insurance, real estate and business activities) and
industry O and P (Community, social and personal services); while the latter provides
output data at a more aggregate level for industries J through P (denoted as ‘Other
activities’ in the UN NA data). Given these, output share produced by industry L, M,
and N can be recovered as:
ShareNMc,t =
(
J PUNNAc,t − J KGGDCc,t −O PGGDCc,t
)
GVAGGDCc,t
; c ∈ (HKG,SGP ) (4.B2)
Out of 1020 observations (60 countries 17 years), there are four countries with a total
number of only 17 missing values. To complete the series of the share of nonmarket
40In EU KLEMS, real estate activities (K70) is also part of the non-market economy due to
measurement difficulties (see O’Mahony & Timmer, 2009). We, however, did not follow EU KLEMS to
exclude K70 from the market economy because for nearly one-third of the countries we cover, their GDP
data are not detailed enough to isolate real estate activities. To keep the definition of market economy
consistent across countries, real estate activities (K70) are therefore part of the market economy.
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Table 4.B1: Data Sources and Variables Used for Output
Data Sources Countries Variables used
WIOD (SEA) 39 VA of industry L, M, N, and total industries
GGDC (10-Sector database) 7 VA of Government services, and total industries
ECLAC 5 VA of Pub.Admin, Edu., Health, and total industries
OECD Stat. 4 VA of B1GVO Q and B1GVA (ISIC Rev.4 )
National Statistics office 3 VA of industry L, M, N, and total industries
UN National Accounts 2 VA of Other activities (ISIC J P)
Notes: United Nations National Accounts data is used in conjunction with GGDC’s 10-sector database
for calculating the nonmarket output share of Hong Kong and Singapore.
output, we resort to using the UN NA data and extrapolate (backward and forward)
as follows:













extrapolate total value added
(4.B3)
The share of the nonmarket output could be as low as 4 percent in Singapore to as high
as nearly 25 percent in Denmark.
4.B2 Market employment versus nonmarket employment
The primary source of data we use for employment is the labour statistics provided
by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). In particular, we obtain employment
measured by the number of employees (i.e. paid-employment and self-employment)
detailed at 1-digit sectoral level using ISIC Rev.3 classification for an unbalanced panel







where LEMP, MEMP, and NEMP denote the number of employees working in nonmarket
sectors; and TOT EMP denotes the total employment of the economy.
Out of the 969 observations that we retrieve from ILO (57 countries 17 years), over
28 percent of the values are missing. We first apply linear interpolation per equation
(4.A1) to fill the gaps that are observed between two data points (13 values are
interpolated) and then extrapolate the remaining missing values complementarily using
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various external data sources (see Table 4.B2). The extrapolation takes the following
general form:






where Data indicates data origins (e.g. ISIC Rev.2, WIOD, GGDC). After extrapola-
tion, the amount of missing data went down from 28% to about 8% and we hold the share
constant to the last value available to complete the series of nonmarket employment
share for this set of 57 countries.
Table 4.B2: Data Sources and Variables Used for Employment
Data origins Used for Variables used
ILO (ISIC Rev.3) BM data Employment at 1-digit sector level (ISIC Rev.3)
ILO (ISIC Rev.2) Extrapolation & BM Employment at 1-digit sector level (ISIC Rev.2)
WIOD (SEA) Extrapolation Number of employees by industry (EMPE)
GGDC (10-Sector database) Extrapolation Total persons engaged by industry (EMP)
Notes: There are three economies with their nonmarket employment numbers approximated using the
employment data of ILO ISIC Rev.2 (i.e. Hong Kong, Honduras, and Venezuela).
As for the other three economies (i.e. Hong Kong, Honduras, and Venezuela) that do not
provide any employment information on industry L, M, or N, we try to proxy it using
more aggregated sectoral employment data classified by ISIC Rev.2. From ILO, there is
employment information available for sector Community, Social and Personal Services,
which corresponds to the sum of industries of L through Q in ISIC Rev.3. Based on a
set of 23 countries, it is found that the employment level of industries L through Q is
on average about 1.5 times more than the employment of industry L, M, plus N. Using
this ratio as a rough indication, the employment share of nonmarket sectors for Hong







The employment share of nonmarket sectors could be as low as 5 percent in Vietnam
to as high as over 30 percent in Scandinavian countries.
4.B3 Market investment versus nonmarket investment
As for the distinction between investment in market sectors and nonmarket ones, we rely
on Social Economic Accounts data of the World Input and Output database (Timmer,
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Erumban, Los, Stehrer & de Vries, 2014) which provides detailed sectoral breakdown of
gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). For a set of 39 economies covered in the sample,





where LGFCF, MGFCF, and NGFCF denote GFCF of nonmarket sectors; and
TOT GFCF denotes the total investment flows of the economy. The investment share
of the nonmarket sector for those 39 economies ranges from slightly over 5 percent in
Russia to about 23 percent in Taiwan. As there are no other data available to breakdown
GFCF by sectors, we use an average share of those 39 economies for the remaining ones
that are not covered by WIOD (i.e. 12 percent).41
41The sectoral GFCF data provided by WIOD often do not cover the last 2 or 3 years (i.e. 2010 and
2011). We keep the last observable share constant to the complete the data series.
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Do stronger intellectual property rights lead to more
R&D intensive imports
5.1 Introduction
Unlike the preceding chapters where the focus is centred around the impact of intangible
capital per se. In this chapter we take a different perspective by examining how the
stringency of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection could serve as a tool for
countries with a slow pace of investment in intangibles to attract knowledge-intensive
goods via international trade.
IPR protection is generally assumed to stimulate innovation and growth (Duguet &
Lelarge, 2012; Gould & Gruben, 1996; Sakakibara & Branstetter, 2001). This can be
through providing incentives for innovative activities by domestic firms, but might also
due to a higher level of technology diffusion from abroad. One important diffusion
channel is the import of sophisticated products. According to the theory formalised by
Maskus and Penubarti (1995), increased IPR protection in the domestic market can
affect imports in two opposing ways. On the one hand, foreign firms have a greater
incentive to export their products to the domestic markets, as IPR protection reduces
the risk of piracy by domestic competitors. This is termed the market expansion effect as
foreign firms increase sales in the market. On the other hand, by reducing the ability of
local domestic firms to imitate foreign products, the exporter has greater market power
which could lead the foreign firm to curtail sales. This countervailing effect is coined
the market power effect. It is theoretically ambiguous which effect dominates since both
effects are at work and may cancel each other out. A large empirical literature generally
finds that higher levels of IPR protection stimulate trade flows for manufacturing












2010; Falvey, Foster & Greenaway, 2009; Rafiquzzaman, 2002; Weng, Yang & Huang,
2009).1
While the market expansion effect of increased IPR protection on trade is well-
established, there is little agreement and evidence on the possible heterogeneity in
responsiveness of imports to IPR protection. This evidence is important because not
all IPR protection is related to products that might provide technology spillovers.
For example, it might be related to protection of brand names of consumer products
mainly leading to imports that embody little technological know-how, in contrast to,
say, machinery. From the perspective of enhancing growth, one would be interested in
the impact of IPR on imports of technologically-advanced products. This is especially
relevant for low- and middle-income countries, as importing technology intensive
products can be an important channel of knowledge diffusion from advanced countries
and thus be a path towards higher growth and income levels (Keller, 2004).
Several studies that have attempted to shed light on this issue have produced mixed
results. On the one hand, strengthening IPR protection is found to have no significant
impact on products with greater technology embodiment (Co, 2004; Fink & Primo
Braga, 1999; Maskus & Penubarti, 1995). Whereas, others find increased IPR protection
has a particularly strong impact on products that are knowledge-intensive (Awokuse &
Yin, 2010) or industries that are patent-sensitive (Ivus, 2010). Besides their obvious
differences in the data sample used, a more fundamental reason that could explain the
mixed results is the empirical approach employed. All these studies relied on dividing
import flows by product and separately analysing the subsample in probing how stronger
IPR protection affects trade. Though helpful and intuitive, the approach is not suited
to examine a differential effect as it does not directly compare and test whether the
difference is statistically significant across products in terms of technology content.
The main contribution of this chapter is to provide systematic evidence on the
differential effects that variations of IPR have on trade, contingent upon the technology
intensity of a product category. This evidence can be seen as an important addition to
the continuing debate regarding the impact of the contentious agreement on the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) signed in 1994.2. TRIPs is an
1The only study that has found clear evidence supporting the presence of the market power effect is
by Smith (1999).
2The major controversy over the TRIPs agreement is centred around the balance between the
incentives to encourage new inventions and the ease with which developing countries can access the
patented products and technology. A salient example is the pharmaceutical industry. The development
costs for new drugs can be very high and it may not be developed without a large (monopolistic) return
ensured by patent protection that is respected across the globe. The worldwide adoption of a uniformly
strong patent protection would, however, raises the probability of very expensive treatments for the
growing epidemics that makes the least-developed countries worse off (Kyle & McGahan, 2012)
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international agreement administered by the World Trade Organisation that sets the
minimum standards for various forms of intellectual property regulation. This agreement
came into effect on 1 January 1995. Has tougher IPR protection mandated by TRIPs
really restricted trade in high-tech products and strengthened the monopolistic power
of a few innovators, as believed by the opponents of the agreement? To answer the
question, we follow the empirical strategy pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and
proxy for the technology intensity of an imported product by the extent to which the
originating industry invests in R&D. We then interact the resulting intensity indicator
of the product categories with the strength of IPR protection of the importing country.
This method is econometrically more appealing than what has been used in the existing
literature, as (1) the interaction term provides a direct test for the statistical significance
of the differences between product categories with varying degrees of R&D intensity; (2)
it provides more convincing evidence on causality since this approach is less subject to
criticism about an omitted variables bias or model misspecification (Rajan & Zingales,
1998); and (3) we could also, for the first time, quantify the magnitude of the effect-
differentials across product categories. For instance, rather than merely stating that
increased IPR protection has a larger impact on R&D-intensive products, we now show
by how much more the trade value will increase for a product category that is more R&D
intensive relative to one that is less R&D intensive. This quantification is interesting in
its own right but it can also be of great value to policy makers in assessing the economic
significance of upgrading the IPR system in the country.
The empirical analysis is based on data for manufacturing imports classified by 18
different product categories for a sample of 119 countries and over the period 1976-2010.
The stringency of IPR protection of the country is measured by an index developed by
Ginarte and Park (1997). Given the nature of IPR index, all the data are grouped into
5 year periods in this study. In other words, the data used in the analysis cover the
following years: 1976, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. The main findings
are that the impact of IPR on imports is indeed significantly positively correlated with
R&D intensity. We find that more stringent IPR protection leads to a 22 percent faster
increase in the value of imports for products at the 90th percentile of R&D intensity
(Office, accounting and computing machinery) than for products at the 10th percentile
(Textiles, leather, and footwear). This finding remains robust to alternative measures
of R&D intensity of product categories and to using a modified IPR index that corrects
for the actual enforcement of patent laws in the country.
By splitting the analysis into pre- and post-TRIPs time periods (i.e. 1976-1990 versus
1995-2010), we show that the differential effect of IPR is significantly larger in the latter
period. This finding supports the notion that the TRIPs agreement stimulates, rather
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than restricts, trade flows and it seems that the agreement is especially conducive to
trading technologically advanced products. If countries are further divided into three
different groups according to their income levels, we find that imports by middle-income
countries are most sensitive to changes in IPR protection. Splitting the source of imports
by different income groups, we also show that the differential effect of IPR is only present
for imports coming from the middle-income countries. This result seems to suggest that
rather than attracting more technology-intensive products from advanced economies as
one would expect after strengthening IPR protection, the middle-income countries only
attracted more imports from countries of its own income group.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 describes the main
empirical strategy and the data used for analysis. Results and sensitivity analyses are
presented in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 provides concluding remarks.
5.2 Empirical strategy and data
In this section, we discuss the econometric approach to analysing the differential effects
of strengthening IPR protection on manufacturing imports, followed by a description
of the data and methods used to construct the key variables of interest.
5.2.1 Econometric specification
The majority of the existing studies focused on examining the main effect of IPR on
trade and relied on dividing imports by product category to identify the differential
effect. This approach, however, is not suitable to examining the heterogeneity in
responsiveness of trade to IPR protection as it has two major limitations. First, the
number of observations diminishes greatly after splitting the sample by product. This
makes it harder to find a significant effect. Second, even if the effect can be identified as
in, for example, Awokuse and Yin (2010), it cannot be directly compared or tested
whether the difference is statistically significant across products, let alone drawing
implications about the economic significance of the differential effect. To analyse the
differential effect of IPR, we adapt from the approach of Rajan and Zingales (1998) by
estimating the following equation:
lnMc,i,t = β · [IPRc,t ×RDi] + ηc,t + ηi,t + c,i,t (5.1)
where the value of imports M for country c, product group i, in year t is expressed
in natural logarithm; IPR denotes the stringency of a country’s IPR protection over
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time; RD is the product-level indicator for technology intensity, as measured by R&D
expenditures as a percentage of value added of the industry which delivered the import;
ηc,t represents all the country-level factors that can vary with time, such as income
levels, openness to trade, price indexes, and institutional quality; ηi,t captures all the
product-level factors that can vary over time, such as global trends in productivity and
prices or in the demand for a product. Note that these two set of dummies also capture
country–, product–, and time–specific fixed effects so that including them separately is
not needed. c,i,t is the idiosyncratic error term.
The coefficient β measures whether more stringent IPR protection leads to higher
values of imports of products that are more R&D-intensive and if so, the size of the
coefficient would reflect the magnitude of this differential effect. Given the theory that
technologically advanced products are more prone to imitation and hence more sensitive
to changes in IPR protection, β is expected to be positive and significant when the
market expansion effect dominates.
5.2.2 Proxy for IPR Protection
As widely used in the literature, the strength of a country’s IPR protection is measured
by an index developed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and further extended by Park (2008).
This index, which we will indicate by G-P in the remainder, is constructed for 122
countries and quinquennially for the period 1960-2010. Five facets of patent laws are
captured in the G-P index: the extent of IPR coverage, membership in international
patent agreements, provisions for loss of protection, formal enforcement mechanisms,
and duration of protection. Each component was further decomposed into characteristics
determining its effective strength. For instance, the extent of coverage refers to the
patentability of various kinds of inventions in a country, ranging from the patentability of
chemical products to the existence of utility models. Membership in patent agreements
indicates the number of international treaties a country is a signatory. Each of these
subcomponents was assigned a value of one if present and zero if absent, with the
component score being the sum of these values as a percentage of the maximum value.
Adding up the component scores, the final G-P index is indicated by a continuous
value ranging from zero to five, with a higher number signalling more stringent patent
protection. This index is considered as the best indicator available in the literature and
it has the major advantage over the other popular measure, the index of Rapp and
Rozek (1990), in that it is constructed for different years which allows for analysis of
the index over time. The Rapp-Rozek index, on the other hand, is merely available for
one single year. Conceptually, the G-P index is also preferred because by considering
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various facets of patent protection in greater detail the G-P index is more nuanced to
reflect variations in patent laws than the subjective and unit-incremental approach used
in the Rapp-Rozek index (Kanwar & Evenson, 2009).3
In general, the world has witnessed a strong increase in IPR protection during the past
half-century. The world average of the G-P index value soared from 1.26 in 1960 to
3.33 in 2010. The country that has upgraded most in terms of the strength of IPR
protection is (South) Korea, with no IPR protection in 1960 to become one of the most
highly IPR protected nations in 2010 (IPR index value 4.33). Somalia, on the other
hand, experienced the smallest increase in IPR protection, with an index value of 1.33
in 1960 and 1.46 in 2010. It may not come as a surprise that the U.S., according to
the G-P index, provides the best IPR protection across all countries at any point in
time (3.83 in 1960 to 4.88 in 2010). Myanmar offers the poorest IPR protection in the
world (index value of 0.2 in 2010). If countries are divided into three different groups
depending on their income levels, it can be seen that the middle-income countries have
strengthened their patent protections most during the period of investigation and the
largest increase in IPR protection, across all income groups, took place in 1995, the
year in which the TRIPs agreement came into effect.
Table 5.1: The Means of the Ginarte-Park IPR Index
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1975-2010
High-income 2.48 2.90 3.07 3.28 4.02 4.29 4.33 4.33 74.6%
Mid-income 1.41 1.49 1.52 1.59 2.31 2.92 3.23 3.33 135.2%
Low-income 1.28 1.37 1.50 1.54 1.85 2.20 2.56 2.65 107.5%
Notes: The classification of the income groups is according to the ranking provided by the World Bank
(2011) for year 1990. Countries with income per capita less than $610 are classified as low-income, the
income range for the mid-income countries is between $611 and $7620, and high-income countries are
those with income per capita larger than $7620.
5.2.3 De jure versus de factor IPR protection
Despite being the most preferred index to use in empirical research, the G-P index also
has a major limitation in that it is a de jure measure, reflecting laws and agreements,
3By consulting the legal text of each country’s patent laws, Rapp-Rozek made a rough and rather
subjective assessment of their conformity with the minimum standards proposed as guidelines by the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. More specifically, countries are assigned a score based on their 1984 patent
system: 0= No patent laws, 1= Inadequate protection laws, no law prohibiting piracy, 2= Seriously
flawed laws, 3= Flaws in law, some enforcement law, 4= Generally good laws, and 5= Protection and
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rather than the actual, de facto, degree of enforcement in the country. In one of the
robustness analyses, we try to correct for the degree of enforcement of patent laws in
the country by using data on the World Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2015b).4
It seems plausible that there is a positive correlation between a country’ governance
strength and IPR protection enforcement. If the governance of a country is completely
ineffective, then de facto IPR protection is likely to be absent regardless of the degree
of protection indicated by the G-P index (i.e. de jure protection). Given that the WGI
consist of six indicators and each indicator ranks the countries on a scale from 0–100,
we take an unweighted average of these six components and divide the final composite
score by 100. This means that we obtain a scaling factor ranging from 0–1, where a
higher value indicates a more effective government and, by assumption, a more effective
enforcement of patent laws. We multiply the scaling factor with the original G-P index
and denote it as the enforcement-adjusted IPR index (IPRe).5 As mentioned, if a
country has perfect governance, the scaling factor would be one meaning that the rules
written down in the book are strictly enforced (IPRe = IPRGP × 1). On the contrary,
if the governance of a country is completely ineffective, the scaling factor is zero and
the enforcement-adjusted IPR index would be zero as well regardless of the value of de
4The World Governance Indicators consist of six indicators: voice and accountability, political stability
and absence of violence, control of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of
law.
5In our sample, the country with the highest composite governance score is Finland (0.98), followed
by Denmark and New Zealand. On the other hand, Somalia, Iraq, and Myanmar have the worst record
of governance in the world.
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jure IPR protection (IPRe = IPRGP × 0). For illustrative purposes, we plot these two
indexes in Figure 5.1 where the left panel shows de jure IPR protection indicated by
the G-P index and the right panel presents de facto IPR protection approximated based
on data on the quality of governance. As shown in the figure, the U.S. has the highest
de jure IPR protection while the Scandinavian countries have the highest de facto IPR
protections.6 Another noticeable feature of Figure 5.1 is that there is a much greater
variation in the enforcement-adjusted index than in the de jure index.
5.2.4 Data on imports
The data on imports are retrieved from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics
Database (UN Comtrade, 2015). The time series of the data spans from 1962-2014 and
the trade commodities are classified by product categories according to three different
versions of the Standard International Trade Classification (i.e. SITC Rev.1, Rev.2,
Rev.3, respectively). Each classification corresponds to a different time span of data
availability.7 Since SITC Rev.1 is too outdated to link products to industries based
on International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC) and data in SITC Rev.3 is
available for a much shorter time span, we opt for the commodity classification based
on SITC Rev.2 at 4-digit for a sample of 119 countries. Given the nature of IPR index
data, the trade data–denominated in U.S. dollars–is also collected every 5 years over
the period 1976-2010.8 Thus, the data used in analysis cover the following years: 1976,
1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010.
The value of the world’s total imports has proliferated between 1976 and 2010. For our
sample of countries, the value has increased by more than 25 times. If countries are
grouped into three different income levels, the low-income countries are found to have
increased their imports value most followed by the middle-income. In addition, among
18 different product categories the imports value has grown most for Communication
equipment, Computing machinery and Pharmaceuticals.
6The correlation between the G-P index and the enforcement-adjusted index is above 0.86. This high
correlation suggests that relying on the standard, de jure, measure of IPR protection is not likely to
lead to a substantial estimation bias, despite the fact that this measure may overstate the true IPR
stringency.
7Trade data classified by SITC Rev.1, Rev.2 and Rev.3 are available, respectively, from 1962, 1976,
and 1988 onwards.
8To increase the number of observations by including the year 1976, it is assumed that the value of
the G-P index in 1976 is the same as in 1975. By doing so, the trade data could then be matched with
the IPR index from 1976 onwards, instead of 1980. As a robustness check, analysis based on the more
restrictive sample is also performed. Results and findings remain consistent (available upon request),
though the exact magnitude of the coefficients differ somewhat.
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5.2.5 R&D intensity across product categories
What is the technology intensity of a product? Standard practice is to trace the R&D
intensity of the industry producing the good as product-level information is generally
not available. Thus, we link products (say computers) to industries (in this case
Office, accounting and computing machinery) and measure the technology intensity
of a product category according to their corresponding industry R&D expenditures.
The industry indicator for R&D intensity is only available at the level of 18 product
groups, together covering all manufacturing products. This data is retrieved from the
OECD STAN Database for Structural Analysis for a sample of 33 countries and over the
period 1987-2009. Industries are classified according to ISIC Revision 3 (ISIC Rev.3)
and the intensity value is calculated as the share of R&D expenditures in total value
added. Thanks to the concordance codes provided by Affendy, Yee and Satoru (2010),
the product categories based on SITC Rev.2 classification can be directly linked to
manufacturing industries classified by ISIC Rev.3.
Given that the variation of R&D intensity in an industry over time is rather limited,
it seems sensible to smooth out the time variation (i.e. RD =
∑
RDt/T). In addition,
we follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) in using the values for the U.S. as the baseline
proxy for the other countries, as the data is generally of a better quality. While the
actual R&D intensity value of a product group differs from country to country, what
really matters is the ranking of product groups based on those intensity values.9 That
is, regardless of the size of the intensity values Pharmaceuticals are likely to be R&D
intensive products relative to other products in other parts of the world just as in the
U.S.; while Textiles, in comparison, will be R&D non-intensive across the globe.
As a robustness check, we also consider using all the data that are available from the
OECD STAN database and take an unweighted average of the R&D intensity values for
the entire sample of OECD countries. Figure 5.2 provides an overview of the distribution
of the product categories with varying degrees of R&D intensity. As anticipated, the
majority of the product categories have a similar ranking between the two indicators
but the size of the intensity values is noticeably smaller in the OECD indicator. For
instance, the R&D intensity value of Computing machinery (industry code C30) of the
OECD indicator is only about half of the value of the U.S. indicator (0.15 versus 0.3).
As will be discussed later, despite the differences in intensity values, results remain
qualitatively consistent.
In addition to using the continuous approach, it is also helpful to consider splitting
9Though relying only on rankings would affect the quantitative implications of our estimates.
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Figure 5.2: Ranking of R&D Intensity by Product Categories
0.1.2.3.4
US R&D Intensity
C33 Medical, precision and optical instruments
C30 Office, accounting and computing machinery
C2423 Pharmaceuticals
C35 Other transport equipment
C32 Radio, television and communication equipment
C34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
C24X Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals
C31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c.
C29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.
C23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
C25 Rubber and plastics products
C26 Other non-metallic mineral products
C27T28 Basic metals and fabricated metal products
C15T16 Food products, beverages and tobacco
C21T22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing
C36T37 Manufacturing n.e.c. and recycling
C17T19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
C20 Wood and products of wood and corkOECD R&D intensity indicator
US R&D intensity indicator
product categories into two major groups: R&D intensive versus R&D non-intensive
as in Ivus (2010). The rationale behind this is the following. If most of the variations
are between the two groups, the magnitude of the effect should then remain similar
to the continuous approach where IPR is interacted with the R&D intensity value of
each product category. However, if product categories are highly heterogeneous, then
treating different product categories as homogeneous in a group is likely to significantly
underestimate the differential effect. As a standard practice, the product groups are
split at the median value of R&D intensity (i.e. C29 in both rankings).
5.3 Empirical results
In this section we discuss the main empirical findings with first results of de jure IPR
protection and its robustness to alternative specifications, followed by a comparison
with the results of de factor IPR protection. By splitting the analysis into different time
periods and dividing importing countries into different income groups, we then study
where is the differential effect mostly concentrated. Finally, we discuss the results of
splitting imports by country of origin.
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5.3.1 Analysis based on the full sample
The results for equation (5.1) using the baseline U.S. R&D intensity indicator and the
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator are presented in the first column of Table 5.2
where the coefficient β is, as anticipated, positive and highly significant. This suggests
that for more R&D intensive products, the impact of more stringent IPR protection is
significantly larger than products that embody little R&D or technology. This coefficient
implies that if a country increases its IPR protection, the imports value will increase
by 22% more for a product category at the 90th percentile of R&D intensity (Office,
accounting and computing machinery) than for products at the 10th percentile (Textiles,
leather and footwear).10
Since a few product categories have very large R&D intensity values, it seems sensible
to check whether the results are driven by any specific product categories. As shown in
the lower panel of Table 5.2, excluding any single product category at a time does not
qualitatively affect the results. There are, however, two product categories that warrant
further explanation, as the exclusion of these two categories affects the magnitude
of the results most significantly. First, after excluding the Pharmaceuticals (C2423)
the size of the differential effect became much more pronounced than the baseline
specification in which all the product categories are pooled together. This increase in the
magnitude seems to imply that imports of Pharmaceuticals may not be that sensitive
to IPR protection as the R&D intensity value predicts. This finding is consistent with
the work of Delgado, Kyle and McGahan (2013) who find that the impact of IPR
protection on imports of Pharmaceuticals is relatively low because merely copying
Pharmaceutical products is not likely to be successful in capturing the market shares
as complementary resources in distribution also play a significant role. In addition,
according to Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) the Pharmaceutical industry relies most
heavily on secrecy in protecting its product innovations rather than patent protection.
In contrast, there is a sizable drop in the magnitude of the differential effect after
excluding Computing machinery (C30). This might be because electronic products are
relatively easier to imitate or copy through reverse engineering. Therefore, relative to
other product categories imports of Computing machinery are particularly sensitive
to changes in IPR protection and leaving it out from the analysis would significantly
weaken the underlying differential effect.
These results remain robust when the alternative OECD R&D intensity indicator is
used for analysis (column 2, Table 5.2). As before, the exclusion of Pharmaceuticals
10This is calculated as: βˆ · (RD90th − RD10th). Plugging in the values, the differential effect of IPR
between these two product categories becomes: 0.718 × (0.316-0.0096)=22%.
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Table 5.2: The Differential Effects of IPR on Imports
(1) (2) (3)
IPR× RDUS IPR× RDOECD IPR×Group
All product categories combined 0.718*** (0.087) 1.689*** (0.251) 0.084*** (0.023)
Excluding
C20 Wood and products of wood 0.882*** (0.085) 2.111*** (0.248)
C17T19 Textiles, leather, footwear 0.800*** (0.089) 1.876*** (0.256)
C36T37 Manufacturing n.e.c. 0.792*** (0.089) 1.862*** (0.255)
C21T22 Paper, printing, publishing 0.702*** (0.091) 1.642*** (0.261)
C15T16 Food, beverage, tobacco 0.635*** (0.089) 1.471*** (0.256) R&D non-intensive
C27T28 Basic and fabricated metal 0.696*** (0.091) 1.626*** (0.258)
C26 Other non-metallic minerals 0.666*** (0.089) 1.550*** (0.257)
C25 Rubber and plastic products 0.723*** (0.087) 1.692*** (0.255)
C23 Coke and petroleum products 0.694*** (0.087) 1.623*** (0.251)
C29 Machinery and equipment 0.692*** (0.088) 1.651*** (0.251)
C31 Electrical machinery 0.713*** (0.088) 1.694*** (0.251)
C24X Chemicals excl. pharms 0.703*** (0.088) 1.667*** (0.252)
C34 Motor vehicles and trailers 0.732*** (0.087) 1.694*** (0.251)
C32 Radio, TV and communication 0.644*** (0.094) 1.475*** (0.274) R&D intensive
C35 Other transport equipment 0.720*** (0.093) 1.650*** (0.253)
C2423 Pharmaceuticals 0.956*** (0.089) 2.868*** (0.247)
C30 Computing machinery 0.455*** (0.089) 0.651** (0.274)
C33 Medical instruments 0.704*** (0.106) 1.577*** (0.260)
Notes: Column (1) uses R&D intensity indicator based on the U.S. values. Column (2) uses the
alternative R&D intensity indicator by taking an unweighted average across all OECD countries and
over the period 1987-2009. Column (3) splits the product categories into two major groups: R&D
intensive versus R&D non-intensive. All specifications include the country-year and the product-year
fixed effects. The model-of-fit, R2, is about 0.93 across all specifications. The number of observations
ranges from a full sample of 11,916 observations to 11,254 observations by omitting one product
category at a time. Standard errors shown in parentheses are heteroskedastic robust to country-industry
clustering. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
leads to a stronger differential effect, and the exclusion of Computing machinery leads
to a significantly weaker effect. Whereas, dropping any other product category one at a
time has modest impact on the quantitative results. Note that the coefficient estimate
β appears to be over twice as large when the OECD intensity indicator is used (1.69
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versus 0.72), but this does not imply that the differential effect of IPR is doubled. Since
the difference-in-differences approach captures a differential effect rather than a main
effect, it is more informative to examine the marginal effect of IPR in relation to the
associated R&D intensity values.
As shown in Figure 5.3 where 18 product categories are denoted by circles or triangles,
depending on the intensity indicator used, the magnitude of the marginal effect remains
very similar between the two intensity indicators.11
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The results also remain qualitatively consistent when product categories are split
into R&D-intensive and R&D non-intensive groups (see column 3 of Table 5.2). The
coefficient remains significantly different from zero and taking the estimate at face
value, this suggests that more stringent IPR protection leads to an 8 percent faster
increase in the value of imports for the R&D-intensive product group than for the R&D
non-intensive group. Comparing this finding to the prior results obtained under the
continuous approach where the differential effect for a R&D intensive product category
and a R&D non-intensive one could be as large as 22 percent, this difference in the
magnitude suggests that omitting product-specific variations in terms of technology
content, as measured by R&D intensity, would drastically underestimate the size
of the differential impact of IPR protection on manufacturing imports. Moreover,
11To be precise, the differential effect for a product category at the 90th percentile of R&D intensity
and one at the 10th percentile, measured by OECD intensity indicator, is approximately 24 percent.
This is very similar to the 22 percent obtained when the U.S. R&D intensity indicator is used.
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as noted earlier the import sensitivities differ highly between Computing machinery
and Pharmaceuticals, even though both of them are classified as R&D intensive
products. Pooling them into one single group could not uncover such large within-group
differences.
5.3.2 Additional analyses
So far, the discussion of the results has been centred around the effect of de jure IPR
protection. In the first column of Table 5.3, we show that the baseline result, from
column (1) of Table 5.2, do not change, both qualitatively and quantitatively, if the
alternative de factor IPR index is used for analysis.12 This suggests that the prior results
obtained under de jure IPR protection are not likely to be biased due to mismeasurement
of the true stringency of IPR protection.
To gain further insights, we split the analysis into different time periods. If imports
of technology-intensive products are truly more sensitive to the stringency of IPR
protection as the theory predicts, it is likely to observe the differential effect to be
more pronounced after 1995, the year in which the world started to rapidly improve
IPR protection as mandated by the TRIPs agreement. The reason for this is that as the
world improves IPR protection, there is a greater incentive to develop new and improved
products that are more technologically-advanced. As a result, the technology content of
the products would increase and therefore the sensitivity to changes in IPR protection is
likely to be higher as well.13 As shown in column (2) of Table 5.3, the differential effect is
present in both pre- and post-TRIPs time periods, suggesting that the qualitative results
are not sensitive to the choice of time intervals. The size of the effect, however, is close
to four times larger in the latter than the former period. This finding seem to support
the notion that the TRIPs agreement enhances trade and it is especially conducive to
trade in knowledge-intensive products. If we divide the sample of importing countries
by income groups (see the Appendix Table 5.4 for the full classification of countries by
income groups), we show that the effect is the highest among middle-income countries,
while there is no significant effect for high-income and low-income countries (column
3, Table 5.3). Since the middle-income countries improved their IPR most during the
period of investigation and the improvement in IPR of high-income and low-income
12The amount of observations decreases because the World Governance Indicators are only available
from 1996 onwards.
13Note, the increase in the technology content of the products does not necessarily mean the technology
intensity, as measured by the share of R&D expenditures in total value added, would increase as well, as
the increase in R&D expenditures is likely to be accompanied by an increase in value added. Moreover,
the increase in technology content of the products is likely to be disproportionately more towards
products that are R&D intensive relative to products that require little R&D.
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Table 5.3: Additional Analyses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IPRe × RDUS IPR× RDUS IPR× RDUS IPRc × RDUS N R2
All combined 0.704*** 7,556 0.929
(0.069)
Pre–TRIPs 0.266** 4,360 0.913
(0.118)
Post–TRIPs 1.010*** 7,556 0.929
(0.093)
Imported by
High-income -0.064 3,150 0.943
(0.243)
Mid-income 0.490*** 5,822 0.896
(0.163)
Low-income 0.098 2,944 0.900
(0.250)
Imports from 0.107
High-income (0.134) 11,145 0.868
Mid-income 0.539*** 11,117 0.818
(0.194)
Low-income 0.251 10,896 0.805
(0.221)
Notes: Column (1) applies the ‘enforcement-adjusted’ IPR index by using data from the World
Governance Indicators. Column (2) splits the analysis into pre-TRIPs and post-TRIPs time periods.
That is, 1976-1990 versus 1995-2010. Column (3) distinguishes importing countries between high-
income, mid-income and low-middle income countries. The distinction is according to 1990 GNP per
capita provided by the World Bank (2011). Column (4) splits the origin of imports into high-income,
low-income and middle-income country groups. All specifications include the country-year and the
product-year fixed effects. Standard errors shown in parentheses are heteroskedastic robust to country-
product clustering. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
countries is relatively modest (see Table 5.1), this seems to imply that it is not the
absolute level of IPR protection that helps countries to import technology-intensive
products but it is the level of protection relative to the other countries.
Since close to 60 percent of the world’s total patent applications originate from high-
income economies (WIPO, 2015), exports from these countries are more likely to have
knowledge embodied than exports from the rest of the world. Thus, it seems probable
that the differential effect should be most prominent for imports sourced from high-
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income countries. In column (4) of Table 5.3, we split imports by the origin of three
different income groups and we find that the differential effect is not present for imports
coming from high-income countries, but only present for imports from middle-income
countries.14 One possible explanation for this could be that the market expansion effect
and the market power effects are cancelled out for imports coming from high-income
economies. This finding, in fact, also resembles one of the results of Awokuse and Yin
(2010) in their analysis of China’ imports. Another possible explanation could also
be that the final production stage (and thus gross exports) of technology-intensive
products are increasingly taking place in middle-income, rather than high-income
countries. International production fragmentation has rapidly increased since the 1990s,
in particular in producing high-tech goods such as machinery and electronics (Timmer
et al., 2014).
5.4 Conclusions
This chapter is the first to rigorously examine whether increased intellectual property
rights (IPR) protection has a larger impact on imports of more R&D-intensive products.
Employing a large panel data and the difference-in-differences approach pioneered by
Rajan and Zingales (1998), we find that the impact of strengthening IPR protection is
significantly stronger for imports of more technology-intensive products. The estimates
imply that more stringent IPR protection leads to an increase in the value of imports
by 22 percent higher for products at the 90th percentile of R&D intensity (Computing
machinery) relative to products at the 10th percentile (Textiles, leather, and footwear).
This finding is robust to alternative measures of R&D intensity of product categories
and to using a modified IPR index that corrects for the potential enforcement bias of
patent protection in the country.
Another major finding of this study is that the product categories are highly
heterogenous in their responsiveness to changes in IPR protection. The dichotomous
approach, i.e. classifying products into technology intensive and non-intensive groups,
used in previous studies (e.g. Ivus, 2010) is unable to reveal such large differences within
the group and is likely to significantly underestimate the magnitude of the differential
effect of IPR on imports.
The differential effect is also found to be more prominent in the post-TRIPs period and
in imports by the middle-income countries. This seems to suggest that by conforming
14This finding remains valid if we split the origin of imports into OECD and non-OECD countries.
Results available upon request.
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to the minimum standards of intellectual property protection set out by the World
Trade Organisation, the middle-income countries have benefited most in importing
technologically advanced products. By splitting the origin of imports into high-, middle-
and low-income countries, we find that the majority of R&D intensive imports do not
originate from high-income countries as one would expect, but they originate from
its own middle-income group of countries. We have argued that this finding could
mean that (1) the market expansion and market power effects are cancelled out for
imports coming from advanced economies; or (2) that the production of some technology
intensive products (e.g. Electronics) increasingly takes place in middle-income, rather
than high-income countries due to international production fragmentation. Irrespective
of the underlying cause, this result seems to imply that by strengthening IPR protection
the middle-income countries have succeeded in attracting more technology-intensive
products from other middle-income countries.
Like most of the previous studies, a major limitation of this chapter is that we cannot
disentangle whether the increase in imports value is due to increase in the quantity of
products traded or in prices of the products. To the extent that the rise in the value of
imports is driven by a higher unit price rather than a larger amount of quantity traded,
we may have erroneously interpreted the presence of market power effect as a market
expansion effect which would harm rather than enhance trade. This is an area for future
research once more detailed data on product-specific prices have become available.
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Table 5.4: List of Countries by Income Groups
High-income Mid-income Low-income
Australia Algeria Malaysia Bangladesh Somalia
Austria Angola Malta Benin Sri Lanka
Belgium Argentina Mauritius Burk. Faso Sudan
Canada Bolivia Mexico Burundi Tanzania
Cyprus Botswana Morocco Cent. Afr. Rep Togo
Denmark Brazil Nicaragua Chad Uganda
Finland Bulgaria P.N. Guinea China Vietnam
France Cameroon Panama Egypt Zambia
Germany Chile Parage Ethiopia
Hong Kong Chile Peru Ghana
Iceland Congo Philippines Guyana
Ireland Costa Rica Poland Haiti
Israel Czech Rep. Portugal Honduras
Italy Dominica Rep. Romania India
Japan Ecuador Russia Indonesia
Luxembourg El Salvador S. Africa kenya
N. Zealand Fiji Saudi Arabia Liberia
Netherlands Gabon Senegal Madagascar
Norway Greece Slovakia Malawi
Singapore Grenada Swaziland Mali
Spain Guatemala Syria Mauritania
Sweden Hungary Thailand Mozambique
Switzerland Iran Trinidad & Tobago Myanmar
Taiwan Iraq Tunisia Nepal
U.K. Ivory Coast Turkey Niger
U.S.A. Jamaica Ukraine Nigeria
Jordan Uruguay Pakistan
Korea Venezuela Rwanda
Lithuania Zimbabwe Sierra Leone
Notes: The classification of the income groups is according to the ranking provided by the World Bank
(2011) for year 1990. Countries with income per capita less than $610 are classified as low-income, the
income range for the mid-income countries is between $611 and $7,620, and high-income countries are





















Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Het begrijpen van de drijvers van economische groei en inkomensverschillen tussen de
landen is een kerngebied van economisch onderzoek. Sinds het neoklassieke groeimodel
werd ontwikkeld door Solow (1956) en Swan (1956) hebben economen geprobeerd om
onderscheid te maken tussen twee ogenschijnlijke oorzaken van de economische groei
en inkomensverschillen: factor accumulatie en totale factor productiviteit (TFP). TFP
duidt de verschillen in productie aan nadat rekening is gehouden met verschillend
gebruik van productiefactoren zoals arbeid en fysiek kapitaal. De heersende aanname
dat TFP het grootste deel van de economische groei en de inkomensverschillen tussen
landen verklaart wordt op de proef gesteld want de moderne economie, gekenmerkt
door het wijdverbreide gebruik van informatie- en communicatietechnologie (ICT),
verandert snel. ICT faciliteert talrijke complementaire innovaties die de productiviteit
verhogen door vermindering van kosten, ontwikkeling van nieuwe producten, of de
verbetering van de immateriële aspecten van de bestaande producten (Brynjolfsson
en Hitt, 2000). Als gevolg hiervan zijn de bedrijfsinvesteringen in de traditionele
activa, zoals machines en gebouwen, minder belangrijk geworden. In plaats daarvan
worden steeds meer middelen verschoven naar investeringen in op kennis gebaseerde
immateriële activa, zoals productontwerp, marketing, research en development (R&D)
en managementpraktijken, die steeds meer worden gezien als de belangrijkste bronnen
van waardecreatie voor ondernemingen. Volgens Hulten (2010) valt de waarde van
sommige wereldwijde toonaangevende bedrijven, zoals Microsoft, grotendeels toe te
schrijven aan zijn immaterie¨le activa. De stijgende trend in deze nieuwe soorten
investeringen suggereert dat de standaard empirische analyse van economische groei
op basis van de traditionele productiefactoren (d.w.z. arbeid en fysiek kapitaal) een
belangrijk deel van de investeringen in de 21e eeuw mist en daarom niet meer geschikt












In het afgelopen decennium is er een nieuwe literatuur ontstaan die als doelstelling heeft
om de manier waarop bedrijfsactiviteiten worden beschreven in de macro-economische
gegevens en analyses te veranderen. Dit wordt gedaan door een verbreding van het
investeringsconcept boven de uitgaven aan fysieke activa. Er wordt gesteld dat zolang
huidige middelen worden aangewend om te voorzien in toekomstige in plaats van huidige
consumptie, dan moeten al deze uitgaven, hetzij aan materie¨le of immaterie¨le activa,
worden gekapitaliseerd en opgenomen in het bruto binnenlands product (bbp) van een
land als de bedrijfsinvesteringen (Corrado, Hulten en Sichel, 2005). Dit argument won
aan populariteit onder wetenschappers en leidde uiteindelijk tot de ontwikkeling van een
brede regeling voor het categoriseren en het meten door het bedrijfsleven immaterie¨le
investeringen zodat ze kunnen worden opgenomen in de nationale rekeningen van een
land.
Ondanks de behaald vooruitgang in het afgelopen decennium, moet er nog veel worden
gedaan om de rol van immaterieel kapitaal in de moderne economische groei beter
te begrijpen. Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan dit zich snel ontwikkelende gebied van
onderzoek door middel van vier nieuwe studies die elk een ander aspect van immaterieel
kapitaal belichten.
Hoofdstuk twee bestudeert het potentie¨le spillover effect van immaterieel kapitaal. In
het geval van R&D zijn dergelijke effecten al lang bekend (Bloom, Schankerman en Van
Reenen, 2013; Griliches, 1992). Echter, investeringen in R&D zijn niet de enige bron van
kennis-spillovers tussen ondernemingen. Recent onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat kennis-
spillovers ook kunnen voortkomen uit een brede set van niet-R&D immaterie¨le activa,
met behulp van data op industrie niveau (Goodridge, Haskel en Wallis, 2012a) of data
over de gehele economie (Corrado, Haskel en Jona-Lasinio, 2014). Geen eerder onderzoek
heeft zich gericht op de mogelijke spillover van investeringen in het zogenaamde
organisatie kapitaal, de kennis van management know-how en organisatiestructuren
op bedrijfsniveau. Dit ondanks het feit dat het niveau van de onderneming het meest
geschikt is voor het analyseren van spillovers, want schattingen op het niveau van
de industrie of de hele economie kunnen geen onderscheid maken tussen produc-
tiviteitswinst van eigen investeringen en spillovers van andere bedrijven. Een gepast
voorbeeld van een dergelijke spillover is Toyota’s just-in-time productieproces, dat
zich heel snel heeft verspreid naar andere autofabrikanten (Liker en Morgan, 2006).
Een ander voorbeeld van de verspreiding van de managementkennis is het build-to-
order (BTO) distributiesysteem dat is bedacht door Dell Computers, maar dat werd
gekopieerd door veel andere bedrijven zoals BMW (Gunasekaran en Ngai, 2005).
We volgen de micro-economische literatuur (Eisfeldt en Papanikolaou, 2013) en maken
gebruik van de verkoop, algemene en administratieve kosten op de winst- en verlies-
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rekening van een bedrijf als benadering voor de investeringen in organisatie kapitaal. Wij
verwachten dat bedrijven meer kans hebben om te profiteren van de investeringen van
bedrijven met vergelijkbare technologische eigenschappen, terwijl hun winstgevendheid
waarschijnlijk het meest te lijden heeft van investeringen in organisatie kapitaal door
naaste concurrenten. We volgen de methodologie van Bloom, Schankerman en Van
Reenen (2013) voor de empirische analyse. Op basis van een grote steekproef van
bedrijfsrekeningen voor 1266 Amerikaanse productiebedrijven over de periode 1982-
2011, hebben we geen bewijs gevonden van kennis-spillovers van organisatie kapitaal die
de productiviteit of de marktwaarde van technologisch vergelijkbare bedrijven verhogen.
Dit gebrek aan bewijs is in tegenspraak met recente studies van Goodridge et al. (2012a)
en Corrado et al. (2014), die wel bewijs vonden voor dergelijke spillovers op basis van
meer geaggregeerde data. Gezien deze verschillen in bevindingen beargumenteren wij
dat kennis-spillovers waarschijnlijk niet voortkomen uit organisatie kapitaal maar uit
andere immaterie¨le activa.
In hoofdstuk drie analyseren we de potentie¨le complementaire relatie tussen
investeringen in ICT en immaterie¨le activa. Deze relatie is bestudeerd in micro-
economische studies voor Amerikaanse bedrijven (Bloom et al., 2012). Het is echter
nauwelijks bekend of deze relatie kan worden gegeneraliseerd naar het macro-economisch
niveau, want vergelijkbare informatie over immaterie¨le investeringen op het niveau van
de industrie was lange tijd niet beschikbaar voor de meeste landen. Deze vraag is niet
alleen interessant op zichzelf, maar het kan ook belangrijk zijn om beter te begrijpen
waarom Europa een tragere groei van de productiviteit heeft ervaren dan de VS sinds
het midden van de jaren 1990. Voorafgaande studies van Basu et al. (2004) en Corrado
et al. (2014) zijn twee eerste pogingen tot een macro-economische analyse. We dragen
verder bij aan deze literatuur door gebruik te maken van recente ontwikkelde gegevens
over immaterie¨le investeringen op industrie-niveau, die een nuttige bron van variatie
vormen en daarom kunnen helpen de complementaire relatie tussen immaterie¨le activa
en ICT vast te stellen
We onderzoeken of een toename van immaterieel kapitaal de productiviteit sterker
verhoogt in ICT-intensieve industriee¨n dan in industriee¨n die weinig ICT gebruiken.
Deze analyse is gebaseerd op de difference-in-differences methode ontwikkeld door Rajan
en Zingales (1998). We gebruiken de data geconstrueerd door Niebel, O’Mahony en
Saam (2013) voor een set van tien Europese landen en elf bedrijfstakken over de periode
1995-2007. De resultaten laten zien dat de productie elasticiteit van immaterieel kapitaal
significant groter is voor ICT intensieve industriee¨n. Door verder onderscheid te maken
tussen de verschillende soorten immaterie¨le activa, tonen we ook aan dat alleen R&D
en organisatie kapitaal een hogere productie elasticiteit in ICT-intensieve industriee¨n
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vertonen. Dit is consistent met een groot deel van de eerdere analyses op bedrijfsniveau
(Brynjolfsson en Hitt., 2003; Polder, Leeuwen, Mohnen en Raymond, 2010).
In hoofdstuk vier wordt nader onderzoek gedaan naar de rol van immaterieel kapitaal
in het verklaren van internationale inkomensverschillen. Deze studie is nieuw omdat de
bestaande literatuur voornamelijk is gericht op de rol van het traditionele materieel
kapitaal (Caselli, 2005; Easterly en Levine, 2001; Hsieh en Klenow, 2010; Hall en Jones,
1999). Het lijkt aannemelijk dat rijkere landen meer investeren in immaterie¨le activa,
waardoor het voor een deel de inkomensvariatie tussen landen kan verklaren.
De analyse in dit hoofdstuk is gebaseerd op een nieuw ontwikkelde database over
immaterie¨le investeringen die consistent en internationaal vergelijkbaar is voor een
steekproef van 60 economiee¨n. Met deze nieuwe database laten we zien dat het aandeel
van de investeringen in immaterie¨le activa in het bbp is gestegen tussen 1995 en
2011. Daarnaast is er een sterk positief verband tussen de mate van economische
ontwikkeling van een land en zijn investeringsintensiteit in immaterie¨le activa. Door
immaterieel kapitaal als een extra productiefactor toe te voegen aan de analyse kunnen
we een aanzienlijk groter deel van de variatie in inkomen tussen landen verklaren dan
voorheen. Afhankelijk van de aannames met betrekking tot de productie elasticiteit van
de productiefactoren kunnen de waargenomen verschillen in immaterieel kapitaal tot
16 procentpunten meer van de inkomensvariatie verklaren. Deze bevinding is consistent
met de voorgaande studies die vinden dat immaterieel kapitaal belangrijk is voor de
groei van een land over de tijd (Corrado et al., 2009;. Fukao et al., 2009). In beide
gevallen is de rol van TFP kleiner zodra er rekening gehouden wordt met immaterieel
kapitaal.
In hoofdstuk vijf bestuderen we in welke mate de bescherming van intellectuele
eigendomsrechten gebruikt kan worden als instrument door landen met een laag
tempo van investeringen in immaterie¨le activa om kennisintensieve producten via de
internationale handel aan te trekken. We benaderen de technologische inhoud van
een ge¨ımporteerd product door de mate waarin de oorsprong-industrie investeert in
R&D. Daarna volgen we de bredere literatuur om de mate van bescherming van
intellectuele eigendomsrechten van een land te meten met behulp van de index scores
opgesteld door Ginarte en Park (1997). Om de differentie¨le effecten van de bescherming
van intellectuele eigendomsrechten over productcategoriee¨n vast te stellen met een
verschillende mate van technologie intensiteit, passen we opnieuw de difference-in-
differences methode toe zoals in hoofdstuk drie. Met behulp van invoergegevens voor
een steekproef van 119 landen over de periode 1976-2010 laten we zien dat de impact
van de bescherming van intellectuele eigendomsrechten op de invoer significant sterker is
voor meer kennisintensieve goederen. Meer specifiek, een verhoging van het niveau van
i
i
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bescherming van intellectuele eigendomsrechten leidt tot een 22 procent snellere stijging
van de waarde van de invoer van producten in het 90e percentiel van de R&D-intensiteit
dan voor producten in het 10e percentiel.
i
i
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